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This thesis extends an approach to justice grounded in the idea of agreement between equals 
to the question of justice between generations. Taking as its starting point the claim that 
distributive principles should be justifiable to all who will be subject to them – in this case, 
those who comprise the present and future generations – it begins by identifying two issues 
which militate against the extension of this method to the intergenerational context: the non-
identity problem and the mutuality problem. In order to overcome the non-identity problem I 
appeal to – and defend – the claim that it is possible to wrong future people without necessarily 
harming them: from this, it can be inferred that we have humanitarian obligations toward future 
generations, by virtue of their status as rights-bearers. I then begin my discussion of the 
mutuality problem with a critical assessment of the idea of a universal contract with 
transgenerational scope. Despite rejecting this approach, I suggest that it captures certain 
fundamental intuitions that we have toward future generations, which complement an analysis 
grounded in indirect reciprocity. In this way, the mutuality problem comes to occupy a position 
of centrality within the thesis. To resolve it, I expound a theory of intergenerational mutuality 
which, I argue, allows the intergenerational context to be analysed as a collective action 
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1. Contractualism and Intergenerational Justice 
 
 
Over the course of the past fifty years, the idea of distributive justice has come to occupy a 
position of pre-eminence within political philosophy. This, in large part, is a direct consequence 
of John Rawls's utilisation of the concept in his seminal 1971 work A Theory of Justice. For 
Rawls, justice is understood to be the 'first virtue of social institutions', and so his enquiry is 
directed toward specifying a set of distributive principles to regulate what he terms 'the basic 
structure of society' – that is to say, those major institutions which 'distribute fundamental 
rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation.'1 The 
success of A Theory of Justice therefore gave rise to a series of broader debates about the 
appropriate way of arranging these institutions. At the same time, the concept has an obvious 
resonance with many of the foremost issues within twentieth-century political discourse: 
discussions around minority rights, the distribution of income and wealth, or the expansion of 
social security programmes are, at heart, debates over how major social institutions should 
apportion the benefits and burdens of cooperation at the societal level. So much to say, then, 
that the idea of distributive justice can be readily applied to some of the most salient issues 
within contemporary politics – and that this goes some way to explaining the ongoing 
philosophical interest in the concept. Supposing that this is the case, though, it raises obvious 
questions about whether or not considerations of this nature are equally applicable to those 
problems which are unique to our present circumstances. Indeed, I would want to argue that 
some of the most exigent questions being asked of electorates and policymakers in the early 
twenty-first century are structurally dissimilar from those of recent history. This is because 
rather than involving our contemporaries, they turn upon the rights and interests of future 
                                                        




generations. The most obvious – and urgent – example of this concerns anthropogenic climate 
change, but wider questions of demography and resource conservation also enjoy increased 
significance. With this in mind, it is worth noting that most enquiries into the way that major 
institutions distribute the benefits and burdens of social cooperation tend to focus explicitly on 
relations between contemporaries. In light of issues such as climate change, we therefore need 
to consider whether the simple fact that the affected parties are spread out over time is 
significant from the standpoint of distributive justice. And if, as I believe, it is, we need to 
address the concomitant issue of how we might incorporate these intergenerational concerns 
into our deliberations. 
 
This thesis attempts to extend an approach to justice grounded in the idea of agreement between 
equals to the question of justice between generations. To be more specific, it takes as its starting 
point the claim that distributive principles should be justifiable to all who will be subject to 
them – in this case, those who comprise the present and future generations. This is characteristic 
of a contractualist approach to questions of distributive justice. In seeking to apply this to the 
question of justice between generations, I identify two problems which militate against its 
extension to the intergenerational context: the non-identity problem and the mutuality problem. 
To summarise, the non-identity problem poses a general challenge to the idea that persons 
ought to be the fundamental units of moral concern. Among other things, it therefore casts 
doubt upon the idea that interpersonal justification can be used to specify principles of 
intergenerational justice. By way of contrast, the mutuality problem is specific to 
contractualism and concerns the role of mutually advantageous social cooperation within the 
theory as a whole. On a standard contractualist reading, the question of justice arises in 
response to the need to regulate the distribution of the benefits and burdens associated with this 




context – most notably, the fact that generations are spread out over time – seem to rule out 
interaction of this sort. This thesis is therefore concerned with providing a contractualist 
response to both of these problems. My overarching goal is to arrive at an account of our 
distributive obligations toward future generations which is grounded in a conception of indirect 
reciprocity – and informed by an underlying theory of intergenerational mutuality. To that end, 
this introductory chapter serves to elucidate these two challenges to the contractualist position 
in greater detail. Prior to that, though, we first need to attend to certain preliminary issues. 
Consequently, this chapter will begin by discussing three fundamental distinctions in how we 
might conceive of the problem of intergenerational justice. By separating the intergenerational 
context out in this way, I intend to delimit the scope of this enquiry whilst giving some 
indication of the goals and objectives of the project as a whole. Subsequently, I will explicate 
the contractualist approach, and provide a qualified endorsement of it. From there, it will be 
possible to examine the problems encountered when attempting to extend this approach to the 
question of justice between generations: the non-identity problem and the mutuality problem. 
Finally, I will provide an indication of how I intend to respond to these two challenges and 




A diverse range of separate – and, at times, unrelated – issues can be grouped together under 
the broader question of justice between generations. It would therefore be appropriate to begin 
by giving some indication of the scope and nature of this enquiry. With this in mind, it would 
be helpful to draw three fundamental distinctions between differing approaches to the subject 
of intergenerational justice. The first of these relates to the contemporaneity of the parties: are 




second concerns whether we conceive of our obligations as being owed to past or future 
generations. So, we might understand the question of intergenerational justice to be about our 
antecedents, and the extent to which we should be willing to memorialise their achievements 
or redress historical injustices that they were responsible for. Conversely, our deliberations 
may be directed toward the interests and prospects of future generations. Then, in addition, we 
can subdivide the issues that might arise in either context into those which affect coexistent 
generations and those where relevant parties are spread out over time. Finally, we can approach 
the subject of what is owed to future generations at either the global or domestic levels. At this 
juncture, it is worth emphasising that the principal focus of this enquiry will be on what is owed 
to non-contemporaneous future generations at the domestic level. In elaborating on these 
distinctions, I therefore hope to offer a justification for focusing on this aspect of the 
intergenerational realm. At the same time, though, examining these points of divergence will 
serve to bring certain unique characteristics of the intergenerational context into focus. In this 
way, these three initial distinctions underpin the wider project and prepare the ground for later 




The distinction between discrete and contemporaneous intergenerational concerns is a direct 
consequence of generational overlap. Simply put, at any point in time members of at least three 
generations will coexist. This fact gives rise to what I term ‘soft’ problems of intergenerational 
justice. That is to say those disputes which obtain between contemporaries, but where 
membership of a specific generational cohort is understood to be a source of inequity. So, to 
give a contemporary example, most developed nations are currently having to shoulder specific 




generational cohort – those born in the mid-twentieth century baby boom – are approaching 
and entering into old age. Consequently, societies are facing a significant decline in the size of 
their working-age populations whilst having to meet the costs associated with an ageing 
population: healthcare, pensions, and so on. All things being equal, then, earlier generations 
will be required to make greater sacrifices than their predecessors, and this may be a source of 
injustice. Similar considerations can be brought to bear on the problem of global warming when 
considered from the perspective of those younger generations whose life prospects will be 
affected by our actions in the present. As before, the fact of being born into an earlier generation 
gives us the ability to shape the opportunities and conditions that our proximate descendants 
will face. Notice, however, that potential injustices can arise in the opposite direction: if, for 
instance, later generations were to neglect the rights and interests of their retired predecessors, 
then it would clearly be inequitable. Indeed, an implicit assumption within the debate over how 
to finance the pensions and care of the baby boomer generation in old age is that later 
generations have justice-based obligations toward the elderly; the issue is how to reconcile 
these with historical contingencies which threaten to make them unduly onerous. Instead, what 
is at play in all of these examples – and what distinguishes them from the kind of disputes that 
might obtain between contemporaries at the intragenerational level – is that at a particular time 
each generation finds itself in a position of power over others, and this raises the prospect of 
that power being abused. This is evident in the case of global warming, where the present 
generation are tasked with making decisions which will have profound consequences for their 
successors. Similarly, though, the charge that younger generations are having unjust burdens 
visited on them by those approaching retirement depends, at least in part, on the claim that their 




saving.2 The idea, then, is that this kind of relationship – in which one generation is able to 
exert a disproportionate level of influence over the prospects of another – is distinct from 
anything which obtains at the intragenerational level. The question of intergenerational justice 
may, therefore, arise in the context of relations between contemporaries belonging to different 
generational cohorts. 
 
We can, however, conceive of intergenerational justice in terms of non-overlapping 
generations, where the relevant parties belong to entirely discrete cohorts. This has particular 
relevance to issues such as global warming, whose costs will also be borne by people who are 
as yet unborn. Equally, though, considerations of this nature may arise when contemplating 
our obligations and duties toward our deceased forebears. The first thing to say, then, is that 
this dimension of the intergenerational realm involves parties who, at the time of deliberation, 
do not exist in any corporeal form. Indeed, in its purest articulation, problems of this nature 
involve parties whose lifespans will never overlap – and so, the question of them coexisting at 
some point in time does not arise. In this sense, relations between non-contemporaneous 
generations would appear to be radically different from anything that obtains between 
concurrent generations. On the one hand, our ability to exercise power over earlier generations 
is limited in this context due to them being deceased: we can choose whether to honour or 
traduce their posthumous reputations, continue or abandon their projects, and so on, but we 
cannot affect their life prospects. On the other, our ability to exert influence over future 
generations is vast: not only can we affect their circumstances and life prospects, but we can 
also determine their composition – by affecting, through our actions and omissions, how many 
people are born and their specific identities. The power relations which characterise 
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interactions between non-contemporaneous generations therefore possess features which are 
dissimilar to those which obtain between contemporaries. Indeed, within the wider literature, 
relations between past, present, and future generations are generally understood to turn upon 
an unavoidable asymmetry.3 That is to say that the disparity in powers between ourselves, our 
forebears, and our successors is an inevitable feature of the relationship between discrete 
generations. So, our predecessors were able to exercise a degree of influence over our 
circumstances which is broadly comparable to the power that we have with respect to future 
generations. Similarly, our ability to affect the posthumous interests of prior generations is 
equivalent to the power that our descendants have over the projects and concerns that we will 
entrust to them. Consequently, relations between discrete generations will never be on an 
equivalent basis, since we cannot improve the prospects of earlier generations or do anything 
to further the posthumous interests of our successors. In this regard, there is an obvious contrast 
to be drawn between this state of affairs and the possibilities for interaction between 
contemporaneous generations, where like-for-like cooperation can occur. If, for instance, an 
earlier overlapping generation has behaved well toward their successors, than their descendants 
can make a return in kind – by, say, providing for them in their retirement; such methods of 
requital are simply not available to discrete generational cohorts. For reasons which will soon 
become clear, I refer to this as the ‘hard’ problem of intergenerational justice, in contrast to 
those ‘softer’ problems which arise between contemporaneous generations.  
 
With these two aspects of the intergenerational context outlined, it is now possible to offer a 
brief justification for focusing on the problem of justice between non-overlapping generations. 
To summarise, the principal distinction between these two approaches to the question of 
                                                        
3. E.g., Jane English, ‘Justice Between Generations’, Philosophical Studies 31 (1977): 91-104 pp. 96-8; Brian 
Barry, ‘Justice Between Generations’ in Liberty and Justice: Essays in Political Theory 2 (Oxford: Clarendon 




intergenerational justice and their intragenerational analogue relate to the temporal distance 
between the parties and the effect that this has on the way in which they interact. So, at the 
intragenerational level, the relevant parties find themselves in a broadly symmetrical 
relationship: if they choose to cooperate, then everyone will stand to gain at the same time and 
in the same way. By way of comparison, relations between non-contemporaneous generations 
are wholly asymmetrical: the fact of being spread out across time militates against any like-
for-like cooperation and restricts the forms of interaction which are possible. Finally, the 
relationship between coexistent generations sits somewhere in the middle: although they can 
cooperate directly, their interactions are characterised by disparities in power, with exchanges 
taking place over time and involving qualitatively different goods – as in the case of older 
generations receiving benefits in old age in return for their historical exertions. We can, then, 
conceive of relations becoming increasingly asymmetrical as the parties in question become 
more remote, up until the point of their being entirely non-contemporaneous. The necessarily 
asymmetric relationship between past, present, and future generations is, therefore, the feature 
that distinguishes the intergenerational context from the perspective of distributive justice. The 
first reason for focusing on discrete generations, then, is to address this property of the 
intergenerational realm directly. Indeed, it is for this reason that I refer to the question of what 
is owed to non-contemporaneous generations as the ‘hard’ problem of intergenerational justice, 
as against those ‘soft’ problems which obtain between coexistent generations. Quite simply, 
the ‘hard’ problem takes those features which differentiate the question of justice between 
generations from that of justice between contemporaries and examines them in isolation. By 
concentrating on the radical asymmetry which characterises relations between non-overlapping 
generations, I therefore hope to arrive at an account which has applications to both aspects of 
the intergenerational realm. There is, however, a second reason for focusing on non-




climate change. To give an illustrative example, although a majority of the carbon dioxide 
being emitted today will be absorbed by the ocean within a matter of centuries, an appreciable 
quantity will remain in the atmosphere for thousands of years.4 Indeed, this dovetails with a 
wider concern around what Stephen Gardiner has referred to as intergenerational ‘time bombs’. 
That is to say, policies whose costs are only realised by our non-overlapping descendants.5 
There is, then, an obvious need to extend any enquiry into the nature of justice between 
generations beyond the contemporaneous level. This, when combined with the explicatory 
potential of a comprehensive response to the ‘hard’ problem therefore provide the rationale for 




The second distinction follows directly from the first, and, in particular, the dissimilar powers 
that we have with respect to past and future generations: to the extent that we have obligations 
toward them, they are going to differ in content and hinge upon separate concerns. Our 
obligations to posterity, for instance, are predicated on our ability to affect their interests and 
prospects. Indeed, it is for this reason that issues such as climate change and resource depletion 
have gained such traction within contemporary political discourse: they turn upon our ability 
to bring about palpable change in the circumstances visited on future people. By way of 
contrast, our duties to prior generations are primarily concerned with the relationship between 
the present generation and its forebears. So, when confronted with a historical injustice, the 
present generation is unable to affect the welfare of their ancestors; instead, the object of their 
deliberations will be a symbolic act of restitution, designed to restore the posthumous 
                                                        
4. See, e.g., David Archer el al., ‘Atmospheric lifetime of fossil fuel carbon dioxide’, Annual Review of Earth 
and Planetary Sciences 37 (2009): 117-34. 
5. Stephen M. Gardiner, ‘A Contract on Future Generations?’ in Intergenerational Justice eds. Axel Gosseries 




reputations of those afflicted. Similarly, when considering whether or not to continue the 
projects of our ancestors, or memorialise their achievements, we are attempting to determine 
the extent to which the interests and rights that they had in life endure into the present. At this 
point, it is worth acknowledging that the question of what might be owed to former generations 
is often at its most salient when it relates to an existing injustice – as in the case of the historical 
institution of slavery and its legacy of racial inequality. It is, however, entirely plausible that 
obligations of this nature could arise without any corresponding contemporary issues – as in 
the case of a putative responsibility to honour the achievements of our predecessors. We are, 
then, attending to separate concerns when addressing the question of what is owed to past and 
future generations. In the case of our predecessors, their being dead prevents us from being 
able to affect their life prospects; we may, however, be able to benefit them by furthering the 
projects and interests that they had in life. Conversely, our actions and omissions in the present 
will have profound consequences for the prospects of future generations. We can, therefore, 
say that although comparable concerns motivate the question of what is owed to past and future 
generations, different things are at stake in either: consequently, it is helpful to distinguish one 
from the other. 
 
Having brought this further distinction to bear on the question of intergenerational justice, it is 
now possible to provide a rationale for focusing on what is owed to future generations. Prior 
to doing so, though, I would want to emphasise that it would be a mistake to conceive of these 
two issues as being wholly unconnected; indeed, in Chapters Four and Five, I will argue that 
there is an interdependence between our obligations to past and future generations. Instead, 
this distinction would be better thought of as a device which allows us to focus on those features 
of the intergenerational context which have particular relevance to this enquiry. To that end, 




investigation into our obligations toward our predecessors, or a general one encompassing both 
past and future generations. Firstly, the idea of distributive justice is more readily applicable to 
the problem of justice between the present generation and its successors. It is, for instance, 
possible to arrive at an account of what is owed to posterity by conceiving of the problem in 
terms of benefits and burdens which need to be allocated in an equitable manner. By way of 
contrast, although there is a distributive component in our obligations toward earlier 
generations, this method of analysis cannot provide a comprehensive account of our duties to 
our forebears. To elaborate on this, consider the claim that the present generation should seek 
to make reparations to the descendants of slaves. In that instance, a historical injustice is 
understood to engender distributive obligations in the present. Notice, though, that these 
obligations arise from the demands of corrective or restorative justice, rather than an explicit 
concern with the distribution of benefits and burdens across a society. In other words, even 
though a policy of reparations would have distributive consequences, its stated aim would 
either be to rectify historical wrongs or to promote reconciliation and seek atonement for past 
injustices.6 So much to say, then, that a thorough account of our obligations to prior generations 
would have to extend beyond the confines of a distributive analysis; to the extent that this 
enquiry is concerned with distributive justice, this represents a reason to concentrate on 
relations between the present generation and its successors. The second rationale for focusing 
on future generations relates to the two problems that emerge when attempting to extend the 
contract approach to the intergenerational context: simply put, they are more acute when 
considered from the perspective of future generations. There are, for instance, disturbing 
implications when the non-identity problem is applied to our relationship with prior 
generations: most obviously, the inference that, by virtue of our having worthwhile lives, we 
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are beneficiaries of those historical wrongdoings carried by our forebears – without which, we 
would not exist. However, the intuitions at play in the non-identity cases are more apparent 
when considering what we owe to future generations: the key move in Parfit’s argument against 
the person-affecting view is to demonstrate that it leads to perverse conclusions regarding our 
conduct toward posterity.7 By focusing on the question of what is owed to future generations, 
we can therefore subject the contractualist position to greater levels of scrutiny. The third and 
final reason for taking our obligations to succeeding generations as the subject of this enquiry 
follows directly from the second: in addition to posing a bigger conceptual problem to the 
contract approach, there is simply more at stake in the question of what we owe to posterity. 
In saying this, it should be noted that our relationship to past generations is of considerable 
political importance – not least in terms of how a society conceives of itself. However, our 
ability to determine the prospects and composition of future generations, in conjunction with 
the urgency of issues such as climate change, makes the question of what we owe to future 
generations a singularly arresting political and philosophical problem. Indeed, given the 
exigent need to incorporate the rights and interests of future people into contemporary policy 
decisions, this aspect of the intergenerational context has particular relevance to any theory of 
distributive justice. In summation, then, the question of what is owed to future generations 
raises issues pertaining to the distribution of benefits and burdens across a society and 
possesses sufficient gravity to necessitate consideration from the perspective of justice. More 
pointedly, it intensifies those problems encountered when attempting to extend the contract 
approach to the intergenerational context. Consequently, by focusing on relations between the 
present generation and their successors, we can scrutinise the coherence and cogency of 
contractualism as a response to the question of intergenerational justice. 
 
                                                        




iii) Institutional Scope 
 
The third, and final distinction reflects the institutional scope of any enquiry, and whether or 
not the question of what is owed to future generations will be understood on a global or a 
domestic basis. To elaborate, we can approach issues such as climate change from the 
perspective of their global impact or from the standpoint of specific countries. The same is true 
within discussions of intergenerational justice. It may, for instance, be the case that we have 
special obligations toward our direct institutional successors. At the same time, though, many 
of the issues which motivate an interest in intergenerational justice are particularly exigent and 
acute when viewed at the international level. In addition to this, questions can be raised as to 
how one set of obligations might relate to one another: if, for instance, there were a conflict 
between our humanitarian obligations to the global poor and those which obtain within 
domestic institutions, then we need to some means of resolving it. At their heart, these 
discussions turn upon the question of how specific distributive obligations are triggered. If, for 
example, we were to hold that the full demands of justice were owed to people as such, then 
the distinction between global, domestic, intra–, and intergenerational justice would dissolve. 
By way of contrast, it may be the case that we have relatively strong distributive obligations at 
the global level and weaker ones in the intergenerational context – and vice versa. 
Consequently, any enquiry into justice between generations has to specify its institutional 
scope: is the resultant theory to be implemented at the global level, or are its findings limited 
to the domestic level? 
 
With the distinction outlined, it is now possible to state that this enquiry will be limited to the 




arrive at a theory of intergenerational justice by building on the existing Rawlsian framework. 
There is, then, a strong reason to delimit the scope of this enquiry to the domestic context on 
the grounds that it is from this perspective that Rawls approaches the question of justice 
between generations.8 Secondly, there is an extensive and varied literature concerning the 
application of Rawlsian contractualism to the international-cum-global context: to attempt to 
incorporate this into an enquiry concerning justice between generations would do a disservice 
to the complexity and scope of that debate.9 Instead, my hope would be that elements of this 
thesis can be brought to bear on theories in that field to elucidate our obligations to future 
generations at the global level. The decision to focus on the domestic level therefore serves to 
restrict the scope of our enquiry in such a way as to allow for a more detailed analysis of the 
contract method within the intergenerational context. 
 
To recap, then, limiting the scope of this enquiry to non-contemporaneous future generations 
serves two main purposes. Firstly, it allows us to focus on those features which ultimately 
distinguish the intergenerational setting from its intragenerational analogue – most obviously, 
the asymmetric relationship between past, present, and future generations. Secondly, it 
exacerbates those problems which militate against the extension of the contract method to the 
intergenerational context. By concentrating on the relationship between the present generation 
and its discrete successors, then, we can address those issues that problematise the 
intergenerational realm for theories of justice generally, and contractualism specifically. And 
finally, directing our enquiry toward the question of what is owed to future generations at the 
domestic level enables a more rigourous analysis of Rawlsian contractualism within the 
                                                        
8. Rawls, Theory pp. 251-2. 
9 See, e.g., Michael Blake and Patrick Smith, ‘International Distributive Justice’, The Stanford Encylopedia of 






intergenerational context. Having dealt with these preliminary matters, it is now possible to 
offer an explication of contractualism as an approach to the question of distributive justice.  
 
1.2 The Contract Approach 
 
During the second half of the twentieth century, a number of approaches to questions of 
moral and political justification began to coalesce around the notion of mutual agreement as 
the basis of our obligations toward others. By and large, these theories were envisaged as 
correctives to utilitarianism and the aggregative tendencies within it.10 In this context, the 
metaphor of contract is enlisted to describe an initial agreement between parties understood 
to be equal participants in some form of cooperative endeavour. The moral and political 
principles selected in this way therefore derive a great deal of intuitive appeal from their 
ability to gain assent in conditions of equality. Indeed, as Stephen Darwall notes, morality is 
'deeply implicated in the very notion of agreement, and vice versa.'11 Put another way, the 
very fact that rational parties would agree to the terms of cooperation specified by this 
method gives them appreciable moral standing. The modern contract tradition therefore 
attempts to specify moral or political principles on the grounds of their acceptability to 
rational parties in ideal circumstances. To give a proper account of this approach we will, 
then, need to examine the nature of this initial agreement along with the cooperative venture 
it seeks to regulate. Before that, though, a distinction needs to be drawn between the two 
main intellectual currents within the contemporary contract approach: contractarianism and 
contractualism. 
 
                                                        
10 Rawls, Theory p. 24; David Gauthier, Practical Reasoning: The Structure and Foundations of Prudential and 
Moral Arguments and Their Exemplification in Discourse (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963) p. 126. 




i. Contractarianism and contractualism 
 
The contract approach therefore seeks to justify a set of moral or political obligations on the 
grounds of their mutual acceptability to equal parties in idealised conditions. It is, however, 
possible to distinguish two radically different interpretations of what such an agreement 
would look like. On one account, known as contractarianism the parties to any agreement are 
taken to be fundamentally self-interested. Accordingly, they will agree to terms of 
cooperation which maximise their interests and reject those which do not. Within the 
classical social contract tradition, this line of thought is most closely associated with the work 
of Thomas Hobbes; in contemporary theory, it manifests in the work of David Gauthier.12 
This may be contrasted with contractualism, according to which the parties are committed to 
selecting principles which can be justified to every individual who will be subject to them. In 
this way, the rational self-interest of the parties to any initial agreement is tempered by 
notions of moral equality and mutual respect between persons. Historically, accounts of this 
type can be discerned in the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant; in modern 
political philosophy, it is most closely associated with the works of Rawls and T.M. 
Scanlon.13 On such an account, the metaphor of contract is used to substantiate a set of moral 
norms and ideals which are independent of the theory itself, such as what it means to treat 
persons as equals in a given context. Conversely, the contractarian approach seeks to ground 
moral and political norms in the idea of instrumentally rational agreement between 
cooperating parties. To elaborate on this distinction, consider Stephen Gardiner's 
characterisation of the contract method as drawing upon three subsidiary concepts: equality, 
cooperation, and agreement. For the contractarian, equality is a purely descriptive concept 
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which serves to ensure that the parties to any agreement have broadly equivalent powers; 
cooperation occurs on a mutually advantageous basis; and finally, the agreement itself is 
intended to specify terms of interaction which the parties would rationally accept. A 
contractualist interpretation, by way of comparison, will conceive of equality in normative 
terms – so the parties to the agreement will be understood to have equal moral worth. 
Similarly, cooperation will be characterised by stronger forms of reciprocal interaction, in 
which ideas of fairness and equity will inform the collaborative enterprise. And finally, any 
agreement will serve to justify the principles in question to those affected by them.14 Of 
course, we should be careful not to overstate this distinction. After all, Rawls makes use of 
rational choice theory within his initial agreement to demonstrate the preferability of his 
chosen principles to mutually disinterested parties behind a veil of ignorance. Similarly, a 
number of theorists within the contractarian tradition would argue that rational agreement can 
engender impartial and equitable principles.15 The point, however, remains that there exist 
two fundamentally different ways of conceiving of the contract method within contemporary 
philosophical discourse. 
 
For the purposes of our present enquiry, we will be focusing on contractualism, rather than 
contractarianism. In part, this stipulation reflects a general sense of unease about the 
implications of a moral and political theory grounded exclusively in mutual advantage. As 
Gauthier himself notes, such a theory cannot generate obligations to those who cannot further 
our interests, such as young children or disabled people. Instead, these groups are understood 
to 'fall beyond the pale' of any moral or political obligations.16 More significantly, though, 
such an approach would appear to be severely limited in its applications within the 
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intergenerational realm. After all, due to the asymmetry in power relations between discrete 
generational cohorts, relations between present and future generations are effectively 
analogous to those between the powerful and powerless in the intragenerational context. 
Admittedly, there may be some scope for limited obligations between overlapping 
generations, but our responsibilities to posterity would begin and end with only our 
immediate successors. The contractualist approach, by way of comparison, offers some hope 
of addressing the distributive conflicts which characterise the intergenerational level in an 
equitable fashion. For example, asymmetrical relations between past, present, and future 
generations do not necessarily militate against the extension of the theory to the 
intergenerational realm. Similarly, the contractualist method allows for our having general, 
humanitarian obligations to future people which can be supplemented – rather than replaced 
– by those obligations arrived at in any initial agreement. Even before we account for the 
appeal of the theory, then, there are reasons to think that contractualism will be more readily 
applicable to the intergenerational context. 
 
In saying this, it is important to emphasise that the simple fact of generations being spread 
out across time raises critical issues for any variant of the contract approach. As we will now 
see, this method of specifying principles of distributive justice presupposes some form of 
cooperation. The thought, then, is that obligations of justice are owed to those with whom we 
interact in a certain way; outside of this context, our obligations will be of a more general, 
humanitarian nature.  
 





We now, therefore, turn to look at social cooperation within the context of a contractualist 
approach. As has been established, the idea of cooperation is a core feature of any contract 
theory. The idea, in outline, is that there are circumstances in which individuals will have to 
pool their talents to make themselves as well off as possible. In this sense, the parties to any 
agreement are understood to have a collective interest in cooperating to achieve this optimal 
outcome. At the same time, though, the members of this group will have heterogenous 
preferences, leading to competing demands on the goods and resources secured through 
collaboration. It is in this context that the question of distributive justice arises. Put simply, 
the benefits and burdens of social cooperation need to be apportioned and, on a contractualist 
account, this needs to be regulated by principles that rational parties would willingly endorse. 
In this respect, Rawls's discussion of the basic structure of society is an obvious point of 
reference. On this account, justice is understood to be the 'first virtue' of basic social 
institutions, such as the political constitution and the fundamental economic and social 
arrangements. These institutions share three features which ensures their primacy in 
discussions of justice: they are non-voluntary, have a profound impact on the life prospects of 
all citizens, and are necessitated by social cooperation.17 The idea of the basic structure is 
therefore closely associated with that of mutually advantageous social cooperation: the 
institutions which comprise it generate those collective goods which give rise to cooperation 
in the first instance. The rules which govern these practices will therefore determine the 
nature of social cooperation and the distribution of the associated benefits and burdens across 
a society. The question of distributive justice, then, arises from the need to regulate the 
institutional framework which enables cooperation at the societal level and the collective 
benefits which flow from it.  
 
                                                        




There is, however, another salient feature of these collective benefits which requires further 
attention: they are vulnerable to individual acts of free-riding. To elaborate, owing to the 
collective nature of the benefits produced in this way, and the difficulties involved in 
attempting to exclude individuals from them, it will be possible to reap the benefits of social 
cooperation without fulfilling any of the concomitant obligations. For instance, the members 
of society will benefit from public goods such as national defence which are financed through 
general taxation. Yet, if an individual were to stop footing their fair share of the tax burden, 
they would still be able to access the benefit in question. There will, in other words, be strong 
incentives to renege on the terms of any agreement. This unavoidable state of affairs 
therefore gives rise to a collective action problem. Simply put, although cooperation would 
make us all better off, the potential for free-riding will militate against any agreement. Rawls 
therefore amends the motivation of the parties to any agreement to include their being 
reasonable as well as rational. That is to say, in addition to being minded to pursue their own 
interests, they share a desire to cooperate with their fellow citizens on mutually acceptable 
terms: they have, in Rawls’s turn of phrase, a capacity for a ‘sense of justice’.18 In this way, 
the parties to any agreement can be satisfied that their fellow contractors will be minded to 
cooperate and willing to abide by the terms of any agreement. To expand on this, it is helpful 
to consider a classic formulation of the collective action problem: the prisoner's dilemma. In 
a standard prisoner's dilemma, two parties need to cooperate to secure the best possible 
outcome but fail to do so due to the fear of defection on the part of the other participant. We 
therefore find ourselves in a situation where the parties would prefer a collective strategy of 
cooperation but opt for an individual one of non-cooperation. By stipulating that the parties to 
any agreement will be reasonable – as well as rational – we are thereby able to check those 
anxieties that give rise to the collective action problem, and allow the optimal, cooperative 
                                                        




strategy, to be chosen. That, of course, is not to say that the parties will be unconcerned by 
the potential for free-riding in any arrangements – indeed, as we will see, any agreement will 
depend upon the enforcement of the norms agreed to. Instead, reasonableness prevents the 
collective action problem from arising by ensuring that the parties to any agreement share a 
disposition toward cooperation. In this way, it builds a presumption in favour of reciprocal 
interaction into the theory. Thus, social cooperation within the contractualist approach is 
directed toward the provision of a central class of collective benefits, and the parties to any 
agreement will be understood to be both rational and reasonable – thereby overcoming the 
collective action problem.  
 
iii. The original position 
 
With the nature of the parties to any agreement and the subject of their cooperation dealt 
with, we may now address the agreement itself. Before proceeding, though, it is worth 
stressing that in all but a handful of cases, this 'agreement' is a representational thought 
experiment, designed to bring clarity to our deliberations. In the context of a contractualist 
theory, this involves structuring the agreement in such a way as to ensure that the principles 
selected could secure the assent of those who would be subject to them. To this end, Rawls's 
agreement – known as the original position – takes place behind a veil of ignorance which 
deprives the parties of morally arbitrary facts about themselves. Instead, their knowledge is 
limited to general facts about society and certain basic interests that they will have – most 
obviously, in maximising their share of primary social goods, such as liberties and 
opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect.19 The contractors are 
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therefore unaware of their class, race, gender, talents, abilities, and so on. This, Rawls 
suggests, will ensure impartiality within any agreement and result in the selection of a set of 
principles that all rational and reasonable individuals would agree to. For instance, if we are 
unaware of whether or not we will have religious convictions, then self-interest will lead us 
to select principles which are consistent with freedom of belief. In this way, the instrumental 
rationality of the parties behind the veil of ignorance can be used to specify equitable terms 
of social cooperation.20 Put another way, if we are unaware of all morally arbitrary facts 
about ourselves and our society, then we will automatically select principles to which all 
could agree. In this way, Rawls’s contract functions as a heuristic device for delineating 
terms of cooperation that could secure the assent of all participants. 
 
Before moving on, it would be pertinent to say something about the content of the principles 
selected behind the veil of ignorance. Given our lack of knowledge, Rawls suggests that a 
rational strategy would entail our adopting the perspective of the worst-off and looking to 
maximise their share of the benefits of social cooperation. The idea behind this proposal is 
that rational parties would be relatively indifferent toward any losses incurred through 
following this strategy as compared to the potential gains that could be secured through 
avoiding the unacceptable outcomes that another rationale may lead to.21 The contention, 
then, is that even if a great number of people deprive themselves of various benefits through 
adopting such a strategy, the resultant settlement will, at the very least, prove acceptable. 
Consequently, Rawls is able to argue that his two principles of justice as fairness would be 
selected over their competitors in the original position, precisely because they prioritise the 
interests and prospects of the worst-off. To summarise, these two principles comprise three 
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component parts: firstly, the equal liberty principle, which states that persons are entitled to 
‘the most extensive scheme of basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme for others’; 
secondly, the principle of fair equality of opportunity, which ensures that offices and 
positions are open to all; and finally, the difference principle, which stipulates that the only 
justifiable inequalities are those which make the worst-off as well off as they could possibly 
be. These principles are then ranked in lexical order so that the fair opportunity principle has 
priority over the difference principle and the equal liberty principle takes precedence over 
both.22 The lexical ordering of the principles of justice as fairness is of significance because, 
as we will see, Rawls conceives of our obligations to future generations as a constraint on the 
application of the difference principle. For our immediate purposes, however, the noteworthy 
feature of this analysis is the claim that by structuring the initial agreement in a particular 
way, mutually advantageous cooperation can be reconciled with ideals of moral equality and 
fair reciprocal interaction. In this way, the contractualist method is able to distinguish itself 
from the contractarian alternative whilst retaining the core features of the wider social 
contract approach. 
 
iv. Contractualism's Appeal 
 
Having given a brief sketch of the theory, we can now consider the appeal of contractualism as 
a method of specifying principles of justice. To that end, I intend to focus primarily on the role 
of reciprocity in the contract approach. Before that, though, something needs to be said about 
ideal agreement as a means of specifying principles of justice. In this respect, it is helpful to 
start from the metaphor of contract itself, and its use as a paradigmatic instantiation of an 
obligation. On such an account, agreeing to the terms of a contract is understood to have a 
                                                        




binding effect on the parties to it; if they renege on those terms without a legitimate excuse, 
then their actions will warrant some form of censure. Put another way, if one of the parties 
were to breach the contract, then they would blameworthy precisely because they had 
previously agreed to it. In the case of a contract, then, the fact that it has been agreed to places 
the parties to it under an obligation. Of course, unlike the classical social contract tradition, 
contractualism is not a theory of political obligation; instead, it uses the idea of agreement to 
specify principles of distributive justice. There is, however, a corollary between the notion of 
agreement as the basis of our contractual obligations and its role in the selection of principles: 
in both cases, having agreed to something is understood to have justificatory force. Contracts, 
for instance, are binding because we have agreed to them. Similarly, if we can demonstrate that 
certain distributive principles would be the object of an ideal agreement, then we can provide 
a justification of them. This has especial relevance when we consider the pervasive and non-
voluntary nature of those institutions which comprise the basic structure. There is, therefore, a 
need to justify the principles which regulate the basic structure to those who will be subject to 
them. In addition to that, though, the idea that the principles which regulate the basic structure 
could secure universal assent can be understood to facilitate a specific kind of social 
cooperation. To elaborate on this, consider Scanlon’s discussion of the contract approach as 
allowing for a particular kind of coexistent relationship between people: 
The contractualist ideal of acting in accord with principles that others (similarly 
motivated) could not reasonably reject is meant to characterize the relation with 
others the value and appeal of which underlies our reasons to do what morality 
requires. This relation, much less personal than friendship, might be called a relation 
of mutual recognition. Standing in this relation to others is appealing in itself—worth 
seeking for its own sake. A moral person will refrain from lying to others, cheating, 




these requirements are not just formal imperatives; they are aspects of the positive 
value of a way of living with others.23 
At this early juncture, it is worth emphasising that Scanlonian contractualism differs from its 
Rawlsian analogue in two ways: firstly, it is concerned with moral reasoning rather than the 
major social and political institutions of a society; and secondly, it attempts to specify 
principles that no one could reasonably reject – rather than ones which everyone would agree 
to.24 In this instance, though, the basic insight is applicable to the political contract envisaged 
by Rawls. By cooperating on terms which could be endorsed by everyone we enable the 
members of a political society to relate to one another as equals. In Scanlon’s analysis, the 
idea of mutual recognition captures this sentiment; for our present purposes, though, it might 
be better to think in terms of solidarity or to conceive of citizens cooperating on the basis of 
fair reciprocity. This, I suspect, is what Rawls has in mind when he suggests that the ‘public 
recognition’ of his two principles of justice can increase the effectiveness of social 
cooperation by bolstering the bases of self-respect.25 By specifying principles of justice in a 
way that could be justified to those who will be subject to them, we therefore ensure that 
cooperation is to the benefit of all and proceeds on an equitable basis. We might, then, say 
that on the one hand, the idea of an ideal agreement is appealing because it is able to meet the 
justificatory challenge associated with the pervasive, non-voluntary institutions that comprise 
the basic structure. Equally, though, principles of justice which would be selected in these 
ideal circumstances embody a notion of fair reciprocity. In what follows, I am going to 
suggest that this underlying reciprocal logic is a decidedly appealing feature of the 
contractualist analysis, with potential applications in the intergenerational context. 
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Appeals to fair reciprocity can – and frequently do – form part of a wider egalitarian strategy, 
and the contract method can be understood to employ this notion in a particularly effective 
way. To give an idea of a general argument from reciprocity, consider the age-old claim that 
capitalism exploits workers and that this is unjust. On one reading, this injustice is understood 
to turn upon a lack of reciprocity between workers and the owners of capital, with the two 
groups receiving a disproportionate share of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.26 
A related – albeit subtly different – line of reasoning can be used to inform a conception of 
disability rights: in that context, though, the complaint would be that existing social practices 
offend against fair reciprocity by preventing individuals from making a contribution in the first 
instance.27 A generic argument from fair reciprocity, then, is likely to proceed from the claim 
that individuals or groups are either not receiving a fair return on their contribution, or are 
being excluded from the cooperative venture. In and of itself, then, the idea of reciprocity can 
be used to generate a powerful critique of the practices and institutions which obtain at the 
societal level.  It is, then, significant that Rawls structures the original position in such a way 
as to 'embody the appropriate reciprocity and equality between persons [conceived of as free 
and equal].'28 By embedding a conception of reciprocity in the initial agreement, Rawls 
therefore brings the contract method into alignment with a powerful line of social criticism. In 
this respect, those works which followed A Theory of Justice and used some variant of the 
contract method to scrutinise existing practices around social phenomena such as race and 
gender give some indication of contractualism’s potential as a critical theory – understood in 
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the broadest sense of the term.29 Although these authors interpret and deploy the contract 
approach in radically different ways – indeed, many have been sharply critical of aspects of 
Rawls’s methodology –  some element of the reciprocal ideal plays a role in their respective 
arguments. At the very least, then, institutions are held to be unjust because they violate 
standards of reciprocity. At a more pernicious level, though, it may be that our existing 
practices militate against reciprocal interaction in the first instance, by inculcating attitudes of 
deference and dependence in specific groups and individuals.30 In this regard, it is worth noting 
the evolution of Rawls’s own thought, as exemplified in his 2001 work Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement. There, the difference principle is recast as a principle of reciprocity: the worst-
off, then, are owed the assurance that they will be as well off as they could possibly be by virtue 
of their status as equal participants in socially cooperative practices.31 Indeed, to quote directly 
from Rawls: 
 
The least advantaged are not, if all goes well, the unfortunate and unlucky—objects of 
our charity and compassion, much less our pity— but those to whom reciprocity is 
owed as a matter of political justice among those who are free and equal citizens along 
with everyone else. Although they control fewer resources, they are doing their full 
share on terms recognized by all as mutually advantageous and consistent with 
everyone’s self-respect.32 
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This is indicative of a broader shift in Rawls’s political thought, characterised by an increased 
scepticism toward the institutions of welfare state capitalism and greater emphasis on the ideal 
of ‘property-owning democracy’: an institutional arrangement in which the ownership of 
wealth and capital is dispersed across a society.33 The capitalist welfare state, Rawls avers, fails 
to recognise a principle of reciprocity by allowing for high concentrations of property 
ownership.34 Even within Rawls’s articulation of the contract method, then, the idea of 
reciprocity is capable of generating a powerful critique of existing practices and institutions. 
This, I would suggest, is of relevance to our present enquiry for two reasons: firstly, the 
interactions between discrete generations can be analysed as a cooperative venture, with each 
cohort shouldering specific burdens and realising certain benefits. The idea of reciprocity may 
then have applications within the intergenerational context. Secondly, if, as I have suggested, 
a conception of reciprocity can motivate a wider critical project, then it would be well suited 
to the task at hand. After all, there can be little doubt that our existing institutions are inadequate 
with respect to the rights and interests of future people. By emphasising the role of reciprocity 
within the contract approach, I therefore want to suggest that it is capable of arriving at a 
plausible and attractive account of what is owed to future generations, whilst demonstrating 
the shortcomings in our current practices toward them.  
 
Before proceeding to look at the non-identity problem, I would, however, want to make a final 
point about reciprocity and the contract approach. As may be evident, discussions of 
distributive justice take place at a certain level of abstraction, and this raises obvious questions 
about their practical value. It is, for instance, far from obvious why a problem like global 
warming needs to be analysed from this perspective. Indeed, there are numerous norms and 
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values that can be appealed to in discussions of what might be owed to future generations – 
stewardship, sustainability, conservation, and so on – and it is understandable to question how 
a theory of fair shares fits into this conceptual landscape. In this regard, the idea of reciprocity 
can go some way to bridging the gap between theory and practice. Contractualism, as we have 
seen, starts from the idea of mutually advantageous social cooperation. The demands of justice, 
therefore, arise in response to the need to apportion the associated benefits and burdens in an 
equitable manner. In this way, the idea of distributive justice can be linked to a more concrete 
conception of relational equality – according to which, the goal of egalitarian justice consists 
in securing a particular kind of relationship between individuals to allow them to interact as 
equals.35 A theory of fair shares, in other words, may be required in order to identify and 
prevent oppression and hierarchical social relations. There is, of course, considerable debate as 
to whether the interactions between generations can give rise to obligations of justice.36 
Supposing they do, though, then the asymmetrical power relations which obtain between 
generations would clearly warrant investigation from the perspective of justice. The intuition, 
then, is that a theory of distributive justice is required to ensure that the parties to any mutually 
advantageous social cooperation relate to one another as equals. By appealing to a conception 
of reciprocity, we may therefore be able to provide a theory of intergenerational justice with a 
concrete grounding in the relations that obtain between discrete generations at the societal 
level. 
 
1.3 The Non-Identity Problem 
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Taking as its starting point the widely accepted claim that a necessary feature of our identity 
is our genetic endowment, the non-identity problem asks us to consider the myriad 
contingencies involved in one person coming into being. If, for instance, we were able to 
make slight alterations to the flow of history, then we could radically alter the composition of 
the current generation: had different gametes been involved in the relevant fertilisation 
events, then a different group of individuals would have been born. Thus, seemingly minor 
events can have profound consequences provided that they exert some influence over the 
particular sperm and egg which combine to form a zygote. In this sense, questions of 
existence are inextricably bound to the social and historical circumstances prior to 
conception. This fact gives rise to a serious problem for theories of intergenerational justice: 
if the current generation has a power to determine the composition of their successors, then 
we may be justified in imposing any manner of burdens on them, so long as their lives are 
preferable to non-existence. To expand upon this, consider Parfit’s test case involving the 
depletion of resources, in which we are asked to choose between two policies: depletion and 
conservation. Choosing conservation will allow for the gradual increase in living standards, 
whilst electing to deplete resources will slightly enhance the prospects of those born in the 
next two centuries, whilst greatly depressing those of all subsequent generations. Clearly, 
depletion is intuitively the more problematic of the two policies. If, though, those generations 
born after the initial period of affluence owed their existence to the decision to deplete 
resources – as is highly probable – then our scope for objection would appear greatly 
diminished.37 As against this view, Parfit suggests that we can reasonably prefer conservation 
to depletion, but only if we are prepared to conceive of morality in impersonal terms. Thus, 
instead of conceiving of our duties to posterity in person-affecting terms – where an act is 
wrong if and only if it makes a specific person worse off – we should reorient our 
                                                        




deliberations around the effects of our choices on states of affairs.38 Such a move, however, 
would conflict with the intuition that principles of distributive justice ought to regulate our 
conduct at the intergenerational level. At their most basic, impersonal approaches are 
characterised by an indifference toward the question of distributive justice: patterns of 
distribution matter only insofar as they bring about certain states of affairs. Indeed, more 
generally, it is difficult to see how an impersonal approach could accommodate concepts like 
individual rights and interpersonal obligations which necessarily apply to people. So much to 
say, then, that the move to an impersonal outlook is likely to have a transformative effect on 
how we conceive of our responsibilities to future generations. The non-identity problem 
therefore calls many of our considered judgements about justice and morality into question. It 
is, then, a problem that all theories of intergenerational justice need to attend to. 
 
To give a better idea of what is at stake in the non-identity problem, it may be helpful to 
conceive of it as turning upon a logical inconsistency between three widely shared 
commitments: 
 
(1) Firstly, that an action is wrong only if it makes someone worse off. (Call this, ‘The 
person-affecting principle’.)  
 
(2) Secondly, that an act which brings someone into existence with a life that is worth 
living does not make that person worse off. 
 
(3) And thirdly, that the acts described in the non-identity cases – which bring people into 
existence with lives that are worth living – are, in fact, wrong.  
                                                        





There are, then, four possible lines of response to the non-identity problem: we either reject 
one of these three intuitions or amend them in such a way as to resolve the inconsistency. 
Parfit, as we have seen, favours rejecting (1) and adopting an impersonal approach in its 
place. We could, however, discard either the second or the third belief. Notice, though, that 
if we do, we find ourselves being forced to defend distinctly counterintuitive positions. In 
the case of rejecting (3), we have to countenance the possibility that the acts in question are 
wholly permissible; similarly, if we jettison (2), then we are required to make the argument 
that most lives are simply not worth having – and this may lead to the conclusion that 
procreation is wrong.39 Consequently, the most popular alternative strategy to that 
suggested by Parfit has been to try and revise one of the three beliefs to make it consistent 
with the other two: in practice, the person-affecting principle is nearly always identified as 
the component of this antinomy which needs to be recast in some way.40 In Part I of this 
thesis, I will look to build upon such an approach. Specifically, I will defend a line of 
response first put forward by Rahul Kumar which seeks to distinguish wronging from 
harming: the implication being that even if no one is made any worse off in a non-identity 
scenario, our actions can still be assessed as being unjust or blameworthy. This, I will argue, 
allows us to respond to the non-identity problem in a way that is consistent with the wider 
contract approach. 
 
Although I have presented the non-identity problem as a general issue for all person-affecting 
approaches to questions of justice and morality – and this is how it tends to manifest in the 
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wider literature – I would argue that it raises two specific problems for the contractualist 
account. Firstly, as we have seen, the manner in which principles of justice are specified is 
necessarily person-affecting: the parties to the original position are representative of people 
who will have to abide by the terms of their agreement. It is, therefore, difficult to see how 
the contract method could be recast in impersonal terms without blunting its central 
justificatory strategy. Secondly, as Parfit notes, the parties to any agreement will 
automatically know that they exist at the point of deliberation. This, he argues, is analogous 
to assuming that we would all be men when choosing principles that would disadvantage 
women.41 There is, then, a question as to whether a contractualism can adjudicate on 
questions of existence in an impartial manner. The non-identity problem therefore calls key 
aspects of the contractualist analysis into question. To that extent, it represents a clear 
obstacle to the contract method’s extension to the intergenerational context. 
 
1.4 Just Savings and the Mutuality Problem 
 
With the non-identity problem attended to, we can now turn to the second facet of the 
intergenerational context which raises problems for contractualism: the absence of mutuality 
between generations. In order to motivate this problem, it will first be necessary to say 
something about Rawls’s proposed solution to the problem of justice between generations, in 
the form of the just savings principle. As has been established, the contract method attempts 
to justify principles by demonstrating that they would be the object of universal agreement in 
idealised circumstances. Consequently, any principles of intergenerational justice must be 
selected in this way. Rawls’s formulation of the original position, however, problematises 
                                                        




this task from the outset: under what is known as the present time of entry interpretation, the 
parties to his initial agreement know that they are contemporaries.  
 
This, Rawls suggests, means that the parties to the original position have no reason to select 
any principle of intergenerational saving. As a result, some aspects of the original position 
will have to modified to allow the contract method to be extended into the intergenerational 
context. 42 The first such amendment, suggested in the original 1971 edition of A Theory of 
Justice, urged contractors to conceive of themselves as 'heads of families' possessed of a 
desire to further the welfare of their proximate descendants.43 Aside from the problems such 
an assumption may raise with regard to the institution of the family, it also serves to limit the 
scope of our obligations to our closest relatives.44 Consequently, in the revised edition of A 
Theory of Justice, this motivational assumption is allied to the observation that a fair rate of 
intergenerational savings can be specified by asking the parties to agree to a principle that 
they would want all prior generations to have followed.45 By introducing this constraint into 
the structure of the original position, Rawls is able to motivate a concern for other 
generations among the parties to any agreement and argues that they would select a two-stage 
just savings principle to regulate our intergenerational conduct. This principle of 
intergenerational saving is directed toward establishing and maintaining just institutions over 
time. So, in the initial phase, the demands of justice require sufficient levels of capital to be 
transferred to future generations to allow for the realisation of just institutions. Once such an 
institutional framework is firmly established, however, net saving may fall to zero 
– effectively entitling subsequent generations to enough and as good as their predecessors. 46 
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Of course, for this line of reasoning to hold, we need to assume that all prior generations will 
have complied with their distributive obligations: if we suspect that there may have been 
historical non-compliance, then we would have no reason to agree to any savings principle. It 
is in this respect that the absence of mutuality between generations becomes especially 
problematic, because unlike at the intragenerational level where we can apply sanctions to 
enforce whatever norms are agreed upon, no such mechanisms are available. This is 
significant, because Rawls is clear that even if all citizens were moved by the same sense of 
justice such assurances would still be a necessary feature of any agreement.47 In seeking to 
develop this argument, Heyd makes a distinction between full compliance and the 
enforcement of compliance. The former concept, he suggests, is only intelligible within the 
context of the latter. Thus, part of our rational basis for complying with those principles 
selected in the original position is the guarantee that others will be deterred from reneging on 
their commitments. Such deterrence, though, is impossible without mutuality.48 The 
assumption that past generations will have complied with the savings rate chosen in the 
original position is therefore seemingly unwarranted. On the contrary, a lack of reciprocal 
interaction between generations would imply no saving whatsoever. 
 
The lack of mutuality between generations therefore gives rise to two closely related issues 
for contractualist theories of intergenerational justice. On the one hand, the absence of like 
for like cooperation places future generations outside of any initial agreement. On the other, 
without some way of enforcing whatever principles are agreed upon, the parties to the 
original position have no reason to select a savings principle in the first place. It is for these 
reasons that many have identified an irresolvable tension between the idea of mutually 
                                                        
47 Rawls, Theory p. 236. 




advantageous social cooperation and the extension of the contract method to the 
intergenerational context. Heyd, for instance, argues that because we are unable to cooperate 
with our predecessors, non-compliance in any savings process can only be viewed as an act 
of disrespect – rather than an injustice – in contractualist terms.49 Elsewhere, Daniel Attas is 
equally pessimistic, noting that the lack of mutuality between generations ‘poses an 
insurmountable problem to any…theory that aims to ground obligations on the ground of 
mutual advantage.’50 Perhaps the most strident criticism of this nature, though, comes from 
Gardiner, who suggests that the absence of mutuality renders the contract method, as 
presently constituted, wholly inapplicable to the intergenerational context.51 
 
The charge, then, is that Rawls’s justification of the just savings principle presupposes a form 
of mutually advantageous cooperation which is simply not possible in the intergenerational 
context: we cannot cooperate with our predecessors or our successors in a normatively 
significantly way, and therefore the question of justice never arises. The mutuality problem 
therefore represents a challenge to the contractualist position to the extent that we believe that 
it needs to be extended to the intergenerational realm. Heyd, for instance, is content to fall 
back upon a set of general humanitarian obligations – akin to the duty of assistance that 
obtains between peoples at the international level – to regulate our intergenerational 
conduct.52 Gardiner, by way of comparison, speculates that ‘a refusal to countenance 
intergenerational issues may undermine the appeal of the contract approach even for many of 
its core supporters.’ The intergenerational context may, therefore, lead to a recasting of the 
contract approach as a theory of justice with universal applicability.53 If, of course, the 
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mutuality problem is predicated on a misconception and cooperation of the kind envisaged 
does obtain at the intergenerational level, then a contractualist theory of intergenerational 
justice, of the sort envisaged by Rawls would be perfectly intelligible. The mutuality problem 
can therefore be characterised in terms of a set of three inconsistent beliefs: 
 
(1) Firstly, that those obligations associated with distributive justice arise within the context 
of mutually advantageous cooperation. 
 
(2) Secondly, that principles of distributive justice are required to constrain intragenerational 
expenditure, with a view to securing the continuation of a just institutional framework. 
 
(3) And finally, that the interaction between discrete cohorts at the intergenerational level 
cannot be characterised by mutuality. 
 
To resolve the mutuality problem, then, one of these three beliefs needs to be rejected. On my 
interpretation, those who reject (1) are advocating some form of universal contract. The idea, 
in outline, is that by excising those commitments to mutually advantageous social 
cooperation from the theory, contractualism can be recast in such a way as to allow for its 
application to the intergenerational context. By way of comparison, those who reject (2) are 
going to accept that the obligations which regulate our intergenerational conduct are of a 
general, humanitarian variety. If this is the case, then Heyd’s likening of the just savings 
principle to the duty of assistance between peoples at the global level would be appropriate: 




well short of engendering obligations of justice.54 Finally, those who reject (3) are able 
incorporate the idea of obligations of intergenerational justice into the contract approach as it 
is presently constituted. Of course, the question facing such accounts is how mutuality might 
obtain between generations. In this regard, the obvious response is that generations cooperate 
indirectly. So, instead of collaborating on a like-for-like basis, discrete generations may be 
understood to cooperate by making a bequest to their successors which is broadly equivalent 
to the legacy they inherited from their forebears. Indeed, this dovetails with aspects of 
Rawls’s account, particularly his characterisation of political society as a 'fair system of 
social cooperation over time, from one generation to the next.'55 At the same time, though, it 
is not clear if cooperation of the form discussed could engender obligations of any kind – let 
alone obligations of justice. Brian Barry, for instance, likens the idea of indirect 
intergenerational reciprocity to being handed a toffee apple by a complete stranger: although 
we might enjoy it, and even feel a sense of gratitude, it is difficult to see how this engenders 
an obligation. Moreover, unless we can demonstrate that some form of mutuality obtains in 
the intergenerational context, then indirect intergenerational reciprocity of the kind envisaged 
will be irrelevant from the perspective of justice. Nevertheless, I would argue that this 
represents the most appealing line of response to the mutuality problem, and Part II of this 
thesis will be devoted to explicating a theory of intergenerational mutuality which engenders 
obligations of justice grounded in indirect reciprocity. 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
This introductory chapter has served three main purposes. Firstly, I have limited the scope of 
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this enquiry to focus on our distributive obligations toward non-overlapping future 
generations at the domestic level. Secondly, I have provided a brief outline of the 
contractualist approach – and suggested that the idea of reciprocity is an integral part of its 
appeal. And finally, I have introduced the non-identity and mutuality problems and illustrated 
why they militate against the extension of the contract method to the intergenerational 
context. 
 
In the interests of expediency, I should state that this thesis will attend to the non-identity 
problem in Part I and the mutuality problem in Part II. So, Chapter 2 will argue that the non-
identity problem can be resolved in manner that is consistent with the contractualist approach 
by distinguishing wronging from harming. It will also be suggested that we can use this 
framework to establish that we have humanitarian obligations toward future generations. 
From there, attention will turn to the mutuality problem as we move into Part II. This will 
begin with a critical assessment of the universal contract approach in Chapter 3. This will 
afford me the opportunity to demonstrate the preferability of an account grounded in a 
conception of reciprocity – and in doing so, foreground the mutuality problem within the 
structure of the thesis. To that end, I will look to refute the claim that the intergenerational 
context is devoid of mutuality in Chapter 4. The present generation, I will argue, depend 
upon future generations to preserve their projects and respect their posthumous interests. As 
against the claim that this lacks significance from the perspective of justice, I will 
demonstrate how these goods relate to the social bases of self-respect and the stability of a 
conception of justice. This, I will suggest, means that the parties to the original position 
would specify a principle of intergenerational savings on mutually disinterested grounds 




Barry’s objection to indirect reciprocity as the basis of our intergenerational obligations. In 
Chapter 5, I will put forward four possible objections to intergenerational mutuality and 
respond to them in turn. In meeting these challenges, I will expand upon the central points of 
discussion in Chapter 4, bringing additional nuance and clarity to the argument. The idea of 
intergenerational mutuality is, then, the central concept in this thesis. 
 
Finally, it would remiss not to take this opportunity to say something about the overarching 
aims and goals of this project. This thesis may, on the one hand, be interpreted as a relatively 
straightforward attempt to build upon Rawls’s work in this area. At the same time, though, it 
can be read more specifically through the prism of my remarks on relational equality in this 
chapter. To elaborate, the Rawlsian contract method affords us an analytical framework 
which, as I pointed at the end of Section 2, is well suited to the task of identifying oppressive 
or hierarchal social relations. This has especial relevance to the question of what is owed to 
future generations due to the radical asymmetries in power which obtain in the 
intergenerational context: the simple fact that generations are able to act with impunity 
toward one another means that the powers at their disposal are liable to be abused. An 
unavoidable feature of the intergenerational context can therefore be understood to militate 
against the normative ideal that generations ought to interact with one another on equitable 
terms. Using the contract method to arrive at a theory of what is owed to future generations 
should, then, be seen as an attempt to specify what fair and equal terms of intergenerational 
cooperation would look like. By taking Rawls’s theory as its starting point and emphasising 
the role of reciprocity within it, the thesis is therefore foregrounding the question of what it 
means to interact with future generations on an equitable basis. To that extent, the theory of 




conception of fair shares and the more concrete question of what it means to cooperate with 









2. The Non-Identity Problem 
 
 
First outlined by Derek Parfit in his seminal 1984 work Reasons and Persons, the non-identity 
problem hinges upon the innumerable contingencies involved in a specific person coming into 
existence, and the ability of earlier generations to alter both the prospects and composition of 
future generations. Suppose, for instance, that we were to intentionally deplete resources to the 
detriment of our distant descendants. Instinctively, we might object to such an act by appealing 
to the deleterious consequences for future people. Such a response, however, overlooks the fact 
that those future generations will be comprised of people who owe their existence to our 
profligacy: had we chosen to conserve resources, then a very different set of events would have 
followed, in which different people would have had different children. Consequently, so long 
as those future people have lives which are worth living, the act of depleting resources in the 
present would appear to make no specific person any worse off. For those of us who understand 
people to be the fundamental units of concern within moral and political philosophy, the non-
identity problem is therefore particularly troubling: it suggests that actions which are prima 
facie objectionable are, in actual fact, permissible. We might, then, characterise the non-
identity problem as requiring us to resolve a logical inconsistency between three plausible 
commitments: 
 
(1) Firstly, that an action is wrong only if it makes someone worse off. (Call this, ‘The 
person-affecting principle’.)  
 
(2) Secondly, that an act which brings someone into existence with a life that is worth 
living does not make that person worse off. 
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(3) And thirdly, that the acts described in the non-identity cases – which bring people into 
existence with lives that are worth living – are, in fact, wrong.  
 
In brief, Parfit avers that we ought to reject (1) and embrace an impersonal approach toward 
ethics, in which our deliberations are concerned with states of affairs rather than people. By 
way of contrast, David Benatar has suggested that being brought into existence visits 
innumerable unjustified harms on people, thereby invalidating (2).56 Finally, David Heyd has 
suggested that any comparison between the welfare levels of existent and non-existent people 
is unintelligible, and that we should therefore be prepared to bite the bullet – and retain the 
person-affecting principle at the expense of (3).57 
 
As varied as these lines of response are, they all leave something to be desired. Moving away 
from the person-affecting view, as Parfit suggests, would require a thoroughgoing reappraisal 
of those fundamental moral concepts which we typically conceive of in personal terms – such 
as rights and obligations. At the same time, though, it is far from clear that our commitment to 
the person-affecting approach ought to be as unwavering as Heyd suggests: when choosing 
between our intuitive belief that the non-identity cases are wrong and a commitment to the 
person-affecting principle, Parfit’s solution may be preferable. Finally, although almost all 
lives involve a degree of hardship, Benatar’s argument requires us to accept that these harms 
cannot be outweighed by the benefits of existence: put another way, we have to accept the 
highly controversial conclusion that procreation is always and everywhere wrong. 
Consequently, I propose to resolve the non-identity problem by amending, rather than 
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rejecting, the person-affecting principle. In its standard articulation, the person-affecting view 
holds that an action is wrong if it makes someone worse off. Since the non-identity cases 
involve people would who otherwise not exist, they fall outside the scope of our ethical 
deliberations. That interpretation of the person-affecting principle, though, fails to capture our 
basic intuitions even in uncomplicated ethical scenarios. Suppose, for instance, that I promise 
to meet you at a certain time but arrive half an hour late without a good excuse. To make up 
for any inconvenience caused, I decide to buy you lunch – the benefits of which more than 
outweigh any of the losses caused by my being late. In such circumstances, my lack of 
punctuality would, in actual fact, have been to your advantage; it would, however, be strange 
to claim that that fact alone would absolve me of any blame. After all, in being late, I failed to 
live up to the promise that I made to you, and in that sense, I would remain culpable. Put 
another way, our actions and omissions have a moral significance of their own which cannot 
be captured by references to the positive or negative consequences which flow from them. In 
this respect, my analysis owes an obvious debt to the works of James Woodward and, in 
particular, Rahul Kumar, both of whom employed such a strategy to outline a non-
consequentialist line of response to the non-identity problem. Following Kumar, I will look to 
draw a distinction between wronging and harming. To outline, a harmful action is a one which 
makes someone worse off than they would otherwise be; a wrongful action, however, is simply 
one which violates certain legitimate expectations that other people have with respect to our 
conduct. Consequently, the fact that future people cannot be harmed has no bearing on our 
deliberations: so long as they can be wronged, we can conclude that the non-identity cases are 
impermissible whilst retaining the person-affecting view. My analysis will diverge from 
Kumar’s account in three ways: firstly, my interest in the non-identity problem concerns its 
implications for a theory of justice, rather than on broader questions within moral philosophy. 
Secondly, my approach is grounded in Rawlsian – rather than Scanlonian – contractualism. 
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And thirdly, I am going to argue that within the confines of a Rawlsian, justice-based approach 
we can limit the scope of deliberations to those future people who will exist, thereby excluding 
hypothetical people from our discussion. In this way, we can meet Parfit’s objection to Kumar 
and respond to the non-identity problem within the confines of the contract method. Scanlonian 
contractualism and Kumar’s analysis of the non-identity are, then, used to elucidate our 
response from the perspective of justice. By appreciating where their approach falls short, we 
can therefore illustrate the comparative resilience of the Rawlsian contract. My objectives in 
this chapter are twofold: firstly, I want to demonstrate that Kumar’s proposed solution is both 
compatible with the political contractualism that forms the subject of this enquiry and more 
cogent when expressed in Rawlsian terms. Indeed, I want to suggest that by repurposing 
Kumar’s analysis and applying it to the original position we can arrive at an account of our 
having humanitarian obligations to all future people who will exist. Secondly, I intend to 
demonstrate that the presumed consent of future people cannot serve as a justification for 
contemporary wrongdoing within the original position. This chapter can therefore be 
interpreted as an attempt to establish that we have general, rights-based obligations towards 
future people as such.  
 
I will therefore begin by offering a brief sketch of the non-identity problem, along with 
Kumar’s response to it, in Section 1. In Section 2, I will marry Kumar’s analysis to the political 
contractualism which constitutes the subject of this enquiry – and suggest that it allows us to 
respond to the non-identity problem in a way that is both consistent with the wider contract 
approach and the claim that future generations will have rights. At that point, I will introduce 
a counterargument to Kumar’s analysis in the form of the idea that identity-affecting rights 
violations might be justifiable on the grounds of the presumed consent of future generations – 
with specific reference to Parfit’s examples of the young mother and the man who writes to 
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The Times. Section 4 will argue that from the perspective of justice this objection is dependent 
on one of two highly questionable assumptions: we either have to incorporate the notional 
rights of hypothetical people who will never exist into our deliberations; or, existence itself – 
rather than the goods which might be associated with it – is shouldering the justificatory burden 
in the argument. I will demonstrate that neither of these suppositions are tenable and affirm the 
rights-based approach in the process.  
 
2.1 Wronging, Harming, and the Person-Affecting Principle 
 
Let us begin by offering a more detailed explication of the non-identity problem. As has been 
established, the non-identity problem turns upon what Gregory Kavka referred to as the 
‘precariousness of existence.’ Simply put, every person develops from a zygote comprising 
two specific gametes; had different sex cells been involved in the fertilisation event, then a 
different person would have been born. Consequently, everything from the identity of the 
parents to the timing of conception has a bearing on the composition of the next generation. To 
elaborate upon this, consider Kavka’s example of the slave child. In this scenario, we are asked 
to imagine a couple who enter into a contract with a wealthy individual requiring them to 
conceive a child who, upon being born, will be transferred into slavery.58 Intuitively, the 
couple’s actions seem wholly immoral; on further inspection, though, it is difficult to see who 
is made any worse off by this transaction. After all, had the couple refused to sign the contract, 
then the child would not have been born. Assuming that the slave child has a life which is worth 
living, we are therefore forced to conclude that, in one sense, she is a beneficiary of this action. 
The issue, then, is whether an act can be wrong without being bad for a particular person. 
Building upon this, Parfit introduces a population-wide non-identity scenario in the form of 
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depletion. In depletion, we are asked to choose between two policies: conservation and the 
eponymous depletion. Choosing conservation will allow for the gradual increase in living 
standards, whilst electing to deplete resources will slightly enhance the prospects of those born 
in the next two centuries, whilst greatly depressing those of all subsequent generations.59 Due 
to the innumerable contingencies involved in their coming into existence, those people who 
come to inhabit those later generations will almost certainly owe their existence to the choice 
to deplete resources. As before, then, our intuitions are at variance with the person-affecting 
principle: so long as those populations in the depletion scenario have lives which they consider 
to be worthwhile, it is difficult to see how this act makes anyone worse off. From this, Parfit 
infers that any solution to the non-identity problem will need to appeal to impersonal reasons. 
That is to say, we will need to adopt an approach to ethics in which acts are right or wrong due 
to their bringing about a certain state of affairs, rather than their impact upon people. To that 
end, he contrasts the person-affecting principle with principle ‘Q’: 
 
If in either of two possible outcomes the same number of people would ever live, it 
would be worse if those who live are worse off, or have a lower quality of life, than 
those who would have lived.60 
 
On such an account, then, bringing about a state of affairs in which the people who are born 
realise a lower quality of life than those who could have been born instead is taken to be 
objectionable – irrespective of the impact that this decision would have on specific people. In 
what are termed same-people choices – where the identities of the affected parties remain 
constant – Parfit suggests that Q is consistent with the person-affecting principle. However, in 
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same-number choices – where different people will come into existence depending on the 
action that is taken – principle Q and the person-affecting view are rivalrous. Thus, in 
depletion, the person-affecting view would recommend that we deplete resources – since that 
would benefit the current generation and make no one any worse off. By way of contrast, 
principle Q would recommend conservation – since it would bring about a state of affairs in 
which the total quality of life was higher.61 Parfit, then, concludes that the non-identity problem 
cannot be resolved in a satisfactory manner unless we are willing to reject the person-affecting 
principle.62  
 
It may, however, be the case that Parfit’s analysis of the person-affecting principle moves too 
fast and that, in actual fact, it can be articulated in a manner that renders it unproblematic. 
Recall, that Parfit understands the person-affecting principle as an approach to ethics which 
understands the rightness and wrongness of an act in terms of its effect on a specific person. 
Put another way, for something to be bad, it has to make someone worse off than they otherwise 
would have been. That, however, overlooks the possibility that some things might be 
intrinsically bad, irrespective of whatever consequences flow from them. Return, for instance, 
to the example of the slave child: we might reluctantly accept that, in one sense, she is the 
beneficiary of the contract, but still maintain that a grave injustice has been visited upon her. 
Consider, for instance, Woodward’s case of a black man, Smith, who attempts to buy a plane 
ticket from an airline who refuses his custom on the grounds of his race. In the scenario, the 
flight that Smith would have been on crashes, killing everyone on board. Clearly, then, being 
the victim of racial discrimination has been to Smith’s advantage. That, however, does little to 
change the fact that there is something intrinsically wrong in discriminating against people in 
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this way.63 Woodward suggests that this intrinsic badness can be captured by the idea of our 
having ‘relatively specific interests’ which can be violated without making us any worse off. 
We might, for instance, have such an interest in honouring our promises: even if I could greatly 
benefit you by reneging on a prior commitment, my actions would still be blameworthy.64 The 
key idea, then, is that people have specific interests which are independent from considerations 
relating to their welfare. In this way, we can conceive of actions which might be bad for 
someone without making that person any worse off. The hope, then, is that by recasting the 
person-affecting principle to take account of the interests that people have, we may be able to 
resolve the non-identity problem without having to adopt an impersonal approach to ethics. 
 
It is in this context that the distinction between wronging and harming becomes intelligible. As 
Kumar puts it, a central feature of all non-consequentialist ethical theories is that they 
understand that ‘what one does has an intrinsic significance in moral reasoning that is 
independent of what happens as a result of what one does.’65 To elaborate upon this, consider 
the example that Kumar gives of the drunk driver. In the scenario, we are asked to envisage an 
evening walk which is briefly interrupted by an inebriated motorist swerving along the street: 
fortunately, no harm comes to us, and the incident is over so quickly that no distress in caused. 
The fact remains, though, that by choosing to drive in such a state, the motorist exposed any 
number of people to unjustified risks.66 By failing to take account of the interests of others, we 
can, then, wrong someone without necessarily harming them. To develop this, Kumar 
introduces the notion of our having legitimate expectations with regard to one another’s 
conduct. These expectations are informed by a normative ideal of persons as ‘being capable of 
rational self-governance in the pursuit of a meaningful life.’ At the heart of this conception are 
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two separate claims about the nature of persons: firstly, they are understood to be capable of 
recognising and acting upon reasons; and secondly, they are able to reflect on these reasons 
and to select which of them to act upon. Consequently, we are able to appraise the actions, 
intentions, and beliefs of both ourselves and others in a manner that is independent of their 
consequences. In this way, legitimate expectations can apply to attitudes and motivations – in 
addition to actions. Indeed, as Kumar notes, we may be held culpable for ‘[failing] to have 
been responsive to certain considerations that it was legitimate to expect one to be responsive 
[to], or to have taken into account considerations…[that one ought to have] disregarded as 
irrelevant.’67 Wrongdoing, in other words, can occur purely at the level of intention; unlike 
harm, it can be understood without reference to well-being. In this way, the person-affecting 
principle can be recast to reflect the legitimate expectations that we have with respect to one 
another’s conduct. A failure to meet these standards of behaviour can therefore be understood 
to violate fundamental commitments to both moral equality and mutual respect between 
persons. Following Kumar’s use of T.M. Scanlon’s contractualism in his explication of this 
idea, I will refer to this as the contractualist interpretation of the person-affecting principle: as 
we will see, by distinguishing wronging from harming, this approach provides the basis of a 
compelling response to the non-identity problem. 
 
With the contractualist interpretation outlined, we can now consider how the legitimate 
expectations of future generations might be incorporated into our deliberations. To this end, 
Kumar appeals to a distinction between ‘type’ and ‘token’ identity statements. In this context, 
a token identity denotes a specific person or thing whereas type identity refers to the abstract 
category to which those things belong. Thus, a concept like ‘future generations’ could apply to 
the specific populations whose existence is predicated on our choices in the present or to a 
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more general classification encompassing all potentially-existing individuals. Contractualism, 
as Kumar notes, is primarily concerned with determining ‘what a person, understood here as a 
type is entitled to expect of another person in certain types of situation.’68 Thus, when 
attempting to select principles of intergenerational justice, our deliberations are directed toward 
the characteristics and interests that we can attribute to posterity as a whole, rather than specific 
future populations. We can, for instance, ascribe an interest in being treated as bearers of a 
capacity for ‘rational self-governance in pursuit of a meaningful life,’ to future people which, 
in turn, can be used to generate specific rights and entitlements.69 In this way, Kumar suggests, 
a ‘discussion of the metaphysics of identity’ can be bypassed in favour of a ‘theory of 
responsibility.’70 The idea, therefore, would be that actions like depleting resources could not 
be justified to posterity, and that this provides us with reasons to prefer conservation. The fact 
that token populations might benefit from the wrongful action cannot shoulder the justificatory 
burden. In this way, Kumar is able to argue that the non-identity problem need not arise in the 
contractualist framework: we don’t have to choose between recognising the wrongful nature 
of the non-identity cases and the person-affecting principle, because on this interpretation, they 
are convergent.  
 
2.2 Wronging and Political Contractualism 
 
With Kumar’s analysis outlined, we can now consider how the idea of types and wronging can 
inform the political contractualism which concerns us in this enquiry. In this way, we can begin 
to see how the concepts advanced in his account can inform on our theory of intergenerational 
justice. To begin, then, it might be helpful to restate – and expand on – the two challenges that 
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the non-identity problem poses to contractualism as a method of specifying principles of 
justice. In this way, we can see how the appeal to types resolves the non-identity problem in a 
way that, at the very least, allows for general, humanitarian obligations to future generations. 
My aim in this section, then, is to demonstrate that contractualism can approach issues such as 
climate change from a minimal, rights-based perspective – of the kind outlined by Simon 
Caney.71 
 
To recap, then, the non-identity problem raises two specific problems for contractualism as a 
method of specifying principles of justice. Firstly, the justifiability of principles on the grounds 
of their being the object of an ideal agreement is necessarily person-affecting: even if, for 
instance, we were to limit the principles on offer in the original position to impersonal ones, 
the parties to any agreement would still ultimately be representative of people. In order to recast 
the theory in impersonal terms, we would therefore have to abandon the idea that the principles 
of justice specified in this way could be justified to individuals. The move toward an 
impersonal approach would therefore have to come at the expense of an integral aspect of 
contractualism’s appeal. Secondly, Parfit suggests that the contract approach is incapable of 
adjudicating on non-identity cases in an impartial manner. Recall that Rawls chooses not to 
make contractors ignorant as to their existence at the present time, fearing that such a move 
would detract from the plausibility of his thought experiment. Parfit concurs with this, 
observing that to do otherwise would require us to ‘imagine something that we cannot possibly 
imagine.’ Unlike Rawls, though, Parfit thinks that this introduces a bias into the selection of 
principles of intergenerational justice. This is because during the selection of principles, we 
will be aware of the fact that we will exist. For Parfit, this is analogous to assuming that we 
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would all be men when choosing principles that would disadvantage women.72 The charge, 
then, is that by limiting the scope of our deliberations to those people who will exist – and 
structuring any initial agreement accordingly – we violate standards of impartiality in the 
context of different-number problems. Insofar as contractualism derives a considerable degree 
of appeal from its claim to specify equitable terms of cooperation, this is a potential source of 
concern. In order to demonstrate how the appeal to types resolves these issues in favour of the 
contract approach, I will tackle these charges separately: firstly, I will employ Kumar’s analysis 
to show how we might begin to mount a defence of the person-affecting view; and secondly, I 
will address Parfit’s criticism with reference to the Rawlsian contract method.  
 
Kumar’s response to the non-identity problem therefore rests on an appeal to types – that is to 
say, the ‘normatively significant cluster of relevant interests that a person might well have in 
virtue of certain general features of that person and circumstances in which she finds herself.’73 
This, by my reckoning, is entirely consistent with the contract method. Indeed, I would want 
to argue that the original position, as envisaged by Rawls, is best understood as an agreement 
between types of people, rather than token individuals. The veil of ignorance, for instance, is 
specifically designed to deprive the parties of any knowledge relating to the arbitrary features 
of their token identity. In turn, this ensures that principles of justice are selected on the basis 
of their justifiability to an entire society rather than their impact on specific people. To provide 
a useful analogy, Kumar likens the selection of principles in contractualism to a legal system: 
if we were legislating, then we would conduct our deliberations from the perspective of people 
could be referred to by the type description of ‘citizens’ or ‘members of society’, rather than 
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to particular token individuals who might satisfy that description.74 Thus, as Elizabeth 
Finneron-Burns notes in her summary of Kumar’s argument, ‘if a person comes into existence 
with a cluster of interests characteristic of a standpoint’ and we take that standpoint into account 
during our deliberations, then we have ‘fulfilled the requirements of contractualist justification, 
regardless of whether or not it was also that principle that caused the person to exist.’75 The 
original position, of course, is necessarily intragenerational in scope: due to the present time of 
entry interpretation, the parties to the agreement know they are contemporaries. What therefore 
matters, is that all things being equal, there will be future people, and that they will have 
rights.76 Even if future generations are outside of the agreement envisaged by Rawls, we will 
therefore, have obligations toward them: hence, the just savings principle. As I have intimated, 
though, even in the absence of any institutional interaction between present and future people 
we would, on this account, still have humanitarian obligations toward them. We can, then, 
move from the claim that we can wrong future people to the more substantive one that they 
will have rights which institutions are obliged to respect. In this way, the non-identity problem 
can be resolved in a manner that is consistent with the wider contractualist approach and which 
can inform our existing practices toward future generations. 
 
In responding to Parfit’s claim that contractualism violates standards of impartiality, it would 
be expedient to quote directly from his discussion of the ‘ideal contractualist’ method:  
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The principle we choose affects how many people exist. If we assume that we shall 
certainly exist whatever principle we choose, this is like assuming, when choosing a 
principle that would disadvantage women, that we shall certainly be men.77 
The contract method, then, is understood to be incapable of ensuring impartiality within our 
deliberations because the parties to any agreement will know that they exist. This, I would 
contend, is a distinctly unconvincing line of argument: it is not at all clear why existence should 
have any relevance from the perspective of the original position. Indeed, I would want to 
suggest that distributive obligations are owed only to those who do, have, or will exist. This is 
because having an interest in, say, maximising one’s share of primary goods is dependent upon 
existence. Put another way, if we did not exist, then we would not have any interests in the first 
instance: in this sense, non-existence sets no one’s interests back. Consequently, assuming the 
perspective of an existing person within our deliberations on the non-identity cases is not 
analogous to assuming a male perspective when adjudicating on matters relating to gender. 
Indeed, Parfit’s analogy would only hold in a world populated exclusively by men, in which 
case assuming a male perspective would not introduce any biases into our deliberations. In this 
respect, it may be the case that Parfit is applying the contract method in an unorthodox manner. 
Suppose, for instance, that instead of attempting to justify a set of principles from the 
perspective of parties who are unaware of their circumstances, we instead assume the 
perspective of parties who are aware of their prospects. In that case, Parfit may have a point: 
if we approach the non-identity problem from the perspective of future people looking back at 
the historical contingencies leading up to their creation, then knowledge of our existence would 
prejudice our deliberations. However, that ex post method of justification runs contrary to the 
most fundamental insights within Rawlsian contractualism: principles of justice have to be 
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selected ex ante on the basis of general information about our life prospects, rather than 
particular knowledge of our specific circumstances. Consequently, I would argue that Parfit’s 
appraisal of the contract method rests upon a conceptual misunderstanding of the Rawlsian 
original position. It should, however, be noted that the idea of existence justifying the wrongs 
involved in the non-identity cases is a recurrent one in criticisms of the contractualist 
approach.78 I therefore want to use such an example to undermine Kumar’s analysis. The idea, 
in outline, is that the retrospective consent of – wronged – future individuals can be used to 
justify the hardships inflicted on them. This, I will go on to argue, demonstrates the 
comparative desirability of the Rawlsian contract approach over its Scanlonian analogue in 
discussions of intergenerational justice. 
 
2.3 The Young Mother Objection  
 
The argument against Kumar’s position that I have in mind suggests that, so long as people 
have lives which are worth living, the wrongs visited upon them could serve as a justification 
for our actions. To put this another way, future generations are unlikely to have legitimate 
expectations with respect to our present-day actions that would militate against their coming 
into being. In this regard, Parfit’s example of the man born to a fourteen-year-old mother is 
particularly instructive. In it, a girl chooses to have a child at a particularly young age, giving 
her offspring a ‘bad start in life.’ As in any non-identity case, this seemingly obvious example 
of wrongdoing is problematised by the fact that the resultant child’s identity depends on being 
born at the specific time; if their mother were to wait a number of years, then her child would 
be a different person.79 Following Kumar, a contractualist response is likely to focus on the 
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legitimate expectations that types of children have with respect to their parents’s conduct, and 
find that the young mother violated certain of these entitlements. Parfit, however, calls aspects 
of this approach into question when he scrutinises what is actually meant by a type identity 
description such as ‘her child’. Statements of this kind, Parfit suggests, are only intelligible 
prior to the child coming into existence – when they could, conceivably, refer to something 
other than a specific person. At that juncture, it might make sense to claim that the girl’s choice 
would set back the interests of ‘her child.’ Once the mother has the child, however, these words 
and phrases will refer to a specific person – who her actions will have benefitted. The 
distinction between types and tokens, then, is alleged to bring us no further forward in 
responding to the non-identity problem in a person-affecting manner. Indeed, as Parfit later 
puts it in On What Matters: ‘[g]eneral people are not individuals…[and]…sets of 
characteristics can’t reject principles, nor could be owe anything to them.’80 Kumar’s analysis, 
then, can only be rendered intelligible if understood in impersonal terms: after all, that specific 
child is not being denied anything to which it would have been entitled, by virtue of the fact 
that it could not have existed in any other way. To expand upon this, consider those populations 
created through choosing a policy of depletion. Although it is evident that their existence would 
be the consequence of a historical wrongdoing, it is difficult to see how this relates to their 
legitimate expectations. Put another way, so long as we have lives that are worth living, it 
would be strange to invoke the expectations that attach to our type identity in order to bemoan 
the actions of our ancestors; in much the same way, the legitimate expectations of future 
generations are unlikely to act as an effective deterrent when the alternative would be non-
existence. 
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There is, however, another facet to the case of the young mother, which raises further problems 
for the contractualist account. In his discussion of rights and the non-identity problem, Parfit 
cites a letter sent to The Times by the – then adult – son of a teenage mother in response to a 
politician welcoming a decrease in teenage pregnancies. Although the man acknowledged the 
various hardships that had been visited on him by having such a young mother, he emphasised 
that his life was worthwhile. Indeed, not only did he not regret the choice his mother made, he 
was outraged that a politician should have implied that it would’ve been better for him not to 
be born.81 The benefits accrued through existence, then, serve to legitimate his mother’s 
decision. We might, then, want to suggest that there are circumstances in which our legitimate 
expectations – and, in this case, our rights – have to be violated to serve some greater good: in 
this case, existing. To elaborate, consider Parfit’s clarificatory example of a surgeon 
amputating the arm of an unconscious patient in order to save their life.82 In that instance, the 
patient’s rights have almost certainly been violated, but the benefits – in this case, continued 
existence – justify the action. This is particularly problematic, because if the rights and 
legitimate expectations of future people can be overridden with the benefits of existence, then 
contractualism – at least of the form that I am looking to defend – cannot provide guidance in 
the non-identity cases. Indeed, if these reading is correct, then so long as future people have 
lives which are worth living, we are free to select whichever principles we want: their coming 
into existence will justify our impositions on them. 
 
In summary, there are two ways of interpreting this line of argument: either in terms of 
presumed consent, or with reference to the idea that existence itself can justify our actions in 
the present. Returning to the example of the surgeon, we might want to say that her actions are 
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justified with reference to the thought that the patient would agree to the amputation if they 
were still conscious: we can, in other words, presume that they would consent, and this justifies 
violating their rights. We might, however, think that the benefits of continued existence are 
doing the work in this example: on this reading, we might acknowledge that a technical rights 
violation had occurred, but contend that this was justified by the gravity of the situation. In the 
case of a surgeon operating on an unconscious patient to save their life, both of these 
rationalisations strike me as being prima facie credible. However, I would want to argue that 
there is a difference between actions justified on the basis of continued existence – as in the 
case of emergency surgery – and actions which cause someone to exist. In the following 
section, I am going to argue that both of these justificatory strategies depend on an assumption 
which runs contrary to the person-affecting view as it manifests in Rawlsian contractualism: 
that the notional interests of hypothetical people – who will never exist – ought to play some 
role in our deliberations. My contention then, is that by limiting the scope of our concerns to 
those who will exist, the contractualist approach can refute the young mother objection.  
 
2.4 The Actual Persons Restriction 
 
Before offering a response to Parfit’s example of the young mother, something ought to be said 
about the distinction between Rawlsian and Scanlonian contractualism. Up until this point, the 
two approaches have been understood to be broadly convergent. However, in light of the 
objections arising from the young mother example, attention must be drawn to the differences 
in justificatory methodology that sets one apart from the other. As, by now, we are well aware, 
the Rawlsian contract justifies principles on the basis of their being the object of agreement 
within the original position. By way of contrast, Scanlon understands a moral principle to be 
 66 
justified so long as others could not reasonably reject it.83 This is significant, because it means 
Scanlonian contractualism conceives of justification as involving actual people who can reject 
a moral principle. Consequently, when Parfit observes that general people cannot rejected 
principles he highlights a fundamental tension between Kumar’s discussion of types and tokens 
and the underlying precepts of the Scanlonian approach. Within the Rawlsian paradigm, 
however, there is no such contradiction: there, justification takes place at the level of the 
original position between representative parties. So much to say that, unlike Kumar, the 
Rawlsian contractualist can respond to Parfit with consummate ease: general people are not 
individuals, but they are representative of individuals and to that extent types can play a role 
in the justification of distributive principles. It is, then, at this juncture that we diverge from 
Kumar’s analysis. 
 
The case against the contractualist interpretation might be summarised as follows: to be 
properly person-affecting, legitimate expectations have to apply to token individuals of a 
specific type, and this opens the door to the possibility of token individuals either consenting 
to the wrongs being visited upon them or having their rights overridden by the benefits being 
conferred upon them. Put another way, if the populations in the depletion scenario knew that 
their existence was predicated on a violation of their legitimate expectations, then they would 
happily waive whatever entitlements they were due in order to secure their existence. Far from 
resolving the non-identity problem, then, we appear to be faced with the same dilemma that 
Parfit identifies: we can either accept that cases like depletion are no worse than conservation, 
or we can try to argue that these actions are wrong for impersonal reasons. In responding to 
this line of reasoning, I aim to show that it rests upon a controversial assumption which runs 
contrary to Rawlsian contractualism: either the presumed consent of future people or the 
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benefit of existence in and of itself can justify a wrongdoing. So, we are encouraged to imagine 
the future generations in the depletion scenario waiving whatever rights and entitlements they 
may be owed in exchange for their existence. That, however, supposes two things: firstly, that 
we can attribute interests to entirely hypothetical future people who will only come into 
existence if we act in a particular way; and secondly, that these notional individuals have an 
interest in existence for its own sake – that is to say, separate from any of the benefits that we 
might associate with it. As I will now argue, both of these claims rest on highly questionable 
foundations.  
 
In the first instance, our attribution of interests to future generations is dependent upon their 
actually coming into existence: if, for whatever reason, there were no subsequent generations, 
then no individuals would exist to have those interests. For the same reason, it is difficult to 
see how anyone could have an interest in coming into existence. After all, had the young mother 
not had her child, then there would be no person whose interests could have been set back in 
this way. Of course, it is possible that, at some indeterminate point in the future, the young 
mother’s offspring will look back on the circumstances of her birth and feel very grateful to 
have been born. Such a speculative exercise would, however, be impossible had she not been 
born in the first place. We cannot, in other words, seriously conceive of ourselves not existing. 
Consequently, an interest in existence is unlike any other interest we might attribute to people, 
because a failure to satisfy it makes the subject no worse off. Indeed, as both Finneron-Burns 
and Rivka Weinberg have noted, there is a kind of axiological neutrality to existence in and of 
itself: it is a prerequisite to someone having interests rather than an interest in itself.84 In this 
way, an interest in existence is unlike any other interest we might attribute to people, because 
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a failure to satisfy it makes no one any worse off. It is, then, difficult to see how it could 
shoulder the justificatory burden envisaged for it in the young mother objection: we can either 
visit a wrongful life on someone, or we can choose not to. If we elect not to bring that person 
into existence, then far from setting their interests back, we have prevented them from having 
interests at all. Consequently, when we discuss the legitimate expectations that a future 
generation has with respect to our conduct, we have to proceed on the assumption that the 
future generation in question will exist. For this reason, there is an obvious problem in 
attempting to compare the legitimate expectations of the populations in the depletion and 
conservation scenarios: only one population will come into being, and so only one will have 
interests which we can promote or hinder. Indeed, this feature of the contractualist 
interpretation serves to emphasise the importance of type identity to the wider theory: owing 
to the various contingencies involved, we cannot say whether or not a token individual or 
population will come into existence; we can, however, be quite sure in saying that types of 
people will exist in the future, and that they will have interests which we can either promote or 
impede. Thus, the idea that posterity’s legitimate expectations could be outweighed by an 
interest in coming into existence is inherently problematic.  
 
With respect to the argument from presumed consent, I would want to go further and suggest 
that it cannot shoulder the justificatory burden in the various non-identity cases. Indeed, in 
seeking to respond to the young mother objection, I would want to defend a stronger claim: 
that the presumed consent of a hypothetical person should be afforded no weight whatsoever 
in our deliberations. On first impressions, this may appear to be too forceful: after all, even if 
we face problems in attributing real interests to hypothetical people, we can at least conceive 
of people who would consent to our actions if given the chance. However, as Woodward 
observes, the notion of presumed consent can only hold water if we incorporate the consenting 
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agent into our moral community.85 Consider, for instance, the invasive surgery example: 
although the surgeon violates certain rights to ensure that the person continues to exist, the 
presumably consenting party actually exists, and their wishes and interests are therefore 
relevant to our deliberations. Compare this with a scenario in which prospective parents can 
choose between two potential children prior to conception, one of whom will have a 
worthwhile existence, but one which – owing to some form of disadvantage – will fall below 
certain legitimate expectations that we might ordinarily attribute to future people. Now, the 
prospective parents may claim that the disadvantaged child would consent to whatever 
hardships were visited upon them to secure their existence. That proposed justification, 
however, depends upon our accepting that there will be a disadvantaged child who can reflect 
on the circumstances of their birth and retrospectively absolve their parents of any wrongdoing. 
We are, then, being asked to assume that that person will exist in order to justify whatever 
wrongs are inflicted upon them. That, however, is at variance with the spirit of the non-identity 
problem. After all, the problem only arises in the context of the contingencies involved in 
specific people coming into existence. We cannot, in other words, attribute the quality of 
existence to one set of individuals without prejudicing our deliberations. Consequently, we 
ought to exclude considerations relating to the presumed consent of specific future people from 
our analysis. 
 
In turn, this focuses attention on the way in which Parfit formulates the non-identity problem. 
Recall, that on his account, cases such as depletion are wrong because they bring about a state 
of affairs in which a population realises lower standards of living than would have been the 
case had the other population come into existence. We might, however, wonder whether this 
comparison can actually be made. After all, we are comparing the real interests of actual people 
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with the notional ‘interests’ of hypothetical persons. To elaborate, imagine an argument for 
depletion which justifies our impositions on future generations with reference to their status as 
beneficiaries of the policy. So, without depletion they would not exist, and existence allows 
them to derive various benefits associated with a life worth living: therefore, the policy is in 
their interest. Now, Parfit would object to this line of argument by pointing out that although 
depletion might be good for those people, things could be much better in the conservation 
scenario. Such a comparison, however, rests upon on a false equivalence between the existent 
and non-existent populations. To elaborate, imagine that we chose to conserve resources. 
Although our decision might confer certain benefits on those populations who come into 
existence and enjoy worthwhile lives, this does not come at the expense of the people who 
would have existed had we chosen depletion: they do not exist, and as such cannot benefit or 
lose out as a result of our decision. Put another way, not coming existence doesn’t deprive 
anyone of anything, because the person is notionally denied certain benefits never exists.   
There is, then, an obvious problem in attempting to compare the well-being and interests of 
future people who will actually exist with the rival claims of hypothetical people who can 
amount to nothing more than a figment of our imagination.  Indeed, the only way to make such 
a contrast intelligible is to assume an impersonal metric: by, for example, replacing all talk of 
interests and expectations with units of happiness. In this regard, Parfit may be building a 
presumption in favour of his conclusion into the non-identity problem from the outset. In 
drawing attention to this, I should emphasise that although I have certain sympathies with 
Weinberg’s position, I am not attempting to argue that the entire non-identity problem arises 
as a result of a conceptual misunderstanding on Parfit’s part.86 Instead, my remarks are better 
understood as proceeding along similar to lines to those of Christine Korsgaard in her ‘Personal 
Identity and the Unity of Agency’. Namely, that there are underlying commitments in Parfit’s 
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account which tend toward impersonalism in ethics and aggregative reasoning.87 That is not to 
diminish from the quality his analysis, but it does allow us to better understand why, on such 
an account, Principle Q appears to be the appropriate response to the non-identity problem. On 
a contractualist interpretation, though, the only future people we have to justify our actions 
toward are those who will actually exist; hypothetical people are of no importance whatsoever. 
Consequently, our duties and obligations to posterity are necessarily limited to actual future 
people. This has the consequence of blocking the young mother objection, because the 
imagined wrongful act can only be justified if we afford the hypothetical person the status of 
someone who will actually exist. 
 
Of course, it might be that Parfit has something else in mind when discussing cases such as the 
young mother. Weinberg, for instance, suggests that the issue at hand might relate to the fact 
that there will be actual future people who have been wronged, and that their having a 
worthwhile existence acts as a form of tacit consent to the historical wrongdoing.88 The man 
who writes in to The Times, for instance, cannot condemn the actions of his mother because in 
giving birth to him, she granted him a worthwhile existence. Similarly, the people in the 
depletion scenario can have no regrets that their antecedents squandered so many resources, 
because it has enabled them to derive innumerable benefits from existence. The implication is, 
then, that the contractualist interpretation of the person-affecting principle cannot account for 
wrongdoing in real – rather than merely hypothetical – cases. The problem with this line of 
argument is that the move from not regretting one’s existence to accepting all of the burdens 
associated with it is far from obvious. The people in the depletion scenario may, for instance, 
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acknowledge that their lives are worthwhile, but still feel that they have been subject to an 
injustice. Indeed, this brings us back to the earlier discussion about Rawlsian contractualism 
and ex ante justification. As was argued, principles of justice as selected on the basis of general 
facts rather than particular items of knowledge about our individual circumstances. 
Consequently, that there are particular people who, on Parfit’s reading, have benefitted from 
having an inequity visited upon them is moot from the perspective of justice. Instead, what 
matters is that the ancestors of people in the depletion scenario acted on unjustifiable principles. 
In this respect, the slave child is a useful further example, because even though her existence 
depends upon her being enslaved, we can still clearly identify her as the subject of an egregious 
injustice. We might, then, respond to the man who wrote to The Times by acknowledging the 
contingent nature of his existence, and congratulating him on making the most of his life given 
in an inauspicious start, but nevertheless claim that, by virtue of his status as a person, he 
deserved a better start in life. Moreover, within the context of the contractualist approach, we 
can appeal to the idea of legitimate expectations to distinguish unreasonable grievances from 
complaints which are well grounded. Of course, the wronged party may wish to maintain that 
their appreciation of the benefits of existence more than compensates any hardships that have 
been visited upon them. To that, though, we can respond that not having been brought into 
existence would not have been bad for that person; indeed, as we been demonstrated, it would 
neither be beneficial or harmful. However, because that person does exist, they have rights and 
interests which entitle them to certain things: a childhood free from undue hardships, for 
instance. So much to say, that if we maintain that existence and non-existence cannot be 
compared in the way the non-identity problems supposes, then we can retain the idea that future 






To conclude, it has been argued that non-identity cases such as depletion are unproblematic 
within the context of a Rawlsian contractualist interpretation of the person-affecting principle. 
This is because in addition to allowing us to draw an intelligible distinction between wronging 
and harming, it also allows us to exclude hypothetical people from our deliberations. In this 
way, we are able to address Parfit’s example of the young mother in a way that other forms of 
contractualism – such as Kumar’s – would find problematic. This is because within the 
Rawlsian approach, justification is done on the basis of general facts behind a veil of ignorance. 
Justification is not, in other words, owed to specific token individuals who are aware of their 
circumstances. In this way, it is possible to acknowledge the injustice of acts such as depletion 
even if they are responsible for bringing many people into existence who have lives which are 
worth living.  
 
From the perspective of an enquiry into intergenerational justice, these findings may read like 
a formality. However, as I have argued, this line of response to the non-identity problem has 
profound implications for how conceive of our obligations toward posterity. The legitimate 
expectations that people have with regard to one another’s conduct are necessarily varied – and 
depend upon how the relevant parties relate to one another. There must, however, be minimal 
levels of consideration and respect that people can insist on by virtue of their status as persons. 
This, I would contend, correlates with the idea of basic human rights. We can, therefore, be 
understood to have general humanitarian obligations to future generations. After all, those 
generations will be comprised of people, and they will have rights. This, I will accept, is but a 
starting point for a theory of intergenerational justice; it does, however, have practical 
implications from the institutional perspective. Obviously, I want to go further and suggest that 
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obligations of justice obtain at the intergenerational level, but this establishes a clear 
humanitarian baseline. Responding to the non-identity has, then, provided us with the 










3. The Universal Contract and Intergenerational Justice 
 
 
By virtue of the fact that generations are spread out across time they are able to exercise asymmetrical 
powers over one another. This has obvious implications for the contract approach, particularly in 
regard to the kinds of cooperation that can obtain at the intergenerational level. This may go some 
way to explaining why, in John Rawls's formulation of the original position – from which his two 
principles of justice are to be selected – the parties to the agreement are aware of their status as 
contemporaries under what is known as the present time of entry interpretation.89 Our obligations to 
future generations within the orthodox contractualist framework are therefore limited. That, however, 
would jar with many of the core intuitions from which the contract method derives its appeal. After 
all, the original position is intended to overcome the disparities in bargaining power which 
characterise agreements in non-ideal conditions. The fact, then, that contractualism may be incapable 
of addressing a particularly severe – and politically exigent – asymmetry in power may well provide 
a decisive reason against adopting such an approach in the first place. 
 
Suppose, however, that the contract method could be reimagined in such a way as to allow for an 
agreement between generations – either by altering the circumstances of justice or by doing away 
with them altogether. This, broadly speaking, is the ambition of a family of theories of 
intergenerational justice which can be subsumed under the heading of universal contractualism. Such 
an approach conceives of an initial agreement as involving every member of a political society across 
time. Consequently, the problems inherent in attempts to use the orthodox contract method to specify 
principles of intergenerational justice do not arise. Instead, we can move directly from the idea of 
mutually disinterested individuals selecting principles behind a veil of ignorance to a substantive 
theory of intergenerational justice. By dispensing with the present time of entry interpretation, 
                                               
89 Rawls, Theory p. 121. 
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therefore, the advocates of a universal contract hope to overcome the problem of justice between 
generations within the standard articulation of the contractualist method. 
 
My reasons for dedicating a chapter to this approach are twofold: firstly, although it has a pedigree 
which can be traced back to Jane English’s ‘Justice Between Generations’, it has, in recent years, 
emerged as one of the most promising methods of extending the contractualist approach to the 
intergenerational context.
90 Secondly, by arguing against it, I can demonstrate the preferability of my favoured reciprocity-
based account. This chapter will therefore argue against the idea of a universal contract and suggest 
that an amended version of the standard contractualist approach – complete with the present time of 
entry interpretation – can provide us with a stronger basis from which to defend and promote the 
interests of future generations. To do this, I will begin by offering a brief sketch of the circumstances 
of justice and the present time of entry interpretation in Section 1. In Section 2, we will consider the 
arguments for removing the present time of entry interpretation from our deliberations, along with 
Rawls's argument against doing so. It will ultimately be suggested that the major point of contention 
is moral rather than methodological – and that the central universalist claim is that the scope of justice 
ought to be extended to future people. With this in mind, Section 3 will attempt to reconstruct an 
argument for universalism on the grounds of moral arbitrariness, before moving on to suggest that 
this view depends on a thick notion of community. Having established this, Section 4 will then 
contrast the community-oriented approach with its reciprocal analogue and suggest that the latter is 
preferable to the former. Finally, in Section 5, I will outline three challenges to the reciprocity-based 
view and indicate the order in which I will attend to them in the following chapters. In this way, it 
will be argued that a theory of intergenerational justice which retains the reciprocal content associated 
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with the orthodox contract method represents a more propitious way of incorporating the interests of 
posterity into our deliberations. That, in turn, will serve to establish the mutuality problem as the 
principal obstacle to a contractualist theory of justice between generations. 
 
3.1 The Present Time of Entry Interpretation and the Circumstances of Justice 
 
Before going any further, it would be advisable to say something about the history and content of the 
circumstances of justice as an idea within political philosophy. In modern political theory, the idea 
that discussions of justice presuppose certain background conditions having been met originates in 
the work of David Hume – from whom Rawls borrows the phrase 'the circumstances of justice.' 
Although Hume's conception of the circumstances of justice differ from those employed in the 
contemporary contract tradition, there is a clear genealogical link between the former and the latter 
which is worth expanding on. On both accounts, questions of distributive justice are understood to 
arise as and when two or more people make competing claims on a certain good or resource within 
certain contexts. Firstly, conditions of moderate scarcity have to obtain: after all, if resources were 
abundant then the kind of disputes which give rise to the demand of justice would never occur.91 At 
the same time, though, it is suggested that under conditions of extreme scarcity the obligations of 
justice might be overridden by those ‘stronger motives of necessity and self-preservation.’ 92 This 
latter stipulation represents an altogether more controversial aspect of Hume's analysis, since it can 
be read as implying that when our basic needs cannot be met, we can disregard any justice-based 
norms that might impede us. As we will see, though, Rawls’s adaptation of the circumstances of 
justice mitigates certain of the more unsavoury conclusions that may follow from this observation. 
Of course, for disputes to arise, certain subjective criteria also need to be met: in short, there needs to 
be a heterogeneity of wants, and our capacity for altruism must, in some way, be limited. Indeed, as 
                                               
91 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals ed. J.B. Schneewind (Indianapolis, IN.: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1983) p, 21; Rawls, Theory p. 110. 
92 Hume, Enquiry pp. 22-3. 
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Hume points out, if everyone's interests were in harmony with one another, or our capacity for 
altruism was so developed as to allow for impartial reasoning, then we would have no need for 
distributive entitlements: there would be no point in ‘[raising] land-marks between my neighbours 
field and mine, when my heart has made no division between our interests.’93 Thus, the potential for 
conflict is an essential feature of this account, and justice is taken to be the normative standard which 
is required to resolve these disputes in a fair and acceptable manner. At the same time, though, we 
should note that the circumstances of justice presuppose a conception of political society as a 
cooperative venture for mutual advantage. Indeed, Rawls draws our attention to this when he 
introduces the circumstances of justice as the 'conditions under which human cooperation is both 
possible and necessary.'94 Additionally, then, the circumstances of justice have to take account of the 
various social and physical criteria which must be met if cooperative interaction of the kind envisaged 
is to obtain. It is in this context that the intergenerational dimension of our distributive obligations is 
so problematic. After all, the power that earlier generations wield over their descendants is, by 
definition, asymmetrical; posterity cannot interact with their forebears on equivalent terms. Having 
said this, disparities in bargaining power are also present at the intragenerational level – and one of 
the stated aims of Rawls's original position is to neutralise these differences by making the parties to 
any agreement ignorant of morally arbitrary facts about themselves and the society they inhabit. Much 
therefore hinges upon how the circumstances of justice are incorporated into the contractualist 
framework. 
 
To appreciate the points of divergence between the Humean and Rawlsian accounts of the 
circumstances of justice, it is necessary to locate them in the wider context of their respective 
conceptions of justice. Rawls, for instance, conceives of justice as being ‘the first virtue of social 
institutions’ – the focal point of his enquiry being the selection of principles to regulate the manner 
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by which the benefits and burdens of social cooperation are to be apportioned at the institutional 
level.95 Hume, by way of contrast, orients his discussion of justice around a set of institutional 
conventions which arise over time, and which are justified by their utility – most obviously, those 
relating to property and contract.96 There are, then, subtle differences in how the circumstances of 
justice are employed in either theory: on the Humean interpretation, they represent a series of 
conditions which have to be met before those norms and mores begin to develop; whereas on the 
Rawlsian account they refer instead to that set of features which make the relevant kinds of 
institutional interaction possible and necessary. When properly located within Rawls’s wider theory, 
this seemingly minor amendment to Hume’s initial understanding of the circumstances of justice has 
far-reaching implications. Simply put, it allows the discussion to be recast in terms of how an 
agreement might be reached with respect to the selection of principles. Hence, Rawls is able to use 
the circumstances of justice to inform his veil of ignorance. In this way, an initial agreement can be 
arrived at in conditions which ameliorate disparities in knowledge and bargaining power. Rawls 
therefore deprives the parties of particular facts about themselves and their society. At the same time, 
though, certain items of knowledge will be conducive to the kind of agreement that Rawls has in 
mind, and it is in this context that the parties to the original position are made aware of their status as 
contemporaries. Whether this is the case is a significant point of contention within the literature. For 
now, though, it is of note that Rawls's understanding of the circumstances of justice differ subtly from 
Hume's, and this allows him – and the contract method itself – to avoid the more obviously 
controversial aspects of the standard Humean account. The question, however, remains as to how 
such an approach can reconcile the idea of political society as a mutually advantageous cooperative 
venture with the unavoidable realities of the intergenerational context. 97 
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Rawls, then, makes the parties to his original position aware of their status as contemporaries in order 
to bring about an agreement. We may, however, question why this is the case – particularly when we 
consider the problems that this move engenders. To elaborate upon this, it is worth contrasting the 
present time of entry interpretation with the idea of the original position as a general assembly 
involving every member of society over time. Were we to adopt the latter interpretation of the original 
position, then the principles of justice would, presumably, have intergenerational scope. Put another 
way, mutually disinterested parties who are ignorant as to which generation they will belong to will 
select principles which apply across time. The general assembly therefore represents an obvious way 
to attend to the problem of justice between generations. By way of contrast, the present time of entry 
interpretation appears ill-suited to the intergenerational context. After all, although the parties are 
ignorant as to the temporal location of their generation, the simple fact that they are aware of their 
contemporaneity could militate against their selecting any principles to govern intergenerational 
conduct. Indeed, as Rawls notes, on such an interpretation there is no reason for mutually disinterested 
parties to select a principle of intergenerational savings: prior generations will have either saved or 
not, and nothing they do can change that.98 It may, therefore, seem odd that Rawls chooses the present 
time of entry interpretation over its competitor. To explain why, it is worth quoting Rawls's discussion 
of the general assembly interpretation at length:  
 
 [T]he original position is not to be thought of as a general assembly which includes at one 
 moment everyone who will live at some time; or, much less, as an assembly of everyone  
 who could live at some time…[i]f we conceived of the original position in either of these  
 ways, the conception would cease to be a natural guide to intuition and would lack a clear 
 sense. In any case, the original position must be interpreted so that one can at any time adopt 
 its perspective. It must make no difference when one takes up this viewpoint, or who does 
 so: the restrictions must be such that the same principles are always chosen.99 
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The general assembly interpretation of the original position is therefore rejected on the grounds that 
it would 'cease to be a natural guide to intuition.' The implication, then, is that the present time of 
entry interpretation is needed to allow us to adopt the perspective of the original position. That, 
though, raises the question as to what differentiates generational membership from race, class, gender, 
and the myriad other facts about ourselves that the veil of ignorance blinds us to. The answer, in brief, 
is that Rawls thinks that knowledge of our existing at a specific time is essential from the perspective 
of the individuals imagining themselves in the original position. In this regard, we can imagine the 
conceptual difficulties in requiring someone who is aware of their existence at the present time being 
asked to imagine their being dead – as in the case of past generations – or unborn – in the case of 
future generations. Equally, it may be the case that Rawls fears that different principles would be 
chosen in the event of a general assembly: more will be said about this in Section 2, but it may be the 
case that certain forms of cooperation are only possible between contemporaries – and that this may 
be relevant from the perspective of justice. In either case, adopting the present time of entry 
interpretation leaves Rawls with the problem of attempting to extend his theory into the 
intergenerational realm, without undermining the bases of his theory. Initially, this took the form of 
an amendment to the motivational assumptions about the parties in the original position: in the 
original 1971 edition of A Theory of Justice, the parties are asked to conceive of themselves as 'heads 
of families' possessed of a desire to further the welfare of their proximate descendants.100 Aside from 
the obvious problem such an assumption may raise with regard to the institution of the family, it also 
violates the notion that fair principles of justice are those which would be selected by mutually 
disinterested parties behind a veil of ignorance. Consequently, in his later writings on the subject, it 
is suggested that a principle of intergenerational savings can be generated by asking the parties to 
agree to a principle that they would want all prior generations to have followed.101 Although this 
seems intuitively plausible, it is not immediately clear why the parties to the original position would 
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entertain the question. So much to say that the present time of entry interpretation is inherently 
problematic from the perspective of a contractualist theory of intergenerational justice. It might, 
therefore, be reasonable to ask whether the general assembly interpretation of the original position 
might, on balance, be preferable. 
 
3.2 The General Assembly Revisited 
 
Indeed, given the problems occasioned by the present time of entry interpretation, it is worth 
considering whether the advantages outweigh the obvious drawbacks. Recall, that Rawls's principal 
reason for preferring the present time of entry over the general assembly interpretation relates to the 
intelligibility of the resultant thought experiment. In outline, he wants people to be able to picture 
themselves in the original position, and asking them to imagine themselves not existing at the present 
moment renders the deliberative exercise implausible. The idea, then, is that we can imagine ourselves 
as being born into a different socioeconomic class, or being assigned a different gender at birth, but 
we cannot credibly deny the fact that we exist in the here and now: it is a prerequisite of our being 
able to adopt the perspective of the original position at a given time. That, though, overlooks the 
insuperable difficulties already involved in assuming the perspective of the original position: we are 
asked to disabuse ourselves of myriad facts about ourselves, many of which are constitutive of our 
identities. For instance, as Jane English argues, the veil of ignorance already requires us to set aside 
fundamental aspects of our identity, such as our conception of the good; it is not obvious that this is 
any easier than denying our existence. 102  The rigid dichotomy that Rawls delineates between 
existence on the one hand and contingent features of our identity on the other, is therefore highly 
questionable. More significantly, though, in his subsequent writing on the subject of the original 
position, Rawls appears to undermine this line of argument. As against the claim that the original 
position is metaphysically problematic, Rawls argues that it should be conceived of as a 'device of 
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representation.' We can therefore sidestep any of the difficulties inherent in attempting to conceive of 
persons who are devoid of any of the constitutive parts of their identity; instead, the parties to the 
initial agreement are simply 'artificial creatures inhabiting [a] device of representation.'103 The parties 
to the original position are therefore representatives rather than actual people. That, though, raises an 
obvious question as to why representatives need to be aware of their existence at a given time. Indeed, 
one can easily conceive of a general assembly in which mutually disinterested representatives from 
all generations select a set of principles with intergenerational scope. Rawls's principal argument in 
favour of the present time of entry interpretation is therefore unconvincing. Unless, then, we can find 
some additional reason against adopting it, the general assembly interpretation may be the most 
intuitively plausible way of extending the contract method into the intergenerational context. 
 
There may, of course, be another reason why Rawls is reluctant to adopt the general assembly 
interpretation of the original position: namely, it might not yield the results he is looking for. After 
all, on the Rawlsian analysis, it is important that 'the restrictions must be such that the same principles 
are always chosen.' The implication, then, is that an interpretation of the original position which 
envisages the agreement as being one between non-contemporaneous representatives might select 
different principles of justice. On first impressions, this may seem odd: after all, the connection 
between the present time of entry interpretation and the selection of principles is far from obvious. 
Indeed, in her seminal analysis, English applies the two principles of justice as fairness directly to the 
problem of justice between generations in order to specify a fair rate of intergenerational saving.104 
On further reflection, though, there may be an issue with the difference principle within the 
intergenerational context. For instance, in his opening remarks on the question of justice between 
generations, Rawls notes that 'when the difference principle is applied to the question of saving over 
generations, it entails either no saving at all or not enough saving to improve social circumstances 
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sufficiently so that all the equal liberties can be effectively exercised.'105 The idea, then, is that 
conceiving of the original position as a general assembly introduces a degree of incongruity into our 
deliberations. Imagine, for instance, that we attempted to adopt the perspective of the 
intergenerationally worst off: would we look to maximise the prospects of the least advantaged group 
– at the possible expense of intergenerational savings – or look to secure the continued existence of 
just institutions over time? In this way, the present time of entry interpretation can be understood to 
simplify the deliberative exercise: by focusing on relations between contemporaries, the inevitable 
trade-offs that would otherwise characterise the selection of principles can be avoided. Of course, it 
may be the case that our intuitions can ultimately be clarified in the general assembly – perhaps, for 
instance, English is right that a favourable rate of savings can be specified by the difference principle. 
It is, however, the case that such an interpretation of the original position introduces an additional 
layer of complexity to the thought experiment. We may, therefore, surmise that the general assembly 
interpretation is rejected by Rawls due to its problematic nature within the structure of his argument 
from the original position: simply put, it dampens the intuitive appeal of the difference principle. 
 
We should, however, acknowledge that there is a deeper, and more troubling respect in which the 
general assembly interpretation might be understood to militate against the selection of the difference 
principle. As Rawls notes in his subsequent writings, the difference principle is understood to reflect 
a deeper idea of reciprocity. The idea, in summary, is that by arranging the basic structure in such a 
way as to ensure that the least advantaged are as well off as they could possibly be, we ensure that 
the contingencies of birth work to the benefit of all in society.106 Failing to do this, Rawls avers, 
means that those more fortunate individuals – who have been blessed with valuable talents, 
advantageous social backgrounds, and the like – are effectively using the worst off as a means to their 
own aggrandisement. Rawls's argument for the difference principle therefore hinges on the idea of 
political society as a solidaristic community, in which social cooperation is directed toward the 
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collective advancement of its members. We may, however, question whether this holds at the 
intergenerational level. After all, by virtue of the fact that generations are spread out across time, the 
prospects for reciprocal interaction of the kind envisaged by Rawls's argument for the difference 
principle are severely limited. Put another way, it is difficult to see how having distant descendants 
who will be considerably better off than us as a result of historical contingencies turns us into a means 
to an end. On the contrary, this might simply be an unavoidable feature of human societies. We may, 
of course, suggest that a feeling of solidarity might hold between proximate generations, but that this 
sense diminishes over time. This, of course, is highly problematic, because it would count against the 
selection of the difference principle within the general assembly interpretation of the original position. 
Simply put, if the types of reciprocity that hold between generations are limited, then the obligations 
which flow from such interaction will be equally restricted. This, then, brings us back to the 
circumstances of justice – and Rawls's contention that they represent the conditions which make 
social cooperation 'possible and necessary.' Rawls is therefore using the present time of entry 
interpretation to privilege a certain kind of cooperation within his theory: namely, reciprocal 
interaction. By way of contrast, those who favour the general assembly interpretation may be drawn 
toward a very different conception of social cooperation – or perhaps even, theories of justice which 
presuppose no such interaction. The debate between the standard contract model and its universalist 
analogue should, therefore, be seen as a moral rather than a methodological debate: the question is 
not how best to incorporate future generations into our deliberations, but what weight should be 
attributed to their interests. As we will now see, the proponents of a universal contract are in fact 
arguing in favour of full distributive equality across generations. 
 
3.3 Equality and Intergenerational Justice 
 
Contractualist theory is founded on a commitment to moral equality: it is for this reason that any 
initial agreement is directed toward specifying principles that could be justified to those who will be 
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subject to them. More particularly, Rawls's utilisation of the veil of ignorance serves to further this 
commitment, by neutralising any disparities in knowledge or bargaining power. It may, however, be 
the case that in the intergenerational context, the standard contract approach fails to live up to its 
egalitarian ambitions. Consider, for instance, Brian Barry's critical remarks in his 'Justice between 
Generations':  
 
 'For the whole idea – and the intellectual fascination – of 'justice as fairness' is that it takes 
 self-interested agents, and, by the alchemy of the 'original position', forces them to choose 
 principles of universal scope. In relation to subsequent generations, the postulate of self- 
 interest is relaxed to allow concern for our successors, but this naturally limited sympathy is 
 not forced by the logic of the 'original position' to be extended any further than it extends  
 naturally. Our limited sympathies towards our successors are fed into the sausage-machine 
 of 'justice as fairness' and returned to as duly certified obligations. We come seeking moral 
 guidance and simply get our prejudices underwritten…'107 
 
The accusation, then, is that the present time of entry interpretation militates against our reaching 
genuinely impartial conclusions in our deliberations on intergenerational justice. Building upon this 
line of criticism, Stephen M. Gardiner has identified what he terms the 'close to the bone' objection 
to the standard contract approach. In outline, Gardiner argues that an inability to address questions of 
intergenerational justice undermines the appeal of the contract method itself. In part, this reflects the 
clear and obvious asymmetries in power which characterise the intergenerational context. More 
acutely, though, Gardiner suggests that the problems identified in the intergenerational realm are 
broadly analogous to those that obtain at the intragenerational level. Taken together, these 
observations lead to a troubling conclusion: 
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 '[These] considerations suggest two things. First, the intergenerational setting might raise  
 issues very close to those that motivate many to be contract theorists in the first place. This 
 suggests that a deep inability to overcome problems in these areas may undermine the  
 appeal of the whole contract approach. Second, the situation arising between generations  
 closely resembles those of central concern to contract theorists even though the element of 
 cooperation (as understood on the exchange model) appears to be absent. Hence, the  
 analogy introduces some doubt about whether the standard account of cooperation must or 
 should play a central role in how we understand such situations.'108 
 
The implication, then, is that by focusing on cooperation, the standard contract approach cannot 
address the problems of the intergenerational context in a manner consistent with the fundamental 
values that underpin its appeal. In response to this, both Gardiner and Barry argue that an agreement 
with universal scope would be the obvious way of extending the contract approach to the 
intergenerational level in a manner that is consistent with a commitment to equality.109 The central 
idea motivating universalism, then, is a moral one: future generations are comprised of people who 
warrant the same level of respect as our contemporaries, and we therefore have to seek their 
agreement within the original position. Notice that the idea of cooperation plays no role in this 
articulation of the contract approach. Instead, our obligations to future generations derive from a 
principle of equal concern for the rights and interests of people across time. 
 
A principle of equal concern, however, is merely an abstract ideal which can, in practice, manifest in 
any number of forms. Indeed, were we to agree with Ronald Dworkin's analysis, then we could 
conceivably argue that nearly all theories of justice appeal to the idea of equal concern.110  We 
therefore need to say more about how and why the standard contract approach violates this norm. Put 
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another way, what would be wrong – from the perspective of equality – in attending to the rights and 
interests of future people through the prism of a series of humanitarian obligations? In this respect, 
Barry's analysis is particularly instructive: 
 
 'The alternative route out of Rawls's difficulties is to pursue the logic of his own analysis  
 more rigorously. This entails scrapping the part of the construction specifying that all people 
 in the 'original position' are contemporaries and know that they are. We should now have to 
 imagine that there is a meeting to decide on intergenerational relationships at which all  
 generations are represented. Clearly the 'veil of ignorance' would be required to conceal  
 from them which generation each of them belonged to. Otherwise, an early generation  
 would always have the whip-hand over a later one in the negotiations.'111 
 
Here, then, we have a clear expression of why the present time of entry interpretation can be said to 
undermine the foundations of the contract method: making people aware of their generation of birth 
is comparable to informing them of their initial social position or native endowments. The present 
time of entry interpretation is therefore understood to violate a principle of impartiality within the 
original position. Recall that Rawls places his party behind a veil of ignorance to build impartiality 
into the structure of his initial agreement. The idea, in outline, is that mutually disinterested parties 
who are made ignorant of morally arbitrary facts about themselves and their society will select 
impartial principles of justice in order to further and promote their interests. Barry, though, draws 
attention to one respect in which Rawls does not follow through on his stated aim: in making the 
parties to the original position aware of a morally arbitrary fact about themselves, in the form of their 
being of the same generation. We might, then, be able to summarise the central argument motivating 
the universal contractualist position in a simple syllogism: 
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 (1) When selecting principles of justice, we should exclude all morally arbitrary facts about 
  ourselves and the societies we inhabit from our deliberations. 
 
 (2) Generation of birth is one such morally arbitrary factor. 
 
 (3) Therefore,  when selecting principles of justice, we should exclude all knowledge of our 
  generation of birth from our deliberations. 
 
Notice, that Rawls does go some way to depriving his parties of facts about their generation of birth 
– they are unaware of the specific generation that they will be born into – but this does not translate 
into a general prohibition on knowledge relating to generational membership within the original 
position. 112  It is also worth stating that even if only one generation were to participate in the 
agreement, the very fact of making them unaware of their being contemporaries would ensure that 
the contract had intergenerational scope. Removing the present time of entry interpretation therefore 
has profound consequences for the contract approach and would appear to make good on a prior 
commitment to deliberative impartiality. 
 
We may, however, begin to unpick this position by questioning whether or not the argument provided 
actually requires an intergenerational contract. On first impressions, the universalist argument seems 
eminently agreeable: after all, the key normative premise – that we ought to exclude morally arbitrary 
facts from our deliberations – is common to most forms of egalitarianism, and one's generation of 
birth is very clearly a morally arbitrary fact about oneself. On closer inspection, though, a problem 
can be discerned: this argument says nothing about the distributive scope of justice. To elaborate, 
were we to maintain that the obligations of distributive justice held only between contemporaries, 
then we could agree to the universalist argument, but continue to maintain that the obligations of 
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justice were intragenerational in nature. On such an account, failing to apply full distributive equality 
to people of other contemporary generations would be a source of injustice, on the grounds that 
generation of birth is morally arbitrary. That, however, is as far as our egalitarian commitments would 
take us. Those proposing a universal contract, then, need to make an additional argument for 
extending the scope of justice to apply across generations. In this regard, two very different strategies 
can be identified. Firstly, it may be argued that the obligations of justice are owed to people as such, 
and extending the scope of our obligations across time is a natural corollary of this commitment. 
Following its use in the global justice literature, I will refer to this position as non-relational 
egalitarianism.113 At the same time, though, it may be the case that the obligations of justice are 
triggered only in specific contexts, but that – contrary to Rawls – this is not mutually advantageous 
cooperation, but membership of a given ethical community. Although these theories need not be 
communitarian in the narrow sense of the term, I will refer to them under the heading of relational 
communitarianism. As we will see, the latter of these two lines of argument represents a promising 
alternative to the reciprocal logic that informs Rawls's interpretation of the contract method. 
 
Before proceeding any further, though, I would like to sound a word of caution. In the following 
section, we will employ concepts and arguments from the global justice literature in order to elucidate 
positions in the intergenerational context. It is, then, important to bear in mind that the focus of this 
enquiry is on intergenerational justice at the domestic or institutional level. Consequently, even 
though certain of the positions that I have in mind would conceive of the demands of justice in global, 
as well as transgenerational terms, for our present purposes we are only interested in their application 
to the intergenerational context. 
 
i) Non-relational approaches 
 
                                               
113 Andrea Sangiovanni, 'Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State,' Philosophy and Public Affairs 35 (2007): 3-39 pp. 
5-6. 
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Within contractualist thought, obligations of justice are triggered by specific forms of social 
interaction. Non-relational approaches dispute this, conceiving of justice as being owed to people 
irrespective of their institutional standing. Equality is therefore understood to be a foundational value 
with universal scope. Within the philosophical literature, this position receives its clearest articulation 
in the following remark by Charles R. Beitz on the subject of global justice:  
 
 'If the original position is to represent individuals as equal moral persons for the purpose of 
 choosing principles of institutional or background justice, then the criterion of membership 
 is possession of the two essential powers of moral personality – a capacity for an effective 
 sense of justice and a capacity to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good. Since 
 human beings possess these essential powers regardless of whether, at present, they belong 
 to a common cooperative scheme, the argument for construing the original position globally 
 need not depend on any claim about the existence or intensity of international social  
 cooperation.'114 
 
Justice is therefore understood to have intergenerational scope by virtue of the intrinsic features of 
human beings. On first impressions, this is highly agreeable: after all, if we can conceive of two 
individuals with the same needs and interests, living at different times, then it would be strange to 
suggest that we should differentiate their claims on the basis of their institutional standing with respect 
to us. On the contrary, a natural way to approach any disputes that might arise between them would 
be to afford them parity in our deliberations. This, broadly speaking, is the position adopted by Barry 
in response to the problem of intergenerational justice.115 In summary, then, individuals – rather than 
institutions – are, on the non-relational account, assumed to be the appropriate subjects of any moral 
                                               
114 Charles R. Beitz, 'Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment,' Journal of Philosophy 80(10) (1983): 591-600 p. 
595. 
115 Brian Barry, ‘Justice Between Generations’, in Liberty and Justice: Essays in Political Theory 2 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1991), 242-58. See also, Reglitz, ‘Practice-Independence of Intergenerational Justice’. 
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enquiry, and our moral and political obligations should reflect this. Institutions, then, are seen as the 
instruments through which justice can be pursued, rather than the site of our justice-based obligations.  
 
Although this conception has a certain moral and intellectual appeal, it is far from obvious how a 
concern for the needs and interests of future generations – or, for that matter, the global poor 
– translates into a demand for distributive equality. To elaborate, by pursuing equality we are 
attempting to bring about a certain relationship between past, present, and future: even if the basic 
needs of posterity are met, we have not fulfilled our obligations until their needs and interests are met 
to the same extent as ours. We might, therefore, want to enquire as to what the relevant features of 
human individuals are that should lead us to pursue distributive equality between them, rather than, 
say, sufficiency. In this way, one can reasonably dispute the central contention of non-relational 
egalitarianism that equality is a fundamental value within our deliberations. More particularly, the 
non-relational approach can lead to problematic conclusions. Consider, for instance, the – highly 
likely – possibility that future generations will enjoy significantly higher living standards than we do, 
by virtue of technological advancement. Although this would result in significant disparities between 
individuals, it is far from clear how this constitutes an injustice; on the contrary, it is simply the 
inevitable consequence of a historical process. Moreover, even if we accept that it is a source of 
injustice, it is difficult to see how it could be addressed without levelling down: we might, for 
instance, be required to stymie the process of technological change, or to deliberately squander 
resources. Although very few non-relational egalitarians would advocate such methods, it does hint 
at a wider problem for the theory: namely, that it builds motivations which approximate to envy into 
our deliberations. So much to say that non-relational egalitarianism, at least as it is presently 
constituted, rests on a controversial conception of equality which many would reject. 
 
It may, of course, be the case that the universal contract could take a non-egalitarian form. Indeed, if 
my analysis is correct, then it is eminently probable that the principles selected in such circumstances 
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would engender obligations of a far less demanding nature than full distributive equality. Moreover, 
we can retain the intrinsic qualities of human beings as our starting point but reach very different 
conclusions if we appeal to the idea that people have basic needs which ought to be met as a matter 
of justice. What I have in mind here, then, is a universal contract which gives rise to a form of 
intergenerational sufficientarianism. This would avoid many of the counterintuitive conclusions of 
non-relational egalitarianism and accord with certain of our intuitions concerning future generations. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to see how a principle of sufficiency would ever be selected within the 
confines of the contract approach. Put simply, many of the ideas which undergird contractualism are 
at variance with the idea of sufficiency as a distributive principle. The most obvious of these being 
why rational parties looking to maximise their individual shares of primary goods would be minded 
to pursue sufficiency when they could be much better off. Indeed, this issue is particularly acute when 
examined within the intergenerational context for the simple reason that the disparities in wealth are 
so vast: some generations will have to subsist on the breadline whilst others will command vast 
amounts of wealth. Reaching a principle of sufficiency within the original position would, therefore, 
only be possible if we were to radically alter the motives and fundamental nature of the parties to it. 
Indeed, for all of its failings, non-relational egalitarianism was, at the very least, broadly consistent 
with the nature of the parties to any initial agreement. Given the nature of the original position, it is 
difficult to see how non-egalitarian principles of justice could be selected. Furthermore, a principle 
of intergenerational sufficiency could also lead to deeply counterintuitive conclusions. Consider, for 
instance, an example in which an earlier generation intentionally squander resources, leaving their 
successors on the threshold – thereby meeting their distributive obligations whilst needlessly 
restricting prospects of their descendants. The central problem, however, for any non-egalitarian form 
of non-relational contractualism consists in the fact that the original position is structured in such a 
way as to lead to broadly egalitarian conclusions. Unless we are willing to amend some of the 
fundamental elements of the contract approach, we would therefore be advised to look elsewhere for 
a universalising strategy. 
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ii) Relational communitarianism 
 
With the non-relational approach dealt with, we now turn to a relational argument for extending the 
scope of justice to our distant successors: namely, the broadly communitarian idea that they are owed 
justice by virtue of their being members of the same community as us. Although this idea is presented 
as being a communitarian one, its appeal is arguably far wider. One can, for instance, see aspects of 
this approach in Rawls's characterisation of political society as a 'fair system of social cooperation 
over time, from one generation to the next.'116 More specifically, an argument of this nature forms the 
basis of David Miller's liberal nationalist thesis, according to which our obligations to posterity arise 
from the historical sacrifices of our forebears: their having 'toiled and spilt their blood' in service to 
the nation obliges us to continue the national project.117 For now, however, we will focus on a more 
explicitly communitarian account, in the form of Janna Thompson's discussion of lifetime-
transcending interests. In summary, lifetime-transcending interests are a specific type of interest 
which relate to both our posthumous concerns and the historical projects of our forebears. 
Consequently, these lifetime-transcending interests can generate a rationale for intergenerational 
cooperation which does not depend on mutual advantage: instead, we cooperate with future 
generations to promote the various projects that we care about. More than simply providing the dead 
with a vehicle for the continuation of their projects, however, it is argued that such lifetime-
transcending interests provide future generations with a fertile intellectual and cultural inheritance in 
which to develop and act upon their own projects. This, Thompson suggests, motivates an ‘objective 
interest’ in the ‘continued existence and survival…of the heritage [we have] obtained from the past,’ 
leading us to identify our own interests with those of political society – thereby motivating certain 
intergenerational distributive obligations.118 We can therefore conceive of our having reasons to 
                                               
116 Rawls, Political Liberalism p. 14. 
117 David Miller, On Nationalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) p. 23. 
118 Janna Thompson, ‘Identity and Obligation in a Transgenerational Polity’ in Gosseries and Meyer, Intergenerational 
Justice pp. 37-8; 43-5. 
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extend the scope of justice into the future, most obviously with respect to promoting these objective 
interests in the survival of our community and the collective projects that characterise it. 
 
Of course, the appeal to community raises two difficulties from the intergenerational perspective: 
firstly, our sense of community tends to be temporally limited. We might, for instance, conceive of 
our community as extending over a few generations, rather than across time itself. Secondly, it may 
very well be the case that future generations ascribe to a different set of moral and political beliefs 
than we do. We might, therefore, have very little reason to extend the scope of our distributive 
obligations to distant generations on account of their being members of our ethical community. In 
this regard, Thompson's position is arguably more resilient. As she notes: 
 
 'We can reasonably assume that people of the more remote future will have lifetime- 
 transcending interests and will make lifetime- transcending demands. Given the importance 
 of these interests to human life, as we understand it, it is morally necessary to make this  
 assumption. Even remote generations can be regarded as successors, as participants in a  
 never-ending chain of relationships in which each generation fulfils moral requirements in 
 respect to its predecessors and successors. The people of the remote future may have  
 different moral ideas and different political institutions, but so long as they are in the above 
 sense our successors, we have a duty not act in ways that might undermine the conditions 
 that need to exist if they are to maintain their institutions and pursue their interests.'119 
 
The idea, then, correlates broadly with Edmund Burke's conception of political society as being a 
compact between ‘those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are [yet] to be born.’120 
In brief, our community is, by its very definition, a transgenerational entity and to the extent that we 
                                               
119 Ibid. p. 47. 
120 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (London: Penguin, 1968) p. 195. 
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identify with it, we have reasons to extend our distributive obligations into the future. In this way, 
there is a potential mechanism which may allow for a genuinely intergenerational contract. Future 
generations are therefore members of our political community and even our distant descendants are, 
in a sense, our successors. Consequently, if we are possessed of a desire to promote and sustain a just 
society over time, granting posterity parity in our deliberations may be seen as a requirement of 
justice. 
 
3.4 Community, Reciprocity, and Posterity 
 
We may, then, have reason to extend the scope of our obligations on account of a commitment to 
furthering the communal projects which underpin political society. On such a reading, the demand 
for intergenerational equity arises from a need to specify fair terms of collaboration. Notice, however, 
that unlike the standard contract approach, this cooperation does not have to be mutual; the only 
prerequisite is our participation in the 'never-ending chain of relationships in which each generation 
fulfils moral requirements in respect to its predecessors and successors.' In this final section, I intend 
to contrast this approach with a reciprocity-based view of our obligations to future generations, 
suggesting that the latter is preferable to the former. In contrast with the community-based view, the 
reciprocal approach holds that our obligations to posterity are based on historical or expected 
contribution to a process of intergenerational savings. To summarise, then, the reciprocal approach 
locates our justice-based obligations to posterity in our having received certain goods from our 
predecessors and the expectation that we will make an equitable and equivalent transfer to our 
successors. Obligations of intergenerational justice are therefore directed toward the development, 
realisation, or sustenance of certain key public goods: just institutions, environmental integrity, and 
the like. Within the context of the community-based approach, however, obligations of justice attempt 
to cultivate equitable relations between past, present, and future in order to further certain communal 
projects – in particular, the values and aspirations of political society itself. In what follows, I will 
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argue that the reciprocal approach is better positioned to capture our basic intuitions about 
intergenerational justice. 
 
To that end, it may be worth elaborating on the obvious contrast that can be drawn between the two 
approaches. On the one hand, the community-oriented account locates the obligations of justice 
within a moral framework in which we are required to preserve certain goods and resources to allow 
for the continued existence of our community. Our obligations, then, turn upon the values and mores 
which characterise an ethical community. On the other, the reciprocal approach locates our 
obligations in the production and preservation of a specific set of goods and resources. Crucially, 
such preservation takes place for its own sake. In other words, on the reciprocal account we do not 
have to conserve natural resources because they are conducive to the survival of our community; on 
the contrary, we might be obliged to preserve them because of their intrinsic importance within a 
cooperative endeavour over time. This distinction is significant, because the community-based 
approach is arguably less resonant with our intuitions than the reciprocal one. Were we to discuss the 
problems of resource depletion over time, for example, its effect on certain values would likely be a 
tangential concern, as compared to the harms visited on future generations and the inherent unfairness 
of squandering a valuable resource in this way. Suppose, however, that the depletion of a given 
resource had no bearing on the life prospects of future generations or the survival of our community. 
In that case, might there still be something objectionable in our using up vast amounts of resources? 
Instinctively, I would argue that there was. By acting wastefully and using more than our fair share 
of the resource in question, we would be depriving future generations of various opportunities to 
utilise it in the pursuit of their own projects, even if their material prospects were unaffected. In this 
respect, the reciprocal approach is better placed to explain certain of our intuitions within the 
intergenerational context. That, of course, is not to say that the preservation of community is wholly 
irrelevant from the perspective of intergenerational justice, but the concerns it addresses are of a 
largely subsidiary nature in the context of issues such as climate change. 
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A further concern facing the community-based view relates back to the original position: how, in 
other words, could we translate its fundamental insights into the initial agreement. After all, the 
parties in the original position are looking to maximise their shares of a relatively specific set of 
primary goods. There is, then, an obvious corollary between the reciprocal view – according to which 
the principles of justice exist to regulate the institutions and practices which generate and safeguard 
those goods – and the contract method as it is presently constituted. There is, of course, the possibility 
that the values which the community-based view seeks to promote relate back to primary goods in 
some way: we might posit that a political culture which embodies certain values is a necessary 
condition for the protection and promotion of basic liberties, for instance. That, however, draws the 
communal approach toward its reciprocal analogue: certain values, on this understanding, are worthy 
of being promoted for instrumental reasons – namely, their connection to primary goods. Indeed, one 
can see how certain cultural practices could, on this account, be rebranded within the language of 
reciprocity as a form of contribution. The problem with pursuing a unificatory strategy of this nature 
is that as both approaches become increasingly enmeshed, the scope for a universal contract is greatly 
reduced. After all, the core features of the intergenerational context – the temporally distant nature of 
the parties, asymmetric power relations, and so on – militate against a universal contract founded on 
reciprocity. The communal approach can, therefore, be rendered intelligible within the context of 
contractualist theory. Unfortunately, this would come at the expense of the universalising ambitions 
which initially motivated the theory. For that reason, I am inclined to believe that a universal contract 
of the kind described would only be possible if we were willing to alter some of the fundamental 
aspects of contractualist theory. For that reason, I now propose to outline the major obstacles to a 
theory of intergenerational justice grounded in reciprocity. 
 
3.5 Three Problems of Intergenerational Reciprocity 
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Given my endorsement of an approach founded on reciprocity, it would be fitting to conclude this 
chapter with a very brief summary of the problems encountered when attempting to apply this idea 
to the intergenerational context. To that end, I want to identify three recurring problems within the 
wider literature which need to be met if an account of our obligations to posterity is to be understood 
in reciprocal terms: scope, mutuality; and justification. Before beginning, though, it should be noted 
that due to the asymmetrical relations between past, present, and future generations, reciprocal 
interaction will necessarily take an indirect form. Intergenerational cooperation, then, involves one 
generation benefitting another who, in requital, confer broadly equivalent benefits on a third 
generation. More will be said about this in Chapters 4 and 5, but for now we simply need to be aware 
of the problems this may engender from the perspective of justice. 
 
i. The Problem of Scope 
 
Since indirect reciprocal interaction occurs between proximate generations, we may question the 
extent to which it can meet the hard problem of intergenerational justice. Joseph Heath, for instance, 
has developed an extensive theory of intergenerational cooperation founded on intergenerational 
overlap.121 That, however, won’t satisfy our stated aim of arriving at a theory which extends between 
non-overlapping generations. Furthermore, even if we can conceive of our obligations as being owed 
to our contiguous, non-overlapping successors, there is still the problem of the intergenerational time 
bomb. The problem of scope can, therefore, be understood to comprise two distinct question: firstly, 
can a theory of intergenerational justice founded on indirect reciprocity generate obligations toward 
                                               
121 See, Joseph Heath, ‘Intergenerational Cooperation and Distributive Justice’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27(3) 
(1997): 361-76; Heath, ‘The Structure of Intergenerational Cooperation’. 
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non-overlapping generations; and secondly, can it specify sufficiently robust regulations to safeguard 
our more distant successors?122 
 
ii. The Mutuality Problem 
 
As we have seen, the contract approach is predicated on the idea that principles of justice regulate 
mutually advantageous social cooperation. That, however, raises the question of how reciprocal 
interaction satisfying these conditions can obtain in the radically asymmetrical intergenerational 
context. Indeed, the benefits of intergenerational cooperation are understood to flow in only one 
direction: from earlier generations to their successors. That, then, would suggest that conditions of 
mutuality do not exist at the intergenerational level; which, in turn, would considerably limit the scope 
and content of our obligations to future generations. If, therefore, we want to use indirect reciprocal 
interaction as a grounding for our obligations toward posterity, then we need to find some way of 
responding to the mutuality problem.123 
 
iii. The Justificatory Problem 
 
Finally, there is the problem of justifying obligations that are generated through indirect reciprocal 
interaction. To elaborate, consider Barry’s celebrated toffee apple example: in it we are given a toffee 
                                               
122 See, e.g., Gardiner, ‘A Contract on Future Generations’ pp. 83-5; Anja Karnein, ‘Climate Change and Justice 
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apple by a benevolent stranger. How is it, Barry asks, that accepting and enjoying this gift generates 
an obligation to buy a toffee apple for a different stranger?124 There is, then, a question as to how 
indirect reciprocal interaction could engender obligations in the first instance – and that raises 
questions as to the justifiability of any savings principle within the confines of the contractualist 
approach. Within the literature, this is frequently cited as the canonical refutation of indirect 
reciprocity as the basis of our intergenerational obligations.125 
 
In responding to these challenges, I intend to prioritise the mutuality problem. The belief being, that 
the lack of mutuality between generations contributes to the problems of scope and justification. If, 
then, we can advance a cogent line of response to the mutuality problem, then the problems of scope 
and justification will become less daunting. Consequently, we will begin Chapter 4 by attending to 
the mutuality problem, before going on to deal with the problems of scope and justification in the 
latter half of the chapter 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter has set out to establish four things. Firstly, it has been argued that the 
disputes between competing interpretations of the original position reflect moral, rather than 
methodological concerns. Simply put, the present time of entry interpretation serves to build the idea 
of mutually advantageous cooperation into the structure of Rawls's agreement. Secondly, it has been 
suggested that a universal agreement is most readily intelligible within the context of a wider 
commitment to community – and to preserving the projects and values which characterise political 
                                               
124 Brian Barry, ‘Justice as Reciprocity’ in Liberty and Justice: Essays in Political Theory 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1991) p. 232. 
125 See, e.g. H.P. Visser ‘t Hooft, Justice to Future Generations and the Environment (Boston, MA.: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1999) pp. 61-2; Richard Vernon, Justice Back and Forth: Duties to the Past and Future (Toronto: Toronto 
University Press, 2016) pp. 198-9. 
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society. Finally, it has been suggested that the reciprocal approach which is implied in the standard 
formulation of the contract method is preferable to the community-based logic of the universal 
account. 
 
In addition, three problems affecting the reciprocal approach have been identified, and it has been 
suggested that the mutuality problem is the most significant obstacle to a contractualist theory of 
intergenerational justice. I will therefore respond to it in the next chapter with reference to my theory 
of intergenerational mutuality. With the mutuality problem resolved, I will then attend to the problems 
of scope and justification. In this way, advancing a theory of intergenerational mutuality will be 




4. The Intergenerational Social Contract 
 
 
The intergenerational realm is characterised by asymmetrical relations between past, present, 
and future generations. Simply put, earlier generational cohorts are able to affect the prospects 
of their successors without fear of requital; by way of contrast, future generations are unable 
to exert an equivalent influence on their distant predecessors. In turn, this militates against the 
kind of like-for-like cooperation which, within the confines of the modern social contract 
approach, engenders the demands of distributive justice. The absence of mutuality between 
generations would therefore imply that our intergenerational obligations are of a more general, 
humanitarian nature – and owed to people as such, rather than having a specific recipient. Such 
a conclusion would, however, be at variance with the notion of a just savings principle – which, 
following John Rawls's discussion of justice between generations in A Theory of Justice, has 
emerged as the most practicable means of incorporating the interests of future generations into 
our distributive deliberations in the present. According to such an approach, the realisation and 
maintenance of just institutions over time enjoys an absolute priority over measures designed 
to make the contemporary worst off as well off as possible. In other words, it is only once the 
interests of posterity have been attended to that distributive justice can be realised at the 
intragenerational level.126 A principle of just savings, in other words, has the appearance of a 
justice-based obligation to future generations. In order to substantiate the problem facing the 
extension of a contractualist theory of justice to the intergenerational realm, consider the 
following antinomy comprising three plausible intuitions:  
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(1) Firstly, that those obligations associated with distributive justice arise within the context of 
mutually advantageous cooperation. 
 
(2) Secondly, that principles of distributive justice are required to constrain intragenerational 
expenditure, with a view to securing the continuation of a just institutional framework. 
 
(3) And finally, that the interaction between discrete cohorts at the intergenerational level 
cannot be characterised by mutuality. 
 
To express this another way: principles of justice are needed to regulate the intergenerational 
context, but they presuppose some form of mutually advantageous social cooperation which 
cannot obtain between generations. To resolve this problem, one of these three contentions 
therefore has to be rejected.  
 
Arguably the most radical line of response would involve the repudiation of the claim that 
discussions of distributive justice presuppose some form of institutional interaction. By 
expanding the scope of our distributive obligations, such an approach effectively sidesteps the 
problems associated with the asymmetry between past and future generations. As we have 
argued, though, such a move a transformative effect on the contract method itself – recasting 
it in a manner devoid of those reciprocal features that go some way to explaining its appeal. 
By way of contrast, a more modest strategy is implied by the rejection of the second intuition. 
On such an account, our obligations to posterity are of an altogether more limited nature than 
those which obtain between contemporaries. Indeed, if this is the case then, as David Heyd has 
noted, the just savings principle can be reasonably likened to the duty of assistance between 
peoples at the global level: both reflect a broad commitment to justice as a value worthy of 
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promotion, whilst stopping well short of being obligations of justice.127 The principal concern 
with such an approach revolves around whether or not humanitarian duties of the kind 
envisaged can grant sufficient weight to the interests of our descendants in our distributive 
deliberations. Could, in other words, a set of general obligations owed to people as such 
constrain the realisation of justice at the intragenerational level in the way that the just savings 
principle attempts to do. If not, then we are left with the third and final intuition – that relations 
between non-overlapping generations can never be characterised by mutuality. Although the 
rejection of this belief may, at first, seem counterintuitive, this chapter will argue that such a 
move represents a promising line of response to the question at hand.  
 
To that end, I will appeal to a concept of intergenerational mutuality in order to illustrate the 
reciprocal nature of cooperation at the intergenerational level. The idea, in outline, is that our 
posthumous interests are more important to us than we generally acknowledge. Consequently, 
there is a sense in which we are vulnerable to future generations and need to cooperate with 
them in order to realise certain essential collective benefits. On such an account, the just savings 
principle serves to regulate this cooperation in an equitable manner. In order to develop this 
case, we will begin by expanding on the concept of reciprocal interaction and its relationship 
to mutuality in Section 1. In Section 2, I will examine the absence of mutuality from the 
intergenerational context, before expounding my own theory of intergenerational mutuality in 
Section 3. In Section 4, I will identify a second source of mutuality within the contract account, 
and in Sections 5 and 6 I will respond to the problems of scope and justification. What will 
ultimately emerge from this exercise is a compelling line of response to the mutuality problem 
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which serves to outline of an approach to questions of intergenerational justice which will be 




In order to bring clarity to our discussion of the mutuality problem it would be helpful to begin 
by saying something about reciprocity as it informs the contractualist analysis. After all, it is 
not immediately obvious why mutuality and reciprocity should have to go hand in hand. To 
illustrate this by way of an example from recent history, the nuclear ambitions of the United 
States and the Soviet Union gave rise to a relationship characterised by mutuality without any 
concomitant reciprocal content. Likewise, we can conceive of transactions in a market 
economy as being reciprocal, but they are not necessarily mutual. We therefore need to say 
something about how the two concepts converge within the contractualist analysis. Consider, 
for instance, the concept of mutually advantageous social cooperation: it is distinguished from 
mere social cooperation by virtue of the fact that the benefits will be felt by all parties. 
Similarly, we could consider the mutual obligations that might obtain between citizens, or the 
mutual burdens that parties may have to shoulder in the pursuit of a societal goal. What is 
ultimately being described in these examples is an idea of correspondence: the benefits or 
burdens being visited upon one party are correlative with those experienced by others. This 
idea also informs our understanding of reciprocity, albeit in a subtly different way. To return 
to the example of a market transaction, it is reciprocal to the extent that the value of the good 
being purchased corresponds to its price. Similarly, at the societal level, we might understand 
a principle of reciprocity to be a one which rewards people in a manner that is commensurate 
with their contribution.  Within the contract method, however, reciprocity is used to inform the 
initial agreement: the parties to the original position are understood to be equal participants in 
 
108 
a cooperative venture who are owed a fair return on their contribution. On the one hand, then, 
the parties are understood to have made corresponding contributions to the scheme, whilst on 
the other, they are owed a return which is commensurate with their input. In this way, the logic 
of both reciprocity and mutuality becomes entwined within the structure of the original 
position. It is for this reason that the apparent absence of mutuality from the intergenerational 
context is troubling from the perspective of a reciprocity-based approach: the parties cannot be 
assured that other generations are making a correlative contribution to the proposed scheme. 
Despite being distinct concepts in their own right, mutuality and reciprocity can therefore be 
understood to converge within the contract method.  
 
With the relationship between reciprocity and mutuality now clarified, we can move on to a 
broader explication of reciprocity. After all, reciprocal interaction can take multiple forms, and 
we need to be clear about the focus of our present enquiry. On a particularly narrow reading, 
for instance, a principle of reciprocity might be understood to give rise to a demand for 
remuneration in direct proportion to one’s marginal contribution. If, however, reciprocity is 
understood in broader terms, incorporating social norms, then the resultant obligations will be 
radically different. Before going any further into our enquiry, then, it will be necessary to 
distinguish different forms of reciprocity from one another and to identify the form of 
reciprocity that will provide the focal point for this chapter. 
 
For our present purposes, two salient distinctions can be drawn between different forms of 
reciprocity. Firstly, between direct and indirect– and whether or not reciprocal interaction is 
understood in exclusively like-for-like terms or can extend to third-party transactions. In a 
direct arrangement, reciprocity involves making a like-for-like return on an initial contribution 
to the group or individual responsible. By way of contrast, an indirect approach will see the 
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return on the initial benefaction being made to a third party. To illustrate, a recognisable 
instance of direct reciprocity occurs whenever an individual buys a friend or colleague a drink 
in the expectation that, at some point in the future, the other party will return the favour in kind. 
A comparable indirect reciprocal arrangement takes the form of the first party buying a drink 
for the second party on the understanding that the recipient will go on to buy a drink for the 
third party. In this way, indirect reciprocal interaction can be likened to the pattern of bequests 
and inheritance which characterises the intergenerational realm. 
 
The second distinction to be drawn is between strong and weak forms of reciprocity. Reciprocal 
interaction is generally understood in terms of deriving some return from an initial sacrifice or 
making good on an earlier benefaction. The contrast between strong and weak forms of 
reciprocity hinges upon how the return is to be appraised. On a weak understanding, reciprocal 
interaction is understood in self-interested terms, and motivated by the expectation of future 
benefits. Strong reciprocal schemes, by way of comparison, are characterised by a willingness 
to reward fair behaviour and to penalise actions which violate behavioural norms, even when 
doing so will require resources to be expended in a manner that is incommensurate with any 
present or future benefits.128 To expand upon this, imagine a scenario in which we receive good 
service in a restaurant to which we will never return. On a weak reciprocal analysis, we would 
have no reason to tip, since we would be incapable of extracting any future benefits from the 
transaction. There would, however, be a strong reciprocal reason to tip, since it would represent 
our making a fair return to the waiting staff. Within the context of strong reciprocity, therefore, 
the expectation of future benefits is of limited importance as compared to the role that this form 
of interaction plays in strengthening and upholding social norms. 
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Within the context of our present enquiry, our focus will be on strong, indirect reciprocity. 
More specifically, we will be concerned with whether or not the form of indirect collaboration 
which obtains between generations can engender justice-based obligations. The issue at hand 
will, therefore, be whether or not the present generation's inheritance of a stock of capital from 
their predecessors requires them to make an equivalent transfer to their descendants. By 
limiting our enquiry to strong reciprocal norms, we are also able to overcome many of the 
issues which ordinarily characterise the intergenerational realm. For instance, the problem of a 
first generation who have no ancestors from whom to receive any inheritance from need not 
arise. On the contrary, the earliest generation can be understood to initiate these practices 
because they have an interest in bringing about fair intergenerational norms. Similarly, as and 
when generational cohorts differ in size the content of any distributive obligations can change 
to reflect this. Put another way, if one generation has far more descendants than their 
predecessors, then they would be required to leave more than they inherited – so as to respect 
the underlying distributive principle. In this way, we can concentrate squarely on the issue of 
whether a distributive imposition of the kind envisaged could be justified through reference to 
indirect reciprocity.  
 
4.2 The Problem of Intergenerational Justice  
 
Within the confines of a contractualist approach, principles of justice serve to regulate the terms 
of mutually advantageous social cooperation. The idea, in outline, is that the parties to any 
agreement need to collaborate to further their interests. At the same time, though, these 
individuals will make competing claims on the goods obtained in this way. Accordingly, a 
unique set of distributive norms are required to apportion the benefits of this cooperative 
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endeavour in an equitable manner.129 The obligations of justice, in other words, are triggered 
by a particular kind of reciprocal interaction. It is in this regard that the intergenerational realm 
is problematic from a contractualist perspective. Simply put, the types of interaction which 
obtain between generations are not conducive to mutuality. To elaborate, earlier generations 
are able to further the interests of their descendants, but subsequent generations cannot 
materially benefit their dead predecessors. The benefits of any cooperation between discrete 
generations are therefore understood to move unidirectionally. If this is an accurate portrayal 
of the intergenerational context, then earlier generations would have little – or perhaps no – 
reason to save; their participation in any savings process would yield few benefits and engender 
appreciable burdens. We therefore find ourselves in a position where mutually advantageous 
cooperation looks to be impossible. If that is the case, though, then a principle of 
intergenerational saving could not be selected in the original position. The lack of mutuality at 
the intergenerational level therefore militates against there being any obligations of justice 
between generations.130 
 
Faced with this problem, three possible lines of response can be identified. Firstly, we could 
attempt to excise the idea of mutually advantageous social cooperation from the contractualist 
framework. Such a move would have a transformative effect on the contract approach, but may 
prove necessary if the more conventional strategies can be found to be wanting. Secondly, we 
may acknowledge that we have no justice-based obligations to future people but suggest that a 
set of humanitarian obligations can regulate the intergenerational domain. In this way, any 
principles of intergenerational saving can be likened to those duties of assistance which obtain 
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between peoples at the international level.131 And finally, we may argue that intergenerational 
cooperation is, in actual fact, characterised by mutuality. By appealing to the idea of strong, 
indirect reciprocity, such a response will try to demonstrate that earlier generations are 
benefitted by collaborating with their descendants. For our present purposes, we can set aside 
the first, universalising strategy. Instead, we will focus on the second and third lines of 
response. By offering a brief outline of the shortcomings of a humanitarian approach, I hope 
to place further emphasis on the desirability of a reciprocity-based account. Then, by 
demonstrating the potential for mutually advantageous cooperation over time, this chapter will 
attempt to dissolve the problem of intergenerational justice. 
 
In light of the problems inherent in attempting to extend the contractualist method to the 
intergenerational context, one may be tempted to follow Heyd in recasting our obligations to 
future generations in general, humanitarian terms. On such an account, our responsibilities to 
posterity can be likened to those duties of assistance which obtain between peoples at the 
international level. A process of intergenerational savings would therefore aim to transfer 
sufficient levels of capital to our successors to allow for the preservation of just institutions. 
Our intergenerational obligations, then, are understood to be principles securing justice rather 
than principles of justice.132 Were that the case, though, then we would expect the resultant 
obligations to be somewhat weaker than those envisaged by the just savings principle. It is, for 
instance, difficult to see how a set of humanitarian obligations could enjoy priority over the 
difference principle in the way that the just savings principle does. More acutely, though, there 
are notable differences between the intergenerational and international contexts, not least with 
respect to the level of influence earlier generations are able to exert over later ones. Indeed, 
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returning to Stephen Gardiner’s analysis, the inability to extend our distributive obligations to 
the intergenerational realm may, in actual fact, undermine the appeal of the contract method 
itself. After all, much of the intuitive appeal of contractualism derives from its ability to 
overcome the asymmetries in power which characterise agreements in other social contract 
approaches. An inability to address the unavoidable asymmetry which characterises the 
intergenerational realm – and which can have a profound and pervasive impact on the life 
prospects of later generations – is, therefore, especially problematic.133 Moreover, as Heyd 
concedes, generations tend to have a solidaristic attachment to their descendants and their 
predecessors.134 Even if this intuition were to be illusory, the sense of cooperation between 
proximate generational cohorts demands further investigation. It may, for instance, be the case 
that there are intermediary norms that fit somewhere between the full demands of justice 
between contemporaries and our general, humanitarian obligations. Indeed, I think this 
represents a more plausible interpretation of the just savings principle: generations may not be 
obliged to extend the full demands of distributive equality to the intergenerational context, but 
they are required to restrain their intragenerational pursuit of it to ensure that future generations 
receive an equitable bequest. In the rest of this chapter, it will be argued that this feeling of 
solidarity between generations has a concrete basis. By appealing to the idea of strong, indirect 
reciprocity we can overcome the difficulties identified in this section by demonstrating that 
intergenerational cooperation is mutually advantageous. Earlier generations would therefore 
be willing to comply with a savings process because they would derive benefits from it. My 
strategy, then, is to block the mutuality problem at source. To put this another way, it is my 
contention that the parties to the original position would select a principle of intergenerational 
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savings for mutually disinterested reasons alone. The obstacles to the just savings principle 
being selected will therefore not arise. 
 
4.3 Indirect Reciprocity, Mutuality, and the Social Bases of Self-Respect  
 
To that end, we will begin by looking at indirect reciprocity in greater detail. As has been 
mentioned, Rawls's justification of the just savings principle hinges upon our accepting that 
cooperation of some form obtains at the intergenerational level. In this regard, the Rawlsian 
intuition can be understood to proceed from the conception of political society as a fair system 
of cooperation over time.135 With respect to this claim, it is possible to identify a pattern of 
inheritance and bequests which characterise the intergenerational context in cooperative terms. 
With the exception of the first and final generations, each cohort finds itself the recipient of a 
historical transfer and a benefactor with regard to their immediate descendants. A theory of 
indirect reciprocity attempts to formalise this relationship and use it as the basis for our 
intergenerational distributive obligations. In this way, the realisation and maintenance of just 
institutions over time can be interpreted as a transgenerational project to which each generation 
is expected to contribute. The idea would therefore be that the present generation’s willingness 
to participate in a savings process is a function of their having benefitted from it. That, however, 
raises the question as to how the first generation could benefit from this process. After all, they 
will receive no benefits from their predecessors but will still be required to save for their 
successors. Faced with such a prospect, the parties to the original position would – assuming 
that maximin is the correct strategy – take this perspective into account when specifying an 
intergenerational savings rate. Of course, such an analysis presupposes that earlier generations 
can derive no benefits whatsoever from intergenerational cooperation. That, however, is to 
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overlook the posthumous interests and ongoing projects that characterise the intergenerational 
domain. To elaborate, the parties to any agreement are aware of their having a conception of 
the good and it is reasonable to suggest that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, this will 
entail our having what Janna Thompson refers to as 'lifetime-transcending interests.'136 By this, 
it is meant that our finding value in certain objects and features of the world can – and very 
often does – provide us with interests which extend beyond our respective lifespans. Suppose, 
for instance, that someone was to devote their life to curating a collection of valuable art and 
artefacts: in those circumstances, it is highly likely that the person would care about the survival 
– and possible expansion – of that collection long after their death. After all, it is likely that 
one of the reasons which possessed this individual to begin her collection was a desire to bring 
these intrinsically valuable items together for people to appreciate in perpetuity. In outline, 
then, a great many people have mutually disinterested reasons to care about the terms of 
interaction between generations – and even those who don’t may be so disposed behind a veil 
of ignorance. The idea that we have lifetime-transcending interests which future generations 
can either promote or set back therefore introduces the possibility that mutuality may obtain at 
the intergenerational level. 
 
In seeking to expand on this claim, Samuel Scheffler’s argument in Death and the Afterlife 
represents a useful point of reference. In order to demonstrate the importance of posthumous 
interests within our overall conceptions of the good, Scheffler proposes two related thought 
experiments exploring the impact of impending extinction on the things we value. In the first, 
simply entitled the ‘doomsday’ scenario, we are informed that thirty days after our death an 
asteroid will collide with the Earth, destroying the planet and all life on it. Being made aware 
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of this, Scheffler argues, would horrify most people. From this, it is inferred that much of what 
we value in life matters to us for reasons other than our being able to experience them.137 More 
significantly, though, it is argued that the doomsday scenario would precipitate an existential 
crisis within our lives: the projects and activities which had previously given us some kind of 
purpose would become either become wholly meaningless or severely compromised.138 The 
second thought experiment, borrowed from P.D. James’s novel The Children of Men, envisages 
a future in which humanity faces extinction through mass infertility, ensuring that human 
civilisation will die out within a century. This, Scheffler suggests, would trigger a similar 
response to the doomsday scenario, leading to ‘widespread apathy, anomie, and despair’.139 
This is significant for two reasons: firstly, unlike the doomsday scenario, it would not involve 
anyone we loved or cared about dying prematurely; secondly, though, it would entail the 
untimely demise of innumerable human projects. This has profound implications for a theory 
of justice, because it suggests that our conceptions of the good are, in some way, dependent 
upon there being a future extending well beyond our lives. It should, of course, be noted that 
less doom-laden responses to these thought experiments have been posited: Susan Wolf, for 
instance, has suggested that, after a period of anhedonic despair we would eventually return to 
the task of attempting to live a fulfilling life.140 What is relevant to our present discussion, 
though, is the thought that an imminent extinction event could prompt a wholesale re-
evaluation of our individual conceptions of the good. It implies that, far from having no reasons 
to care about the future, mutually disinterested individuals could be minded to consider the fate 
of posterity in the original position.  
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In attempting to flesh out this line of argument, I would want to suggest that similar concerns 
obtain in ordinary, non-apocalyptic circumstances. Consider, for instance, our curator – who 
is concerned, among other things, about the survival of her collection of art and artefacts into 
the distant future. Now suppose, for the sake of the argument, that she were to be made aware 
of the fact that shortly after her death, a particularly malevolent individual would divide her 
collection up and unceremoniously sell it off for monetary gain. Such knowledge, I would 
suggest, would have a profoundly deleterious effect on our curator – possibly to the extent of 
destabilising her entire conception of the good. This, in large part, is down to the fact that the 
wrongdoing occurs after the curator has died: had it happened in her lifetime, then at least she 
could intervene to either stop or mitigate the process. What I am suggesting, then, is that the 
asymmetry in power relations between past, present, and future generations has a flip side 
which consists in the vulnerability of our projects and posthumous interests to acts of non-
compliance by future generations. The curator, for example, has dedicated her life to building 
a collection on the understanding that it would survive well into the future: her overarching 
project in life is, then, dependent upon future generations either maintaining or contributing to 
the collection that she has amassed. Scheffler notes as much in his 2018 work Why Worry 
About Future Generations, in which relations between the present generation and its successors 
are taken to have reciprocal content: ‘[t]he term “reciprocity”’, writes Scheffler, ‘is appropriate 
in this context because our relation to future generations is one of genuine mutual dependence, 
even if the form taken by our dependence on them is different from the form taken by their 
dependence on us. Each side is dependent on, and so is vulnerable to, what the other does or 
what happens to the other.’141 There is, in other words, a form of mutuality between 
generations. Moreover, I believe that we can analyse this mutual dependence in terms of a 
collective action problem – of the sort envisaged within the contractualist framework. To put 
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this somewhat crudely, our successors want us to save on their behalf; and we want them to 
preserve – or, at the very least, show respect toward – our projects and posthumous interests. 
In order, then, to achieve the outcomes that both want, the present generation and its successors 
need to strike an intergenerational bargain. Now, within the context of the original position, 
the idea of an agreement between generations is out of the question, due to the present time of 
entry interpretation. It is, however, possible for members of the present generation to specify a 
principle to regulate this practice by asking themselves which principle they would want 
previous generations to have abided by.142 The thinking, then, is that by selecting a savings 
principle that we would have wanted our predecessors to have followed, we might secure the 
compliance of future generations in upholding our projects and respecting our posthumous 
interests. In this way, it may be possible to envisage the just savings principle being selected 
by mutually disinterested parties, without any amendments to the structure of the original 
position. 
 
There is, of course, an obvious rejoinder to the argument I have just outlined. Namely, how 
could these diffuse and varied interests be incorporated into the contract approach? Recall that 
the parties to the original position are looking to maximise their share of a relatively specific 
list of primary goods: they are not, in other words, simply trying to promote whatever interests 
we may wish to attribute to them. Indeed, it is for this reason that Thompson suggests that 
lifetime-transcending interests are simply too particular to be admissible within the original 
position.143  Elsewhere, Eric Brandstedt has suggested amending the list of primary goods to 
include ‘sustainability of values’.144 My argument, however, would be that if our lifetime-
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transcending interests are as animating as I have suggested, the contract method is already 
capable of attending to these concerns. Indeed, I would want to appeal to the social bases of 
self-respect as a potential candidate for bringing these considerations to bear within the 
confines of the orthodox contract approach. To elaborate, the social bases of self-respect are, 
by Rawls’s reckoning ‘perhaps the most important primary good’ and are defined as having 
two aspects: firstly, a person’s sense of their own value – including the idea that their 
conception of the good is worth carrying out; and secondly, having confidence in their ability 
to fulfil their intentions.145 If the Schefflerian analysis is correct, then the idea that our 
posthumous interests might be disregarded would, to my estimation, threaten the first feature 
of the social bases of self-respect: it would have the potential to undermine our conception of 
the good – or, at the very least, to raise severe doubts as to its worthiness. This, as Rawls 
suggests, would have particular significance to the parties in the original position: 
 
When we feel that our plans are of little value, we cannot pursue them with pleasure or take 
delight in their execution. Nor plagued by failure and self-doubt can we continue in our 
endeavors. It is clear then why self-respect is a primary good. Without it nothing may seem 
worth doing, or if some things have value for us, we lack the will to strive for them. All desire 
and activity becomes empty and vain, and we sink into apathy and cynicism. Therefore the 
parties in the original position would wish to avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that 
undermine self-respect.146 
 
Notice that we don’t have to concur with Scheffler’s conclusions to see how our relations with 
future generations might affect the social bases of self-respect. Indeed, all we need to 
acknowledge is that our conceptions of the good will, very frequently, give rise to posthumous 
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interests which place us in a relationship of mutual dependence with future generations. In this 
way, it is possible to move from the idea of mutually disinterested parties specifying principles 
of justice at the intragenerational level to a concern for the relations between past, present, and 
future generations. Put another way, if earlier generations are minded to cooperate with their 
successors, then the mutuality problem does not obtain within the intergenerational context. 
 
If the mutuality does obtain at the intergenerational level, then we can return to the original 
position and ask whether or not the just savings principle would be selected. Recall that the 
just savings principle specifies that sufficient levels of capital are to be transferred to the next 
generation to allow for the realisation and maintenance of just institutions, with a further 
stipulation that no generation should leave less to their forebears than they received through 
the savings process.147 We therefore need to consider what features of the original position 
would lead to this being selected over a more straightforward principle of sufficiency. As we 
noted in Section 1, when mutuality obtains we can be assured that others are making an 
equivalent contribution to the scheme in question: in the intergenerational context this means 
that past, present, and future generations are all fully participating parties within the scheme of 
intergenerational cooperation and are owed an equitable return. To demonstrate why this would 
lead to the selection of the just savings principle rather than a principle of sufficiency, consider 
a generation who only transfers enough capital to their successors to maintain just institutions 
– thereby leaving their descendants worse off than they were. This would clearly violate those 
reciprocal norms which underpin the contract method: by allowing the earlier generation to 
derive disproportionate benefits relative to the burdens that the scheme entails, a principle of 
sufficiency would be rejected on the grounds that it is not impartial. In this context, Rawls’s 
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discussion of the strains of commitment and the psychological harms involved in having to 
shoulder disproportionate burdens relative to others is especially relevant: inequitable terms of 
social cooperation, Rawls suggests, can have a pernicious effect on an individual’s prospects 
to the extent of undermining their capacity for self-respect.148 In this regard, there is an obvious 
symmetry between the just savings principle on the one hand, and the practice of honouring 
posthumous interests on the other: both serve to promote and safeguard a specific primary good 
in the form of the social bases of self-respect.  Consequently, the parties to the original position 
would select the just savings principle on mutually disinterested grounds. To put this another 
way, allowing individual generational cohorts to leave less to their successors than they 
received would be seen as an unreasonable gamble within the original position: by assuming 
the position of the least advantaged, the parties would gravitate toward a principle which 
maximised their individual share of primary goods – in this case, the just savings principle. We 
can, therefore, understand the just savings principle as being reflective of the idea of reciprocity 
within the intergenerational context and as a further guarantor of the social bases of self-
respect. 
 
4.4 Mutuality and Stability 
 
Before proceeding to look at the problem of scope, I would like to draw attention to a second 
source of mutuality within the contractualist approach. In outline, it is my contention that an 
appeal can be made to the stability of a conception of justice – the requirement that institutions 
organised in accordance with the principles of justice can generate their own support – to 
introduce a secondary form of mutuality into the theory.149 I refer to this as ‘secondary’ because 
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within the original position, a test for stability follows the selection of principles: if they are 
found to be wanting in this regard, then they are rejected.150 Such a commitment may engender 
obligations of the sort envisaged in two closely related ways: firstly, in instances where making 
intergenerational transfers inculcates and reinforces a ‘sense of justice’ among contemporaries; 
and secondly, when making a bequest to our successors serves to stabilise a conception of 
justice in the long-run.151 There may, in other words, be a sense in which the inability of future 
generations to make a like for like return is immaterial from the perspective of justice. If, for 
example, intergenerational saving strengthens certain norms at the intragenerational level, then 
the practice would be mutually advantageous. Compliance with a savings process could, then, 
be to the benefit of the present generation, meaning that there is an additional form of 
intergenerational mutuality which can be incorporated into the contract method.   
 
To expand upon this, it is worth noting that stability is a necessary condition for the enjoyment 
and appreciation of those primary goods whose distribution is the principal concern of those 
parties behind the veil of ignorance. Indeed, as Rawls himself notes, a stable conception of 
justice is a one which is ‘perspicuous to our reason, congruent with our good, and rooted…in 
the affirmation of the self’ – or, to put it another way, one in which the chosen principles of 
justice create a social environment in which we are free to pursue our goals in conditions 
characterised by mutual respect between citizens.152 Given the future-oriented concerns 
engendered by a commitment to stability, it thereby follows that intergenerational transfers 
need to be informed by such considerations. Suppose, for instance, that prior generations had 
saved at a particularly low rate, so as to maximise their intragenerational wellbeing. Not only 
would such a state of affairs militate against the cultivation of a sense of justice in the 
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contemporary generation, but it would also have a deleterious effect on the bonds of mutual 
respect which are essential to a well-ordered political society. In this respect, there may be a 
parallel to be drawn between Rawls’s later argument for the difference principle as a guarantor 
of the least advantaged group’s self-respect, and this argument for the just savings principle; 
both are couched in explicit commitments to reciprocity, solidarity, and an overarching concern 
that inequities in the distribution of goods may have pernicious consequences with respect to 
the ability of individuals to develop and pursue their own, individual conception of the good.153 
An approach to intergenerational justice which emphasises considerations relating to the 
stability of a conception of justice therefore enjoys considerable overlap with an account of our 
intergenerational obligations grounded in indirect reciprocity. By incorporating strong 
reciprocal interaction into the theory, however, we are able to respond to the charge that this 
form of interaction cannot be mutual. On the contrary, instances of non-compliance are to the 
detriment of present and future generations. Consequently, the decision to adopt a principle of 
just saving would be a rational course of action for those mutually disinterested parties in the 
original position. 
 
4.5 Indirect Reciprocity and the Problem of Scope 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the problem of scope is of particular relevance to this 
enquiry: we are, after all, focusing explicitly on the hard problem of intergenerational justice 
and looking at what is owed to non-contemporaneous future generations. We may, therefore, 
be able to discern a clear and obvious challenge to theories of intergenerational justice 
grounded in indirect reciprocity. As has been noted, the focus of such a theory is on securing 
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equitable terms of cooperation between proximate generational cohorts. Thus, although we can 
envisage duties and obligations to our distant descendants, the most onerous demands of 
intergenerational justice begin and end with our immediate successors. This gives rise to the 
problem of so-called 'time bomb' policies – wherein the deleterious effects are deferred for a 
number of generations, so as to ensure that our nearest descendants are unaffected. Although 
such hypotheticals may sound far-fetched, many of the most salient issues within the 
intergenerational realm – such as climate change – could, quite accurately, be characterised as 
time bombs of the sort envisaged. The problem, as Gardiner observes, is that contract theories 
which are grounded in mutual advantage appear to lack the conceptual resources to condemn 
acts of the kind envisaged.154 Imagine, for instance, that the present generation wilfully 
diminished the prospects of all people born 150 years in the future to their immediate benefit. 
Since they would still be able to discharge their justice-based obligations to their successors, 
the argument goes, there would be no injustice on such an account. All things being equal, 
then, we may have reasons for scepticism with respect to the scope of the obligations envisaged.  
 
In replying to this, it is worth stressing that, at the bare minimum, earlier generations will have 
humanitarian obligations to their distant descendants. Consequently, a policy which 
intentionally restricted the prospects of future generations below a certain threshold would be 
worthy of condemnation from the perspective of justice. For the sake of the argument, then, let 
us assume that the extent of the imposition is not so grave as to breach any humanitarian 
obligations, but enough to depart from standards of mutual respect between persons. In that 
case, a great deal would depend upon the temporal proximity of the generations – and the extent 
to which they are mutually dependent on one another. As I have demonstrated, cooperation 
between proximate generations would be regulated by something along the lines of a just 
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savings principle. This, on my account, gives rise to the most demanding justice-based 
obligations which obtain in the intergenerational context. Intergenerational mutuality and 
indirect reciprocal cooperation are not, however, limited to relations between contiguous 
generational cohorts. Indeed, on the account I have put forward it would be wholly plausible 
to suggest that our justice-based obligations could extend over many centuries. We could, 
therefore, conceive of our obligations as moving gradually from the maximal standard of the 
just savings principle toward the humanitarian minimum. That, however, strikes me as an 
intuitively plausible way to think of the demands of intergenerational justice: our extremely 
distant successors are as removed from our present circumstances as members of remote tribes 
in this day and age. A theory of justice grounded in indirect reciprocity therefore has a number 
of resources to draw upon when faced with problems that take the form of an intergenerational 
time bomb. More specifically, though, the idea of intergenerational mutuality resolves the hard 
problem by necessarily extending the obligations of justice to non-contemporaneous 
generations. In this way, resolving the mutuality problem has overcome the problem of scope.  
 
4.6 Intergenerational Mutuality and the Problem of Justification 
 
Having attended to the problems of mutuality and scope, all that remains is to offer a brief 
account of how intergenerational mutuality resolves the problem of justification. Recall that 
Brian Barry attempted to draw attention to the apparent absurdity of indirect reciprocity by 
asking us to imagine ourselves receiving a toffee apple from a benevolent stranger. How, asks 
Barry, could our acceptance and enjoyment of the toffee apple engender a correlative duty to 
buy toffee apples for strangers? To develop this point, Barry envisages a set of circumstances 
in which receipt of a toffee apple would generate distributive obligations: if, for instance, there 
was an established practice of handing out toffee apples to strangers then, having taken and 
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enjoyed one, it would be appropriate to claim that the recipient ought to make an equivalent 
contribution – as in the case of people buying drinks in rounds. That, however, would still fail 
to account for why our obligations were owed to a third party.155 In responding to the 
justificatory challenge, we therefore need to meet two objections to indirect reciprocity: firstly, 
we need to demonstrate that these transfers are part of a wider distributive scheme; and 
secondly, we need to know why our obligations are owed to a third party. 
 
By virtue of the fact that we have demonstrated the existence of an extensive scheme of 
intergenerational reciprocity, the first part of the justificatory challenge can be dismissed 
outright. Instead, I want to focus on the second question raised in this context: why, in other 
words, are our obligations owed to third parties in the intergenerational context? To explain 
this, I would like to introduce Axel Gosseries’s distinction between ascending and descending 
modes of indirect reciprocity. To elaborate, imagine three contiguous generations: A, B, and 
C. Suppose now, that A – the earliest generation in this sequence – transfers certain benefits to 
their immediate successors, B. On the descending model, this transfer would place Generation 
B under an obligation to make an equivalent transfer to their successors, C. By way of contrast, 
the ascending model operates in the opposite direction: Generation B may promote the interests 
of Generation A, and this is understood to oblige Generation C to act similarly toward their 
predecessors.156 So, within the scheme we have described, transferring capital goods to the next 
generation would accord with the descending model. Conversely, the ascending model is 
manifest in the practice of honouring the posthumous interests of our forebears. The two 
models can therefore be understood to combine in the wider system of intergenerational 
reciprocity. Consequently, by advancing a theory of intergenerational mutuality, we are able 
                                                        
155 Barry, ‘Justice as Reciprocity’ pp. 232-3. 
156 Axel Gosseries, ‘Three Models of Intergenerational Reciprocity’ in Intergenerational Justice eds. Axel 
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to identify an indirectly reciprocal scheme of cooperation between generations which resolves 




In conclusion, it has been argued that obligations of justice, grounded in the idea of mutually 
advantageous cooperation, can obtain at the intergenerational level. Accordingly, the 
contractualist method can be brought to bear on the question of justice between generations. 
As we have seen, the perceived impossibility of mutuality at the intergenerational level presents 
the most significant obstacle to such an account. By expounding a concept of intergenerational 
mutuality, however, I have demonstrated that participation in an indirect reciprocal scheme 
yields benefits at the intragenerational level. More specifically, I have suggested that the types 
of cooperation which obtain between generations could be analysed as a bargain in the original 
position. To put this another way, the mutually disinterested parties in the original position 
would willingly select a principle of intergenerational saving. Complying with the associated 
norms of intergenerational saving is, therefore, in the interest of the present generation. 
Consequently, Rawls's contention that the parties to the original position can assume historical 
compliance is unproblematic. Indeed, with these amendments made to the contractualist 
account, the characterisation of the just savings principle as 'an understanding between 
generations to carry their fair share of the burden of realizing and preserving a just society' is 
an appropriate one. Moreover, the resultant theory has demonstrated that it can resolve the 
concomitant problems of justification and scope. Intergenerational cooperation, then, may take 
an indirect form, but it nevertheless gives rise to a unique set of distributive obligations between 
discrete generational cohorts. In this way, an approach to the question of justice between 
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generations grounded in indirect reciprocity is capable of offering a coherent and compelling 
response to the problem of intergenerational justice. 
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5. Intergenerational Mutuality: Objections and Responses 
 
 
In the previous chapter, a theory of intergenerational mutuality was presented as a solution to 
those problems which militate against the extension of the contract method to the 
intergenerational context. To summarise, by envisaging the relationship between discrete 
generations as a one characterised by mutuality, we can address the three problems identified 
at the end of Chapter 3 – those of justification, scope, and mutuality. The concept of 
intergenerational mutuality therefore underpins the thesis as a whole. It would, then, be 
appropriate to give some consideration to the objections which might be raised against the 
theory. In this concluding chapter, we will focus on two sources of scepticism concerning 
intergenerational mutuality: doubts about posthumous interests and concerns surrounding 
historical non-compliance and enforcement. In order to flesh these sceptical intuitions out into 
something more concrete, we will begin by setting out four arguments against intergenerational 
mutuality in Section 1, before responding to each in Sections 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The first 
of these will focus on the appropriateness or otherwise of posthumous interests from the 
perspective of justice. They may, for instance, be unreasonable, in which case granting them 
any standing in the original position would be inherently problematic. The second line of 
argument I want to address concerns the commensurability of posthumous interests with those 
goods generated by the wider process of intergenerational savings. The point of contention in 
this instance is whether the idea of an intergenerational bargain is plausible when the goods 
moving in either direction are so qualitatively different. In responding to both of these claims, 
particular emphasis will be placed on the relationship between posthumous interests and the 
social bases of self-respect, thereby allowing for further exposition of this aspect of the theory. 
The third and fourth points of contention that will be examined in this chapter are closely 
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related and concern the resilience of the proposed scheme in the face of non-compliance. To 
elaborate, we have, thus far, proceeded on the assumption that generations will comply with 
their obligations to one another. In practice, however, generations may fail to fulfil their 
obligations and we need to consider how the indirect reciprocal scheme could recover from 
acts of historical non-compliance for two reasons: firstly, widespread non-compliance has the 
potential to undermine the scheme in its entirety; and secondly, the only enforcement 
mechanism that is available to later generations – disregarding the projects and posthumous 
interests of their non-compliant predecessors – would precipitate the collapse of the reciprocal 
arrangement. In responding to both of these issues in Section 4, I will look to expand upon the 
idea that each generation has an interest in bringing about fair intergenerational norms. That, 
of course, raises the separate question of whether or not the proposed scheme is actually 
characterised by reciprocity. After all, if generations have grounds to bequest goods to their 
successors irrespective of what they received from their predecessors, then this calls the 
reciprocal credentials of the theory into question – and in Section 5.5, we will attend to this 
issue. Responding to these objections will therefore serve two purposes: firstly, it will allow us 
to tie up any conceptual loose ends within the thesis, and secondly it will bring additional layers 
of nuance to the theory. What will hopefully emerge, then, is a more thorough and detailed 
understanding of mutuality in the intergenerational context. 
 
5.1 Four Objections 
 
To provide some insight into the four objections that form the principal subject of this chapter, 
it would be expedient to offer a brief sketch of the central argument in favour of 
intergenerational mutuality as outlined in the broader thesis:  
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(1) Many people will have posthumous interests which, in some cases, will be inextricably 
bound to their conception of the good. 
 
(2) This means that within any political society, there will be a population whose goals and 
projects are dependent on the compliance of future generations. To this extent, relations 
between past, present, and future generations are characterised by mutuality: just as earlier 
generations can promote the interests of their successors by participating in a process of 
intergenerational savings, later ones can benefit their forebears by furthering their posthumous 
interests. 
 
(3) For that reason, those norms which obtain at the intergenerational level can be enforced. 
The parties to the original position will therefore be minded to select a principle of 
intergenerational savings. 
 
There are, then, three key moves in the argument: firstly, the recognition of posthumous 
interests themselves; secondly, the implied symmetry between the posthumous interests of 
earlier generations and the benefits conferred via intergenerational saving; and thirdly, the idea 
that this allows us to punish historical non-compliance and provides a mechanism by which 
the principles selected in the original position can be enforced. From this, we can identify four 
major points of contention which demand further discussion: 
 
i) Firstly, do posthumous interests warrant the kind of recognition within the original position 
that we have afforded them? Here, what I have in mind is something along the lines of the idea 
– prominent in the writings of Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson – that it is objectionable 
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for earlier generations to impose their projects on their successors.157 To elaborate, the theory 
of intergenerational mutuality set out in this thesis appeals to the idea of posthumous interests 
to motivate the parties in the original position to consider the prospects of future generations. 
The notion, in outline, is that the parties to the agreement will see an intergenerational savings 
process as a means a furthering their posthumous interests. That, however, leaves open the 
question of whether or not these motives are appropriate within the original position. After all, 
if we were being uncharitable, this could be characterised as allowing earlier generations to 
bind future generations into their projects via the mechanism of an intergenerational savings 
process. Instead, it may be better to think of posthumous interests as a feature of human 
psychology which, like envy or spite, is unreasonable from the perspective of justice and so 
plays no role in the selection of principles.158 The first charge, then, is that a theory of 
intergenerational mutuality depends upon unreasonable motivations being made admissible 
within the original position: if this is the case, then the argument in favour of intergenerational 
mutuality would be fatally compromised. 
 
ii) Secondly, are the goods flowing in either direction within the proposed scheme 
commensurate? To put this another way, those capital goods being transferred to our successors 
via the just savings principle are qualitatively different to any benefits they can confer on us 
by furthering our posthumous interests. We therefore need to consider how these goods relate 
to one another and whether there can any correspondence between them. It may, for instance, 
be that we need to give thought to how one set of goods might be exchanged with the other. 
                                                        
157 See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, ‘Letter to James Madison, Paris, 6th September, 1789’ in Thomas Jefferson: 
Writings ed. Merrill D. Peterson (New York, NY.:Literary Classics, 1984); Thomas Paine, ‘The Rights of Man’ 
in Rights of Man, Common Sense, and Other Political Writings ed. Mark Phillp (New York, NY.: Oxford 
University Press, 1995) pp. 91-2. 
158 Rawls, Theory pp. 123-4. 
 133 
Obviously, if the goods are so dissimilar that intergenerational trades of this nature cannot take 
place, then the proposed reciprocal scheme would prove to be illusory. 
 
iii) Thirdly, we need to further consider how non-compliance would affect the scheme: might 
it be possible to salvage something from our forebears, would the scheme wholly collapse, or 
could it be restarted? This is particularly relevant in cases where prior generations have failed 
to fulfil their obligations in a widespread or deleterious manner – to the extent that their legacy 
represents a threat to indirect reciprocal interaction between generations. 
 
iv) Fourthly, we need to examine the enforcement mechanisms available within the 
intergenerational context. The most obvious of these would see the posthumous interests of 
non-compliant generations being disregarded. However, as with the previous issue, this runs 
the risk of either undermining or bringing about the collapse of the indirect reciprocal scheme. 
 
The theory of intergenerational mutuality is, then, vulnerable to multiple objections. In 
responding to these, we will begin by looking at the role of posthumous interests in the original 
position in Section 2, before moving on to consider the commensurability of the goods 
generated by indirect intergenerational reciprocity in Section 3. Owing to the overlap between 
the two issues, the questions of non-compliance and enforcement will be attended to 
simultaneously in Section 4. This process will ultimately draw attention to two features of the 
theory of intergenerational mutuality: firstly, the centrality of the social bases of self-respect 
within it, and secondly, the scheme’s ability to reconstitute itself in conditions of widespread 
non-compliance.  
 
5.2 Posthumous Interests and the Original Position 
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In defending the concept of posthumous interests within the original position, it would be 
helpful to begin by appealing to an idea present in Rawls’s own work – as well as the wider 
liberal canon – namely, that generations ought to enjoy a significant degree of autonomy with 
respect to one another. Indeed, to quote directly from A Theory of Justice: ‘[A]ll generations 
have their appropriate aims. They are not subordinate to one another any more than individuals 
are and no generation has stronger claims than any other.’159 There are, then, limits on what 
discrete generations can demand of one another and the just savings principle – at least as 
Rawls envisages it – exists to specify this. By way of contrast, the just savings principle as 
envisaged by the theory of intergenerational mutuality can also be thought of as a mechanism 
through which earlier generations can promote their posthumous interests. To reiterate, the 
earlier generation bequests a stock of capital goods to their successors and the later generation 
reciprocates by honouring the projects and posthumous interests of their predecessors. We 
therefore need to consider whether or not this modified savings principle has the potential to 
encroach upon the autonomy of future generations. After all, on an uncharitable reading, the 
savings process could be recast as a mechanism by which earlier generations can bind posterity 
into the projects by foisting benefits on them. This is of a particular significance, because Rawls 
is quick to exclude motivations which militate against fair terms of social cooperation – such 
as envy or spite – from his conception of rationality.160 It may very well be, then, that 
posthumous interests are a common feature of our lived experience which, nevertheless, are 
rendered inadmissible by the structure of the original position. Obviously, if that were true, 
then the argument for intergenerational mutuality would fall at the first hurdle. We therefore 
                                                        
159 Rawls, Theory p. 257. 
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need to further examine posthumous interests, their role in the original position, and their 
relationship to the just savings principle. 
 
To begin to respond to this line of criticism, it would be helpful to offer a brief summary of 
how posthumous interests are factored into the original position within the wider theory of 
intergenerational mutuality. Recall that within Rawls’s formulation of the original position, the 
parties are looking to maximise their share of primary goods, and I argued that posthumous 
interests relate specifically to the social bases of self-respect. The idea, in outline, is that some 
people will have conceptions of the good which are inextricably linked to their posthumous 
interests. Consequently, the idea that the parties to the original position would be wholly 
indifferent to the circumstances of future generations can be called into question. Moreover, 
since the parties to the agreement are unaware of their specific conception of the good they will 
be mindful of the fact that they could find themselves in this position. In this way, the 
vulnerability of particular conceptions of the good to the actions of future generations would 
be a universal concern within the original position. The parties to the original position are not, 
therefore, looking to promote their posthumous interests per se. Instead, their concerns about 
the relationship between the present generation and its successors turns upon the need to secure 
the social bases of self-respect. With this in mind, the question facing the parties to the 
agreement is how to bring about a relationship between the present generation and its 
successors in which those conceptions of the good which entail significant posthumous 
interests are afforded the appropriate degree of respect. Posthumous interests are not, therefore, 
something to be promoted in their own right within the original position. Instead, they are 
afforded standing within our deliberations due to their being a component of the social bases 
of self-respect. It would, then, be more appropriate to characterise the resulting principle of 
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intergenerational savings as one specifying equitable terms of cooperation – such that past, 
present, and future generations can interact on the basis of mutual respect. 
 
With the role of posthumous interests in the original position now established, we can turn our 
attention to the question of how burdensome this arrangement would be for posterity. The first 
– and arguably most salient – thing to say is that attempting to bind future generations into our 
projects would run contrary to the goal of the savings principle envisaged by the theory of 
intergenerational mutuality. After all, the intergenerational savings process is undertaken to 
ensure that the burdens of social cooperation over time are distributed equitably and in a 
manner that is consistent with mutual recognition and respect between generations: attempting 
to shackle posterity in the way envisaged would clearly violate this core intuition. Instead, the 
idea embedded within intergenerational mutuality sees the projects of earlier generations as 
being worthy of respect – to the extent that they should be afforded appropriate weight in our 
deliberations. Notice, however, that this does not imply that posthumous interests have to 
necessarily trump the rights or interests of future generations. To elaborate on this, consider 
the example of the curator from Chapter 4. Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that she has 
built up an extensive collection of jewellery, ornaments, and other assorted artefacts made from 
an especially rare metal. Now, for the sake of the argument, suppose that future generations 
were to consider melting her collection down for monetary gain. In these circumstances, we 
can clearly see that their actions violate the standards of mutual respect that characterise a 
theory of intergenerational mutuality. Conversely, were the rare metal an essential 
technological component that could save millions of lives, then the rationale behind melting 
the collection down would be altogether more justifiable – albeit in a way that acknowledges 
that however great the gain, something of value would be being lost. Obviously, a theory of 
justice is not designed to adjudicate on specific cases of this type, however, this example 
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hopefully captures the core intuition behind the idea. As before, the goal of the savings process 
is to safeguard the social bases of self-respect within the intergenerational context. By linking 
posthumous interests to the social bases of self-respect we can, therefore, incorporate them into 
the theory in a way which avoids affording asymmetrical power to earlier generations and 
prevents onerous burdens being placed on posterity. 
 
5.3 Posthumous Interests, The Just Savings Principle, and the Social Bases of Self-Respect 
 
The theory of intergenerational mutuality conceives of discrete generations as participants in a 
series of broadly symmetrical exchanges: earlier generations save on behalf of their successors, 
and later ones respect and, in some cases, actively promote the projects and interests of their 
forebears. It is, however, an unavoidable fact that these interactions involve very different 
goods flowing in either direction. We therefore need to consider how the stock of capital goods 
that the present generation will pass on to their immediate descendants relates to those 
posthumous interests that later generations can promote on behalf of their antecedents. The 
concern, in brief, is that the goods being exchanged between generations are simply too 
dissimilar to ground the distributive obligations in question. Indeed, the comparatively diffuse 
nature of ‘lifetime-transcending’ interests is what ultimately led Janna Thompson to abandon 
her attempt to incorporate them into the original position.161 My strategy in this regard has been 
to incorporate posthumous interests into the social bases of self-respect. That, however, only 
serves to prompt the question of how posthumous interests relate to the social bases of self-
respect. The proposed correspondence between the just savings principle, posthumous 
interests, and the social bases of self-respect could, for instance, be radically dissimilar in either 
                                                        
161 Janna Thompson, Intergenerational Justice: Rights and Responsibilities in an Intergenerational Polity (New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2009) p. 52. 
 138 
instance. The argument in favour of intergenerational mutuality would therefore lose much of 
its cogency. Consequently, in this section, I want to argue that the goods flowing in either 
direction are of a broadly comparable nature from the perspective of justice. To that end, I 
intend to establish a correspondence between the just savings principle and the honouring of 
posthumous interests as they relate to a person’s capacity to develop and act upon a conception 
of the good. In this regard, my argument against the claim can be understood to take the insights 
found in the previous section and integrate them into the analysis of the just savings principle 
in the previous chapter. 
 
Within the confines of the contract approach, primary goods are understood to have universal 
appeal to rational parties. At its most basic, the idea is that however divergent and 
incommensurable our individual conceptions of the good will be, we will require primary 
goods if we are to develop and act upon them.162 It is for this reason that the goods transferred 
through an intergenerational savings process and those that might be promoted by honouring 
the posthumous interests of our forebears must ultimately relate back to the metric of primary 
goods. After all, those goods could, ultimately, be put to manifold ends: what matters from the 
perspective of justice is that they possess the essential characteristic of being desirable 
irrespective of one’s ultimate goals. In arguing for the just savings principle over its 
competitors, I suggested that an appeal to the social bases of self-respect could explain its being 
selected ahead of rival savings principle in the original position. Similarly, I have argued that 
the honouring of posthumous interests are best understood through the prism of the social bases 
of self-respect. That, however, is not sufficient evidence to state that there is an equivalence 
between the goods being exchanged in this way: one, for instance, might be intimately bound 
to the social bases of self-respect, whilst the other is only tangentially related to it. 
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Consequently, we need to recap the arguments linking both to the same primary good. Recall 
that posthumous interests are associated with the social bases of self-respect owing to their 
centrality to certain conceptions of the good: were the curator to assume that her collection 
would be disbanded at the point of her death, then it is highly likely that her major lifelong 
project would, in some sense, be destabilised. The honouring of posthumous interests therefore 
enables people to develop and act upon conceptions of the good that may otherwise appear 
futile. The just savings principle, by way of comparison, was linked to the social bases of self-
respect on the grounds that generations ought to bequeath a comparable amount of capital to 
their successors as they received from their forebears. To elaborate on this, it was suggested 
that an earlier generation who acted in a particularly profligate manner – to the detriment of 
their successors – would visit certain psychological strains on their descendants whose ability 
to develop and act upon their own conceptions of the good could be compromised. There is, 
then, a congruence between the two arguments: honouring the posthumous interests of prior 
generations and transferring an appropriate stock of capital to later ones both relate to the social 
bases of self-respect via their impact on the capacity of individuals to develop and act upon a 
conception of the good. To that extent, these seemingly disparate goods may be comparable 
from the perspective of justice. 
 
There is, however, is an obvious rejoinder to this line of argument: as I have acknowledged, 
the number of people whose conceptions of the good relate so closely to their posthumous 
interests could be fairly limited, whereas in the argument for the just savings principle, an entire 
population may be affected. I, however, would disagree with this analysis: if we are to take 
Rawls’s commentary on the strains and commitment seriously, then we ought to be alive to the 
harms that can visited on individuals in this way; indeed, they may be especially acute if the 
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group in question is few in number.163 Imagine, for instance, that the burdens of the previous 
generation’s imprudence fall disproportionately on the worst-off group within the successor 
generation: if anything, the psychological harms being envisaged may be rendered more 
deleterious by virtue of their relative isolation from the rest of society. More pointedly, from 
the perspective of the original position, numerical impact ought to have no standing: however 
rare the features of a given conception of the good may be, the parties – being unaware of their 
overarching goals and projects in life – would have to err on the side of caution and assume 
that they may, in some way, be dependent on future generations who will respect their 
posthumous interests. For this reason, I contend that despite the qualitative differences between 
the goods in question, they are, from the perspective of justice, convergent. The honouring of 
posthumous interests and the transfer of capital goods in accordance with the just savings 
principle both serve to safeguard the social bases of self-respect, allowing individuals to 
develop and act upon conceptions of the good that would otherwise prove unattainable or futile. 
For this reason, I conclude that we are warranted in viewing the transfers between generations 
as symmetrical from the perspective of justice.  
 
5.4 Historical Non-Compliance and Enforcement 
 
Having dealt with posthumous interests, we can now proceed to examine those concerns 
relating to historical non-compliance and enforcement. In order to explicate the theory of 
intergenerational mutuality, we have, thus far, assumed that each generation will be fully 
compliant with the demands of justice. In practice, however, generations may fall short of their 
obligations, and this is significant in two ways. Firstly, we need to know what effect non-
compliance would have on the scheme itself: it may, for instance, have the potential to 
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undermine or perhaps even bring an end to reciprocal interaction between generations. 
Secondly, we need to consider what methods of enforcement later generations could employ 
to sanction historical non-compliance. This latter question is particularly troubling because the 
obvious method of enforcement available to subsequent generations involves their refusing to 
honour the posthumous interests of their non-compliant forebears; however, that has the 
potential to collapse the scheme in its entirety. After all, one of the central ideas within the 
theory of intergenerational mutuality is that generations are, at once, recipients of a bequest 
and the guarantors of posthumous interests: if the present generation cannot fulfil these roles, 
then the chain of obligation linking past, present, and future generations breaks down. This is 
of consequence from the perspective of the mutuality problem because, as Heyd notes, the 
parties to the original position require assurances that acts of non-compliance will be met with 
credible sanctions.164 Consequently, the absence of viable enforcement mechanisms within the 
intergenerational context threatens the very idea of intergenerational mutuality. This is 
especially concerning because the sanctions available to later generations become increasingly 
drastic as non-compliance becomes more and more pervasive. It is for this reason that I have 
chosen to tackle these two issues simultaneously: in cases of widespread non-compliance, the 
only viable sanctions available to later generations threaten the reciprocal scheme itself. In 
order to respond to this, I will begin by looking at instances of limited non-compliance – where 
viable methods of enforcement are available – before moving on to examine wholesale non-
compliance. In those instances, I will concede that the only sanctions available to later 
generations will bring about the collapse of the scheme. However, I will then argue that this is 
not a problem because those generations who have to employ such sanctions would restart the 
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scheme. Consequently, credible mechanisms of enforcement are available to subsequent 
generations, and the theory of intergenerational mutuality can meet Heyd’s challenge. 
 
We will begin, then, by looking at how the scheme might deal with instances of limited non-
compliance. Suppose, for instance, that a prior generation has failed to fulfil certain obligations 
toward their successors, but not in such a way as to warrant draconian sanctions. In that case, 
we can conceive of the later generation having the ability to partially resile from their 
obligations to honour the posthumous interests of their predecessors. To elaborate on this, 
consider Gosseries’s metaphor of the castle which is representative of a political society over 
time.165 In keeping with the wider theory of intergenerational mutuality, let us assume that each 
generation represents a separate group of individuals who own and occupy the castle for a set 
period of time. Suppose now, that this is castle is filled with innumerable projects and 
undertakings carried out by previous residents – some of these may be trivial, but others will 
have had enormous significance to the people in question. During their tenure, the cohort can 
use the castle as they fit, so long as they leave it in as good a condition as they received it – the 
just savings principle, when applied this example – and show an appropriate degree of respect 
toward the extant projects of previous inhabitants. In return, they can contribute projects of 
their own to the castle. Now, for the sake of the argument, let us imagine that one group of 
occupants arrive to find that the previous inhabitants have left the castle in a state of minor 
disrepair. In those circumstances, it would be reasonable to assume that the projects of the non-
compliant former residents would not be owed the same degree of respect as they might have 
otherwise had. Notice, however, that this sanctioning mechanism does not require the practices 
which regulate occupancy in the castle to break down: the new residents are not required to 
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expunge every project inherited from their predecessors. In much the same way, we can 
conceive of limited non-compliance in the intergenerational context being dealt with similarly: 
later generations can still observe the general practice of honouring the posthumous interests 
of the predecessors, albeit in a less vigourous and somewhat attenuated manner. Indeed, at the 
level of a political society we can – and frequently do – choose to impede certain projects 
inherited from our forebears whilst upholding others. In ideal circumstances, the project being 
hampered would be closely associated with the act of historical non-compliance. However, 
even in circumstances where this is not possible, the fact remains that later generations can 
sanction their ancestors in cases of limited non-compliance. As we will now see, though, the 
forms of sanction on offer to later generations become increasingly ruinous as non-compliance 
becomes more widespread. 
 
Widespread non-compliance poses a unique challenge to a theory of intergenerational 
mutuality for the simple reason that it is not possible to sanction earlier generations without 
collapsing the reciprocal scheme. To illustrate the nature of the problem, let us return to 
Gosseries’s castle. Now suppose that our cohort arrives to find the castle in a state of absolute 
dilapidation as a direct result of the previous residents’ disregard for future occupants. In these 
circumstances, the only adequate form of sanction would involve showing a comparable 
disregard for the projects that the non-compliant residents had left behind. As we have 
discussed, though, this would spell the end of the practices which, up until that point, had 
regulated occupancy within the castle. There may, however, be an additional question which 
is worthy of consideration: would the new cohort abandon the castle, or might they be willing 
to restore it and start the process over again? If the ability to memorialise their achievements 
and pass their projects on is as important as I have argued, then they would have strong reasons 
to prefer the latter option. Indeed, in this respect, there is a clear parallel with our earlier 
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discussion of the first generation who initiate those practices associated with intergenerational 
mutuality. Recall, that this initial generational cohort receive no inheritance from their 
predecessors but have reasons of their own to start the process of intergenerational savings: 
they have a general interest in bringing about fair intergenerational norms and a more specific 
one in furthering their posthumous interests. On the basis of that analysis, we can infer that any 
generation who has to collapse one particular iteration of the scheme to punish compliance 
would seek to revive it. Indeed, in this respect, it is helpful to consider an analogy with political 
societies: over time, they reconstitute themselves through processes of comprehensive reform 
or revolution. In much the same way, we can interpret the process of winding up the reciprocal 
scheme in response to widespread non-compliance as something which may very well happen 
within a wider system of intergenerational cooperation. However, so long as the generation 
who have to administer this sanction are willing to restart the process, then this is 
unproblematic. So much to say, then, that intergenerational mutuality endures even if specific 
iterations of the indirect reciprocal scheme come to an end. From this, we can conclude that 
effective enforcement mechanisms are present with the theory and that, as a consequence, the 
parties to the original position can be assured that non-compliance will be met with sanctions. 
 
5.5 The First Generation, Non-Compliance, and Reciprocity 
 
At this point, we have addressed the four objections set out in Section 1 and demonstrated the 
resilience of intergenerational mutuality in the face of such criticism. It would, however, be 
remiss not to acknowledge that in the process of responding to these lines of argument a further 
tension has emerged. As we have seen, generational cohorts are able to sanction widespread 
non-compliance because even if the scheme collapses, they will have reasons to reconstitute it. 
That, however, jars with the reciprocal norms which undergird the wider theory of 
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intergenerational mutuality. If, for instance, generations have their own independent reasons to 
transfer capital to the next generation, then we have to question whether or not the scheme is 
characterised by reciprocity in the way that has been suggested. Suppose, for instance, that 
generations are simply engaged in a process of intergenerational saving to further their own 
interests: although the pattern of transfers might have the appearance of reciprocal interaction, 
it would be wholly inaccurate to characterise it as such. In this final section, I therefore want 
to respond to this in two ways: firstly, I will elucidate the motives of the parties by appealing 
to the idea of strong reciprocity; and secondly, I will explain why, in ordinary circumstances, 
the logic of intergenerational reciprocity would take precedent over these reasons. In this way, 
it will reconcile the independent motivations of generations outside of the scheme with indirect 
reciprocal interaction within it.  
 
In order to meet this challenge, my first line of response will be to suggest that there is strong 
reciprocal content in the motives of the first generation. In this way, it will be possible to push 
back against the claim that reciprocal obligations are only possible within the context of an 
establish institutional arrangement. To appreciate how this is possible, it would be helpful to 
revisit our discussion of strong and weak forms of reciprocity in the previous chapter. Recall 
that strong reciprocal interaction revolves around the maintenance and reinforcement of social 
norms: an action can have reciprocal content even if it yields no future benefits. These 
interactions are ‘reciprocal’ to the extent that they strengthen social norms from which we all 
benefit. Consequently, if saving on behalf of future generations is considered a ‘fair’ or ‘just’ 
course of action, then it would have reciprocal content. The payoff, in this context, consists in 
the reinforcement of those distributive norms which regulate a society’s major social 
institutions. Consequently, even outside of an established institutional arrangement, the 
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decision of any first generation to save on behalf of their successors can have reciprocal 
content. 
 
Those generations who initiate the savings process can, therefore, be doing so on a reciprocal 
basis. That, however, leaves open the problem of overdetermination within the scheme of 
reciprocal interaction. To outline, generations may have more than one reason to participate in 
a savings process and to further the posthumous interests of their forebears: unless the logic of 
intergenerational reciprocity prevails over these additional motives, then the scheme rests upon 
shaky ground. What, in other words, is the factor which hands primacy to these reciprocal 
obligations in the intergenerational context? To answer this, it would be helpful to revisit our 
prior discussion of the just savings principle and social bases of self-respect. There, it was 
argued that the just savings principle emerges over its competitors by virtue of its status as a 
guarantor of the social bases of self-respect. Elsewhere, we have discussed the corresponding 
relationship between the honouring of posthumous interests and the social bases of self-respect.  
The reciprocal arrangement between generations is therefore closely associated with the 
promotion and safeguarding of what Rawls famously considered to be ‘perhaps the most 
important primary good,’ without which our ability to develop and act upon a conception of 
the good is greatly reduced.166 To elaborate, any generation finding itself in the position of 
having to initiate a savings process does so from a disadvantageous position: their predecessors 
were either incapable of making an equitable bequest toward them or failed to comply with the 
demands of justice. Thus, while they may have strong, independent reasons to save for future 
generations, they do so from a position of relative hardship. By way of contrast, a generation 
whose predecessors have complied will receive a fair bequest from their predecessors – which, 
as we have argued, is conducive to the self-respect of the people who comprise that generation. 
                                                        
166 Rawls, Theory p. 348. 
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Moreover, they will be able to make a full contribution to the scheme by saving for their 
successors and honouring the posthumous interests of their ancestors. In summary, appreciable 
benefits can be derived from relating to past and future generations on an equitable basis. For 
this reason, the reciprocal logic that was outlined in the previous chapter will take precedence 
over those independent rationales for saving. Under normal circumstances, therefore, the 




To conclude, this chapter has demonstrated that the theory of intergenerational mutuality is 
able to withstand the four major internal objections to it. In Sections 2 and 3, the incorporation 
of posthumous interests into the contract method was defended with reference to the social 
bases of self-respect. Indeed, the relationship between this specific primary good, posthumous 
interests, and the just savings principle has been one of the major threads running through this 
chapter. As we have seen, there is a symmetry between the honouring of posthumous interests 
and the just savings principle which can be explained with reference to the social bases of self-
respect: in outline, both can be understood to safeguard and promote them within the 
intergenerational context. In Section 4, attention turned to the ability of the reciprocal scheme 
to reconstitute itself in the event of widespread non-compliance. Then, in Section 5 we were 
able to draw these narrative threads together to further explicate the nature of intergenerational 
reciprocity. In this regard, we ought to acknowledge the centrality of the social bases of self-
respect to the wider theory of intergenerational mutuality: they are the primary good which, on 
a contractualist analysis, makes the wider system of cooperation between generations both 
possible and necessary. In the final analysis, then, a deeper understanding of mutuality as it 
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applies within the intergenerational context allows for a richer appreciation of two of the central 





In the introductory chapter, I identified two problems which militate against the extension of 
contractualism to the intergenerational context: the non-identity and mutuality problems, 
respectively. To that end, this thesis has proceeded in two distinct phases. In Part I, I 
demonstrated that the non-identity problem can be overcome in a manner that is entirely 
consistent with the contract method: by distinguishing wronging from harming, we can object 
to the non-identity cases whilst retaining a person-affecting approach to questions of morality 
and justice. In addition, I suggested that we could use such a framework to establish our 
humanitarian obligations toward future generations, on the grounds that they will have rights. 
I began Part II with a critical assessment of the universal contract approach. In turn, this 
allowed me to demonstrate the preferability of an account grounded in reciprocity – and, by 
implication, the centrality of the mutuality problem to the thesis as a whole. To that end, a 
theory of intergenerational mutuality was expounded in Chapter 4. As against the claim that 
the intergenerational context is devoid of mutuality, I demonstrated that there is a very real 
sense in which we are vulnerable to posterity: many of our major life projects and conceptions 
of the good are dependent on the compliance of future generations in a wider system of 
intergenerational cooperation. To illustrate how this insight could be incorporated into the 
contract approach, I suggested that this form of mutually advantageous cooperation had 
significance from the perspective of stability and the social bases of self-respect: consequently, 
mutually disinterested parties would be minded to specify an intergenerational savings 
principle in the original position. Having outlined the theory of intergenerational mutuality, I 
then proceeded to examine Brian Barry’s objection to indirect reciprocity as a basis for 
obligations at the intergenerational level. In meeting the justificatory challenge, I was able to 
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give an indication of the explanatory potential of intergenerational mutuality in our 
deliberations on what is owed to future generations. Finally, I considered objections to 
intergenerational mutuality and, by responding to them drew attention to two fundamental 
aspects of the theory: firstly, the centrality of the social bases of self-respect to our 
understanding of indirect reciprocal interaction between generations; and secondly, the ability 
of the scheme to reconstitute itself in extreme circumstances. 
 
Intergenerational mutuality is, then, the idea at the heart of this thesis. The claim, in 
summary, is that past and future generations are reliant on one another’s cooperation in order 
to secure certain essential goods. To that end, I have taken an account of lifetime-
transcending interests from the works of Janna Thompson and Samuel Scheffler and married 
it to the Rawlsian concept of the social bases of self-respect in order to locate it within the 
contractualist framework. If my analysis is correct, then much theorising on the subject of 
intergenerational justice rests on a falsehood: that relations between past, present, and future 
generations can never exhibit or be characterised by mutuality. That, of course, is not to say 
that the concept of intergenerational mutuality can single-handedly resolve the myriad 
problems that arise in the intergenerational context. Instead, it would be better to think of it as 
allowing for a richer and more varied understanding of intergenerational cooperation. To that 
extent, then, it should be seen as an important and significant step toward a better 
understanding of our relations at the intergenerational level. I would also want to suggest that 
there is a distinctly practical element to a concept like intergenerational mutuality, in at least 
two regards: firstly, by emphasising the mutual dependence that obtains between generations, 
it might reasonably be hoped that it can motivate us to take a greater interest in the question 
of justice between generations. Secondly, though, it raises the question of what, if anything, 
could be done to promote the sense of mutuality between generations. Given the exigent need 
 151 
to confront issues such as climate change, appeals to our dependence on future generations – 
and, for that matter, on there being a future at all – may yet prove to be an effective spur to 
action. 
 
It would, of course, be remiss not to reflect on the limitations of this thesis – and the 
prospects for further research. I therefore want to attend to three separate issues in the wider 
intergenerational context. The first of these relates to my decision to focus specifically on 
distributive justice. As I stated in my introductory chapter, a theory of fair shares is but one 
part of a much broader theory of relational or social egalitarianism. It would, therefore, be 
interesting to see how a concept like intergenerational mutuality might be applied in related 
subject areas. In this respect, the relationship between indirect reciprocity and the more 
substantive concept of environmental stewardship described by Edward A. Page, along with 
Dominic Welburn’s recent work linking stewardship to a conception of Rawlsian political 
liberalism would a represent a promising point of departure.167 Secondly, although I stand by 
my decision to limit the scope of this enquiry to the question of justice and future 
generations, a comprehensive theory of intergenerational mutuality will need to take account 
of our obligations toward our predecessors. This could – and, to my mind, should – seek to 
extend the concept of intergenerational mutuality to the realm of reparative justice. In that 
way, we could look to extend intergenerational mutuality to non-ideal theory. Finally, by 
virtue of the fact that issues like global warming are international in scope, it would be 
interesting to consider how a concept like intergenerational mutuality might be applied at the 
international-cum-global level. As I suggested in my discussion of the problem of scope in 
Chapter 4, a theory of intergenerational mutuality could engender obligations based on a 
                                                        
167 Edward A. Page, ‘Fairness on the Day after Tomorrow: Justice, Reciprocity and Global Climate Change’, 
Political Studies 55 (2007): 225-42 pp. 232-8; Dominic Welburn, ‘Rawlsian Environmental Stewardship and 
Intergenerational Justice’, Environmental Ethics 36(4) (2014): 387-404. 
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number of distributive norms. I am therefore minded to think that it could be incorporated 
into a number of institutionalist approaches.  
 
The idea of intergenerational mutuality is, then, a one with manifold applications in a number 
of contexts. Given its explanatory and motivational potential, my hope would be that it might 
evolve into a broader theory linking theory and practice. At this early juncture, however, that 
must be read as little more than a speculative aside. For our present purposes, the salient 
conclusion to draw from this enquiry is that the mutuality problem very possibly rests on a 
misconception. To the extent that it has proven to be an impediment to theories of 
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